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Abstract 
Avery Brundage became President of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) 
in 1952, ready to lead the IOC according to the vision of its modern founder, Pierre de 
Coubertin. One of the IOC’s challenges during Brundage’s tenure as President involved 
the participation of South Africa in the Olympic Movement and Olympic Games. Racial 
discrimination and segregation, known as apartheid, was rampant in South Africa 
because of governmental laws and policies. These discriminatory practices, which 
were ingrained in the South African National Olympic Committee (SANOC), conflicted 
with principles laid down in the Olympic Charter, especially Article 1 forbidding racial 
discrimination. Due to pressure from the international community, the IOC opposed 
apartheid by suspending South Africa from the 1964 Tokyo and 1968 Mexico City 
Olympic Games through IOC policy and procedure, which eventually led to South 
Africa’s expulsion from the IOC, Olympic Games, and Olympic Movement in 1970. 
This dissertation explored the debates and correspondence of important actors 
within the IOC and the Olympic Movement from 1955 to 1968, in the context of the 
organization's discussion of South Africa's controversial place in the Olympic 
Movement and Olympic Games. A reconstructionist approach was adopted to examine 
the relationship between the IOC and SANOC, by investigating specifically the 
correspondence of key actors in a network of exchanges that centred on Brundage 
and the IOC. Perspectives and strategies of the actors in this network were traced. The 
analysis identified three ‘dominant voices’ in this debate: (1) South African Olympic 
affiliates; (2) domestic resistance; and (3) a concerned international sport 
community. Furthermore, three factors that guided the decision-making of the IOC 
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when determining South Africa’s participation in the Olympic Games emerged: (1) 
IOC rules and regulations; (2) IOC structure and protocol; and, (3) the IOC’s stance to 
remain a neutral party in domestic political issues. This in-depth investigation into 
the thinking of these central and influential actors contributes a new dimension to our 
understanding of the IOC’s approach to the South African controversy, and the events 
leading to South Africa’s expulsion. 
 
Keywords: Avery Brundage, Olympic Games, International Olympic Committee, South 
Africa, Apartheid.  
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Chapter One:  
Avery Brundage, the IOC, and South 
African Race Politics 
1. Introduction 
As the fifth President of the International Olympic Committee (IOC), and the only 
non-European to have held the office to date, Avery Brundage steered the 
international growth of the organization by expanding its reach to Africa, Latin 
America, and Asia.1 Although the Western world still had firm control of the IOC 
during his tenure as President (1952-1972), the percentage of Europeans and North 
Americans elected to IOC membership declined by 13.8%. The percentage of Africans 
and Latin Americans increased by 11.3%. The total number of participating Olympic 
nations rose to 127 by his retirement in 1972.2 
This expansion also created new political issues and challenges for the IOC and the 
nations represented in it. In particular, the IOC’s increasing reach in Africa brought 
the issue of the organization’s position on racism in sports to the forefront, 
particularly concerning the racial politics of South Africa. Here Brundage played an 
influential role in shaping the relationship between the IOC and South Africa when the 
issue of apartheid first arose in the 1950s. The position of Brundage in these 
developments has been generally summarized. What has not been made explicit and 
examined in detail are the specific strategies, actions, interventions, and interactions 
that characterized Brundage’s position on these issues, during the crucial time period 
from 1956 to 1968. 
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1.1 Avery Brundage and the IOC’s Position on Race and Sport 
Reflecting on the man behind the IOC presidency could provide some introductory 
insights into the understanding Brundage brought to the management of 
controversies during his term in office. Born in Detroit on 28 September 1887, 
Brundage had a humble upbringing.3 His family eventually moved to Chicago where 
he was raised by his mother. He attended the University of Illinois to become a civil 
engineer. During his adolescent and university years, Brundage participated in 
multiple sports, eventually gravitating towards track and field where he specialized 
in multiple events. He eventually competed in the 1912 Olympic Games as part of the 
United States (US) pentathlon and decathlon teams, an Olympic teammate to both Jim 
Thorpe and George S. Patton.4 Subsequent to his athletic career, Brundage devoted 
himself to the development of amateur sport and its organization in America. On 20 
November 1928, Brundage was elected President of the Amateur Athletic Union, 
where he served through seven terms of office from 1929 to 1936. He served as Vice-
President of the International Amateur Athletic Federation from 1930 to 1952. On 19 
November 1930, he was elected President of the American Olympic Association, and 
following the Berlin Olympics in 1936, he replaced Ernest Lee Jahncke as a member 
of the IOC.5 He went on to become the organization’s Vice President in 1945, and its 
President in 1952.6 
Brundage emulated Pierre de Coubertin’s administrative style and shared his 
vision for the Olympic Movement, which ultimately reflected the force driving the 
direction of the IOC.7 Brundage viewed the Olympic Movement from the perspective 
of a ‘religion’ that strongly emphasized ideals of fair play, sportsmanship, and 
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amateurism.8 When Brundage spoke of the Olympic Movement, he emphasized 
competition and spectacle, but also visualized it as a gathering of individuals from 
across the world who abided by a single tenet while putting aside differences of race,9 
religion, and politics.10 He was the ultimate Olympic idealist, preached the benefits of 
being a part of the Olympic Movement,11 and was suspicious of those who held 
membership “for reasons other than allegiance to Olympism.”12 As the IOC views it 
today, Olympism’s definition should be based on Coubertin’s ideals: 
Olympism is a philosophy of life, exalting and combining in a 
balanced whole the qualities of body, will and mind. Blending sport 
with culture and education, Olympism seeks to create a way of life 
based on the joy found in effort, the educational value of good 
example and respect for universal fundamental ethical principles.13 
Aligned with this interpretation of Olympism, Brundage understood the inherent 
meaning of the Olympic Games to be: 
… a demonstration of idealism in action and as such they [the Games] 
appeal to all people of every country who hope for a better world. 
They are an enterprise, conducted by devotees, by dedicated 
individuals, who seek to demonstrate the best and the finest without 
thought of personal gain. Based on the high principles of the amateur 
code, they illustrate a system where everyone has an equal 
opportunity and where the reward is measured by the ability and the 
application of the participant – a system that is honest, fair, just, and 
so a system which meets the aspirations of all people.14 
Brundage was explicit in his emphasis on “the zeal with which the International 
Olympic Committee defends its principles and the firmness of the steps it sometimes 
has to take” to prevent becoming too “materialistic and politically driven.”15 He used 
these standards when selecting new IOC members: 
Members are co-opted and selected for their devotion to the Olympic 
Movement, their international viewpoint, their knowledge of and 
experience in amateur sport, and their independent spirit. They are 
ambassadors from the Committee to their countries. It is the man 
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and not the country that counts. Nations new to the Movement have 
insisted that they should name a ‘representative’ on the committee. 
But the Olympic Games would soon lose all their purpose if they 
were controlled by a committee composed of members striving to 
advance the interest of their own country instead of the Olympic 
Movement. Political considerations would soon prevail and blocs 
would form within the Committee, which would be incompatible 
with its rules and principles.16 
Brundage could be seen as an idealist preacher of Coubertin’s ideology of the 
Olympic Movement.17 His strong personal interpretation of Coubertin’s ideals of 
Olympism influenced his outlook and shaped the direction of the IOC’s development. 
Brundage’s insistence on an amateur, non-political, and anti-commercial Movement 
influenced his dealings when political issues such as the problem of racism and 
Olympic sports arose. 
Brundage was confronted with the issue of racial politics within the Olympic 
Games well before dealing with the apartheid issue in South Africa. Though the 1936 
Berlin Olympics were overshadowed by boycott campaigns to protest racial policies 
espoused by Hitler and the National Socialists, Brundage himself opposed boycotts, 
insisting that political issues had no place in the Olympic Movement.18 Only major 
infractions against the Olympic mission would sway Brundage from his position to 
endorse American participation in the 1936 Games.19 However, the true reasons for 
his support of the Berlin Games will always be in question because of anti-Semitic 
remarks that came to light in letters to his friends; neither was he shy in his support 
for the German government’s promotion of Nazi state physical education.20 Some 
three decades later, according to Sam Ramsamy: 
An Olympic Committee for Human Rights (OCHR) was formed to 
lobby for a black American boycott of the 1968 Olympic Games, 
openly accusing Brundage of being a racist. The committee 
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demanded the removal of Avery Brundage from his post as President 
of the International Olympic Committee. The OCHR exposed the fact 
that at the time Brundage owned the Montecito Country Club in 
Santa Barbara, California which in fact excluded Jews and Blacks 
from membership. Brundage also displayed sympathy for the white 
South African National Olympic Committee.21 
Brundage rejected the accusations of being anti-Semitic and anti-black. In a cogent 
overview, Maynard Brichford pointed out some of the race issues confronted by 
Brundage during his career; ranging from the removal of the 1920s track and field 
championships from New Orleans to employing blacks and Jews in his businesses.22 
Brundage was not averse to instigating confrontations. He, too, was not hesitant in 
defense of positions which he considered important. Thus, in response to the black 
American boycott led by Harry Edwards tied to the Mexico City Olympics, Brundage 
tellingly said, “If the American Negro Athletes boycott the Olympic Games, they won’t 
be missed.”23 This comment energized the well-known protest of Tommie Smith and 
John Carlos during the medal awards ceremony in 1968. At the same time, Brundage 
showed instances of forward-thinking leadership as indicated by the delight 
expressed in his last opening address prior to the 1972 Munich Olympic Games at 
seeing Islamic women being free to participate in sport.24  
It was true that Brundage’s life was filled with controversial episodes, and the 
Olympic Games themselves had a history of racial controversy where some 
considered the expulsion of South Africa to indicate the end of racism in the Olympic 
Movement25 while others considered the retirement of Brundage as marking the end 
of racial thinking.26 In any case, the fact that black athletes from Africa did not enter 
Olympic competitions until 195227 could be interpreted as an indicator of the IOC’s 
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ambivalent attitudes towards its policies of concerning race; an attitude that played a 
part in determining the slow pace of change in the Olympic Movement in this regard. 
Nonetheless, while dealing with the ‘South African situation’,28 Brundage and the 
IOC were confronted with other challenges. Deciding if the Nationalists in Taiwan or 
the Communists on mainland China represented the Republic of China became a 
concern in the early 1950s. How to deal with East and West Germany’s participation 
in the Olympic Games after World War II needed to be addressed throughout the 
South African situation. The problem of performance enhancement drug use became 
salient at the 1952 Winter Games at Oslo. Before the 1956 Melbourne Games, the IOC 
had to deal with the aftermath from the Suez War and Hungarian Revolution. The IOC 
had to suspend the Indonesian National Olympic Committee in 1963 for denying visas 
to Israeli and Nationalist China athletes to compete in the IOC sponsored Asian Games. 
North Korean athletes were suspended for the 1964 Tokyo Games for participating in 
the discriminatory Games of the New Emerging Forces. Due to the civil rights 
movement during the 1960s in the USA, the threat of boycott and using the Olympic 
Games as a political platform lingered. Lastly, leading up to the 1968 Mexico City 
Games, the IOC had to confront the killing of peaceful protestors by the Mexican army 
weeks before the Games.29 
Beyond world politics, the 1960s had its share of IOC organizational struggles. How 
to distribute the revenue from Olympic Games’ demanded the IOC’s attention. This 
affair changed the dynamic of the organization drastically as NOCs united to create 
the Permanent General Assembly in 1968 and ISFs founded in 1967 the General 
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Assembly of the International Federations to negotiate their respective percentages 
of the revenue.30 
Therefore, although the South African situation and racism in sport were important 
foci for Brundage and the IOC from the mid-1950s to 1970, they were two of many 
ongoing challenges that Brundage and the IOC had to resolve to maintain the integrity 
and existence of the Olympic Games.  
2. Statement of the Research Issue 
Due to pressure from the international climate, the IOC opposed apartheid by 
suspending South Africa from the 1964 Tokyo and 1968 Mexico City Olympic Games 
through IOC policy and procedure, which eventually led to South Africa’s expulsion 
from the IOC, Olympic Games, and Olympic Movement in 1970. This dissertation 
investigated the debates and correspondence of important actors within the IOC and 
the Olympic Movement, within the context of the organization's discussion of South 
Africa's controversial place in the Olympic Movement and Olympic Games.  Tracing 
the shifting positions of the IOC and those segments of the Olympic Movement 
concerned with the South African situation is the aim of this reconstruction.  This 
debate emerged in response to the rise of apartheid policies in South African society 
and sports, and it was reconstructed here through an archival investigation of the IOC 
President Avery Brundage's voluminous correspondence on the issue.  
The time frame for the investigation was defined by the issue of apartheid in South 
African Olympic sports first reaching international notoriety in the mid-1950s, to its 
intermediate conclusion with the retraction of South Africa's invitation the 1968 
Mexico City Olympics; these Games were the last that South Africa would have been 
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eligible to attend prior to its expulsion from the Olympic Movement in May 1970.  The 
focus was provided by the debates, opinions and proclamations carried on by 
important actors in the IOC in a series of exchanges with influential IOC President 
Avery Brundage at the centre.  The investigation revealed that what I refer to as the 
'three dominant voices' shaped the debate, ranging from the IOC and its South African 
affiliates, to South African domestic resistance, and parts of the international 
community interested in Olympic sports.  As the literature review indicates, such a 
detailed historical reconstruction of the South African situation between 1955 and 
1968 from the perspective of a series of exchanges centering on the leadership of the 
IOC, in particular Avery Brundage, has not been completed to-date. 
Therefore, my research contributes to the body of knowledge in two specific ways.  
First, it used the archival and historical record to trace and reconstruct specific 
positions, arguments, interventions, and actions with respect to the issue of South 
African apartheid in Olympic sports and the Olympic Movement.  From this specific 
contribution, a secondary outcome has resulted: an engagement with the study of race 
and racism in sports, with a particular focus on the race politics of South African 
sports in their connection to the Olympic Movement and Olympic Games.  Explicit 
negative racializing remarks are absent from the IOC correspondence investigated 
here, but it is clear that the IOC’s decisions in regard to South Africa’s involvement 
had racializing implications, either contributing to the effects of apartheid on South 
African sports by operating under the status quo, or by rejecting the effects of 
apartheid, as was ultimately done through the expulsion of South Africa in 1970. 
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Before proceeding to a review of the academic literature pertaining to the IOC and 
South African situation, the historical and cultural background for this study need to 
be delineated by examining the importance of sport in South African society and the 
influence exerted on that sport system by the racial politics of the South African 
regime. 
3. The Historical Context of South African Sport and 
Race Politics 
According to George Wright, the popularity of sports in South Africa could be 
attributed to a variety of reasons, “1) the country has a splendid climate; 2) there is 
an abundance of open space; and 3) there exists a relative impoverishment of other 
cultural-aesthetic outlets.”31 In addition, sport had been seen as the epitome of social 
expression and cultural dominance for the white population, thus used as a tool to 
express the superiority of a more ‘civilized’ white race32 over the black population, 
which itself adopted sport at the same time as the white population. The origin of the 
racial tensions that came to characterize sports could be traced back to the days of 
early colonial expansion, specifically to 1652 when the Dutch East India Company 
established itself in South Africa.33 After the Dutch East India Company went bankrupt 
in 1794, the British occupied the Cape, “British missionaries began to arrive, and as 
soon as the Cape was definitively annexed, in 1807, attempts were made to stimulate 
and modernize the economy.”34 During that time, sport became prevalent in South 
African society with the first ever cricket match played in 1808.35 Although sport 
interchanges across racial barriers did occur, this did not indicate equality because 
British rule was generally based on principles of racial discrimination. This was most 
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clearly expressed through the development of the Constitution of the Union of South 
Africa in 1910.36 
The constitution did not entirely prevent interracial sport and competition from 
developing between members of the non-white populations, that is, blacks and 
coloureds.37 However, by the early 1900s, segregation was encouraged because it was 
believed that segregation itself was the best way to preserve and strengthen existing 
cultures, which in South Africa meant grouping whites with whites and blacks with 
blacks. The Natives’ Land Act of 1913 limited black ownership of land to 7% of the 
country, increasing that amount to 13% in 1936.38 In 1923, the Natives (Urban Areas) 
Act established segregated living areas in cities and the Representation of Natives Act 
of 1936 further restricted African political rights in the Cape, limiting Africans to 
voting for only white representatives.39 These initiatives, though introduced by the 
British, were carried on by the (also white) Dutch-Afrikaner population in a harsher 
fashion when the British political presence waned. However, non-whites established 
political representation in 1912 when the South African Native National Congress was 
founded, which was later renamed the African National Congress in 1923.40 
During the first half for the 20th century, the black population, more so than the 
coloured population, had minimal opportunities to participate in sport. The lack of 
access to resources hindered the development of sport for the non-white four-fifths 
of the population in general.41 Thus from 1895 to 1910, it was exclusively white-only 
organizations that were admitted to international or British Empire organizations. By 
1945, not only were firm links established internationally, but some white South 
African sports leaders had assumed executive positions.42 As a founding member of 
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the International Rugby Board and the International Cricket conference, as well as 
participation in the Olympic Games since 1908, South Africa succeeded in developing 
deep roots and allies in the international sporting community.43 
The segregation of whites from blacks and coloureds deepened when the Afrikaner 
National Party came to power in 1948. “Apartheid,” an Afrikaans word meaning 
apartness, came to stand for and symbolize the new regime’s political direction.44 The 
population was classified according to physical differences and racial heritage. These 
distinctions ultimately determined the extent of legal and civic rights extended to the 
individual. They were codified through various laws in the 1940s and 1950s whose 
oppressive effects were aimed at the black population in particular.45 In 1949, the 
Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act was introduced to prevent whites from marrying 
blacks and coloureds, and a year later, the discouragement of interracial romances 
was heightened by the Immorality Act, which prohibited sexual acts between whites 
and any non-whites. Other Acts were passed in 1950 such as the Population 
Registration Act, which established mechanisms for determining and registering the 
race of all South Africans. This registration helped to control further segregation of 
races into specific geographical areas established by the Group Areas Act. The 
Suppression of Communism Act was also enacted in 1950. This particular Act was 
harmful to any advocacy for change since communism was defined as “… any scheme 
that aimed ‘at bringing about any political, industrial, social or economic change 
within the Union by the promotion of disturbance or disorder’ or that encouraged 
‘feelings of hostility between the European and the non-European races of the Union 
the consequences of which are calculated to further’ disorder.”46 In 1951, Separate 
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Representation of Voters Act reserved government official positions to white 
representatives. In 1952, Natives Laws Amendment Act restricted the length of time 
a person can remain in an urban area without a permit. In 1953, the separation of 
races became more specific with the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act, which 
forced each race to have separate amenities that did not need to be equal across races. 
The Bantu Education Act, also enacted in 1953, removed funding from various non-
white schools, and in 1959, the Extension of University Education Act prohibited 
blacks from attending white institutions of higher education.47 Due to the many racist 
Acts, Robert Archer and Antoine Bouillon noted in their important study of racism in 
South African sports:  
By savagely curtailing black access to education, urban residence, 
employment, wealth, and the freedom to associate, to travel and to 
free expression, the Nationalist Government necessarily stunted the 
natural development of sport and dealt a crippling blow to the 
attempts of black players to improve their standards of play and 
organization.48  
Thus, sports came to be another explicitly politicized area of cultural practice, but 
it was not until 25 June 1956 that the first official statement regarding sport was made 
by then Minister of the Interior, Dr. Theophilus Ebenhaezer Dönges.49 He denied that 
the government interfered with non-white sport by pointing out that sport did not fall 
under government jurisdiction. Most importantly, however, he affirmed that sport 
should be organized and practiced separately by whites and non-whites, that no 
interracial competition should occur within the country’s borders, and that racial 
integration on teams should be avoided.50 However, well before that official 
statement, white clubs and associations already practiced segregation.51 For example, 
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the South African Athletic Association erected a colour bar in 1931, ensuring that 
sports would be developed in a segregation perspective.52 
In a Bill ostensibly designed to award full independence to tribal reserves in South 
Africa in 1959, the Prime Minister, Hendrik Verwoerd, ended the possibility for black 
representation in parliament, a strategy designed to further strip blacks of political 
power in South Africa.53 Two years later, in 1961, a similarly important 
announcement came from the Minister of the Interior, Senator Jan De Klerk. On 29 
March, he announced that “the government would not approve the participation of 
mixed teams in global sporting events; that mixed teams from other nations would 
not be welcome in South Africa; and that only separate white and non-white teams 
could compete abroad in international competition.”54 
Some anticipated the possible suspension of South Africa from the Olympic 
Movement following this policy statement, especially in view of strengthened racial 
laws when South Africa became a Republic in 1961.55 However, at the subsequent IOC 
Session in Moscow, in 1962, only five members voted for immediate suspension,56 
allowing South Africa more time to mitigate the effects of apartheid policies on sport. 
In February 1963, De Klerk outlined four principles of the National Party’s sports 
policy: each racial group would form a separate controlling association in each sport, 
white associations would control the code, send representatives to the world 
federation competitions, and assist the development of black associations. Racially 
mixed teams would not represent South Africa, and sports officials would not invite 
racially mixed teams from abroad to play in the Republic.57 
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Amid those repressive developments, then, the impact of the anti-apartheid 
movement on sport had to be taken into account.58 The first challenge to apartheid 
policies in white South African sports occurred in 1946, when the non-white 
weightlifters requested recognition from the British Empire Games Weightlifting 
Federation because the officially recognized South African governing body restricted 
membership only to white weightlifters.59 Likewise, in 1947, the beginnings of an anti-
apartheid stance could be noticed when the non-racial South African Table Tennis 
Board became a recognized affiliate of the International Table Tennis Federation 
(ITTF). At the same time, ITTF refused to acknowledge the white African Table Tennis 
Union.60 In a similar vein in 1955, Dennis Brutus61 raised the issue of discrimination 
in South African sport for the first time in the Olympic Movement.62  
Such actions, however, foundered on the IOC’s membership policies, since only one 
specific National Sports Federation (NSF) per country could be represented at the 
National Olympic Committee (NOC) level and cases of divergence of opinion with the 
IOC were referred back to the NOC, which in the case of the SANOC was dominated by 
whites. This created a near unsurmountable obstacle for black athletes.63 In South 
Africa, whites, therefore, completely controlled access to international selection and 
competition. Although Avery Brundage advocated as early as 1958 for a form of dual 
representation from the white and black federations in order to create a national 
team, his suggestion was never seriously considered by the white federations and 
SANOC.64 Nonetheless, during the 1950s, the black athletic community began to build 
a voice against apartheid in sport, aided and abetted by other NOCs, NSFs, and 
International Sports Federations (ISF). 
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The 1950s were important years for the anti-apartheid movement as many 
organizations and key relationships began to develop.65 An international appeal 
opposing apartheid was signed by 123 world leaders on 10 December 1957.66 The 
South African Sports Association (SASA), formed in 1958, quickly grew to include over 
70,000 black sportsmen and women.67 This first non-racial sports organization, 
originated from a meeting of black sports federations arranged by Brutus, was closed 
down by police and government representatives.68 Brutus himself became the target 
of an extended harassment campaign.69 In May 1959, SASA sent a memorandum to 
the IOC indicating the failure of SANOC to comply with the Olympic Charter.70 Also 
during 1959, the anti-apartheid sport movement received support from Soviet 
representatives.71 The IOC was asked by the Soviets to ban South Africa from the 
Olympic Games on the basis of its apartheid policies72 and SANOC’s lack of active 
pursuit of fulfilling the Olympic Charter rules for participation, in particular, the 
stipulations laid down in Articles 1 and 24.73 Article 1 addressed the rejection of 
participation based on race, religion, or political affiliation. Article 24 enjoined NOCs 
to enforce all IOC rules and regulations, including Article 1 of the Olympic Charter.74 
Responding to the Soviet initiative, Reginald Honey, the South African IOC 
representative, gave assurances that all athletes entered by SANOC would be issued 
passports for competition travel. What Honey omitted to point out was that the 
likelihood of non-white athletes being entered by the South African Committee was 
nil.  
Brundage’s awareness of the political explosiveness of the apartheid issue before 
the formal request for South Africa’s expulsion in 1959 was fortuitous for SANOC.75 
16 
 
 
The question of black athletic opportunity in South Africa was raised by Brundage 
three years earlier with then SANOC Secretary Ira Emery.76 Emery’s initial response 
was not positive and there was evidence in an April 1958 letter to Emery that 
Brundage tried to make recommendations to be proactive in order to pre-empt the 
eventual attention this issue would attract on the international stage.77 SASA tried to 
lobby the IOC to put pressure on SANOC to integrate black athletes, but Brundage 
stood firm in his belief that the IOC should not get involved in member nations’ 
domestic affairs.78 All Brundage sought was an affirmation from SANOC that it would 
do its utmost to abide by the Olympic Charter. Although SASA tried to combat the racial 
discrimination issue by working with the IOC and SANOC, it was difficult for the latter 
organizations even to acknowledge SASA’s concerns.79 However, in tune with the 
initial Soviet backing, support for more open African sport systems also came from 
fellow Socialist countries such as Hungary, Poland, and Yugoslavia. In addition, 
support was registered by western European countries such as Italy, Belgium and 
France.80  
The horrific Sharpeville and Langa massacres of March 1960 added to the political 
urgency of the issue. Sixty-nine people were killed and hundreds wounded when 
police opened fire on a nonviolent demonstration.81 Both the African National 
Congress and Pan-Africanist Congress were banned, as well as new laws that 
“reinforced official powers of repression: it became legal to detain suspects for up to 
90 days without trial or judicial control, subsequently to 180 days (in 1965), then one 
year, then one year indefinitely renewable.”82 
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This event received international attention and significantly increased the 
awareness of the apartheid situation in South Africa. SASA subsequently transformed 
into the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (SAN-ROC) in 1962, which 
integrated the black and coloured organizations in South Africa.83 This coincided with 
the formation of the African bloc nations into a major anti-apartheid, proactive force 
against white South Africa.84 The development of the African bloc nations began after 
World War II during the postcolonial era. According to Philip Bell, three crucial events 
stood out between 1945 and the early 1960s, which changed the African landscape: 
(1) the Algerian War of 1954-62; (2) the increase of African state representation on 
the United Nations by 1962; and, (3) the attention garnered by the apartheid conflict 
in South Africa.85 
In the area of sport, increased representation in the IOC and participation in the 
Games in conjunction with support from the Eastern bloc allies gave added power to 
this growing African bloc. Sport provided an international stage to voice political 
statements against South Africa. Brundage, because of his understanding of the 
Olympic Movement as non-political,86 was not happy with such statements.  
By the 1960s, joining the white establishment in South Africa became a possibility 
for the black and coloured associations and federations. This courtesy extended by 
the whites created the appearance of political change, but it did nothing to alter the 
balance of power between the dominant white minority and the black majority; non-
white organizations remained in a subservient role.87 As the 1964 Tokyo Olympics 
approached, the political pressure on SANOC to abide by the Olympic Charter 
increased, especially with regard to Articles 1 and 24.88 SANOC ultimately was found 
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to be in contravention of these principles, and South Africa’s invitation to the Tokyo 
Olympics was withdrawn. African delegates even threatened to walk out of a 1965 
NOC Assembly in Rome if South African representative Honey were admitted.89 
Nonetheless, in an ongoing attempt to establish a balance suitable for the IOC, 
Brundage continued to welcome new African NOCs into the IOC, even though he 
feared that the new member nations would use their positions in the Movement to 
achieve political objectives, especially since sport in ‘new’ African nations was closely 
aligned with their respective governments.90 Brundage’s concerns about the new 
members’ political actions were confirmed through the founding of the Supreme 
Council for Sport in Africa (SCSA) in 1966. Although its “general purpose was 
coordination and promotion of sport throughout Africa … its specific objective was 
the attack against South African apartheid in sport.”91 SCSA not only wanted ISFs and 
NSFs to cut ties with South Africa, but also encouraged boycotts of all major 
competitions attended by South Africa.92 In addition, the United Nations (UN), in 1966, 
deemed apartheid a crime against humanity.93 However, many ISFs maintained the 
status quo during the 1950s and 1960s. For the exception of the ITTF banning the 
white table tennis NSF in 1956 and the International Amateur Boxing Association 
expelling South Africa in 1968, most South African NSFs benefited from international 
affiliation until 1970 and beyond.94  
As a proactive measure aimed at securing admittance to the 1968 Olympic Games 
in Mexico City, SANOC President Frank Braun announced the following concessions: 
(1) South Africa would send a mixed team to the Games, (2) all 
members would march under the same flag and wear the same 
colors, (3) South Africans of different racial groups would compete 
against each other at the Games, and (4) a non-white Olympic 
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committee would be formed and each racial group would designate 
its candidates for selection.95 
Following Braun’s statement, Prime Minister Vorster reaffirmed that apartheid 
would still be enforced domestically. To avoid a backlash, Braun tried to expedite 
South Africa’s acceptance to the Mexico City Olympics. If the IOC did not accept the 
terms immediately, Braun feared the concessions would be stalled and then reversed 
upon the South African Olympic team’s arrival at the Games. Upon receiving Braun’s 
statement, the African bloc, led by the President of the Ethiopian Olympic Committee, 
announced a boycott of the Games if South Africa were to be present.96 Brundage 
affirmed that a decision would be made at an upcoming IOC Session, after a 
commission consisting of Lord Killanin of Ireland, Sir Adetokunbo Ademola of Nigeria, 
and Reginald Alexander of Kenya had visited South Africa. The commission was given 
instructions by Brundage not to become involved in political matters.97 The 
commission’s report categorically found that South Africa was not in compliance with 
Olympic principles.98 Nonetheless, the Western-dominated IOC still favoured South 
African participation in the Mexico City Olympic Games. This decision did not sit well 
with the African bloc, SCSA, and SAN-ROC. A boycott was organized that included fifty 
countries which threatened to withdraw if South Africa were allowed to participate.99 
After a brief personal visit to South Africa, Brundage held a meeting to vote on a 
retraction of the invitation to South Africa. In a vote on 21 April 1968, the IOC 
supported retraction by a 47 to 16 vote.100 In an attempt to avoid the overt 
politicization of the issue, the IOC rationalized its decision out of a concern for safety 
issues, rather than on the basis of a violation of the Olympic Movement’s principles.101 
Brutus, however, offered insight into SANOC’s actual political strategies: 
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Frequently it is said that South Africa had undertaken to send, for the 
first time, a truly representative team which would include non-
whites. This is not the whole truth. There are documents to show 
that the offer made by the [South African National Olympic 
Committee] was in fact a conditional one, that only those non-whites 
who were prepared to accept apartheid in sport would be 
considered for selection. It was this condition that caused the 
majority of the non-white sportsmen to reject the offer and it was 
the knowledge of this that enabled General Clark, President of the 
Mexican Olympic Committee, to decline to follow the IOC’s order to 
issue South Africa an invitation.102 
Subsequent to the exclusion of South Africa from the 1968 Games, the United 
Nations (UN) also placed the issue of South African apartheid and sport on its agenda. 
The UN General Assembly passed its first resolution on 2 December 1968, and 
subsequent resolutions were extensions of this initial resolution.103 Although non-
binding, the UN resolutions enhanced the legitimacy of the anti-apartheid movement 
and provided an added rationale for those who protested against South Africa.104 The 
increasing international pressure led to the expulsion of South Africa from the 
Olympic Movement in Amsterdam in May 1970, with a vote of 35 to 28, and 3 
abstentions.105 Led by SCSA’s secretary-general Jean-Claude Ganga (Congo) and 
President Abraham Ordia (Nigeria), SCSA was an influential voice when the IOC made 
the decision to terminate South Africa’s membership.106 
The expulsion of South Africa from the Olympic Movement registered both 
supporters as well as opponents. On one side, there were the traditional conservative 
Western IOC members and Avery Brundage, who gave South Africa the benefit of the 
doubt on the issue. On the other side was the alliance of Communist states and Third 
World countries who vowed to eliminate South Africa from the IOC. The position of 
the Communist and Third World alliance continued to strengthen as more nations 
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were admitted to the Olympic organization, which, as much as he welcomed them, 
caused Brundage concerns since he feared the increasing politicization of the 
movement.107 Brundage, fearing intrusion of domestic politics, or, for that matter any 
kind of politics, was reluctant to trust the motivations behind any new committees 
and groups that formed in support or non-support of the current South African sport 
system.  
In an attempt to offer an illusion of change after expulsion from the IOC, South 
Africa undertook a rebranding strategy to mask as ‘multi-national’ the racializing 
tendencies of apartheid. The 1971 multi-national sports policy had three goals: 
(1) to break up the unified sports federations and create separate 
Indian, Coloured and African associations; (2) to create new racial 
federations where it proves impossible to provoke a division; (3) to 
finance and promote the emergence of a new sporting elite among 
Blacks whose sporting and political interests will lead them to 
support the status quo and the official policies of the regime, while 
effectively depriving the non-racial sports associations of finance 
and facilities.108 
However, sporting organizations were not misled by South Africa’s attempted 
rebranding of the sport system as multi-racial sport. Only when total isolation from 
international sport seemed to be a threat, did sports administrators attempt to 
introduce modifications that accommodated non-white participants.109 
South Africa, then, had a well-entrenched history of sport, racism, and segregation. 
The IOC and the Olympic Movement played a role in contributing to, and opposing, 
racism and segregation in sport within South Africa. During the pivotal period when 
South Africa’s relationship with the IOC and the Olympic Movement changed from 
active membership to excommunication, Avery Brundage was the IOC President. In 
addition to addressing the racist politics of South Africa and the internal and external 
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pressures placed on the IOC, Brundage also had to take into account the IOC’s past 
encounters with racism and his own personal accusations of being anti-black and anti-
Semitic.  
The following section examines literature pertaining to Brundage’s character and 
the state of racism in South African sport to provide some human and cultural context. 
In addition, the literature that discussed Brundage’s private correspondence with 
sport and government officials regarding the South African issue was examined to 
provide an idea of Brundage’s firsthand thoughts on South Africa’s standing within 
the IOC. 
4. Literature Review 
4.1 Racism and the Olympics 
The Olympic Games, as the relevant literature indicated, have experienced its share 
of controversy with regard to the issue of racism and politics of race. A telling example 
occurred as early as the 1904 Games. Matti Gøksyr showed that the 1904 
Anthropology Days accompanying the Olympic Games consisted of evaluating various 
African, Asian and American Indian representatives on their physical capabilities in 
comparison to “sport’s dominated cultural group at the time: the white man.”110 
Although the racializing thrust of this exhibit originated with the organizers of the 
Fair, and not with the Olympic organizers, the author pointed out the latter did not 
attempt to end or at least reframe the focus of the Anthropology Days. 
The issue of racism came to the fore again during the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games, 
which Adolph Hitler and Nazi leaders avidly supported to display the superiority of 
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the Aryan race and Fascist political ideology.111 The discrimination towards Jews and 
other ‘undesirable’ minorities was widely known,112 but these circumstances were not 
sufficient to dissuade the Olympic Games’ organizers to change the host destination. 
To alleviate suspicions the Americans had regarding the charges of discrimination 
against Jews and others in Germany, Brundage, as the President of the American 
Olympic Committee, conducted an investigation in 1934. In addition to being 
impressed by Germany’s sense of order, Brundage interviewed Jewish leaders who 
assured him that there would be no discrimination.113 Therefore, upon his return, 
“The American Olympic Committee, which met with Brundage and voted to accept 
Germany’s invitation to participate in the Games, claimed that sport was the wedge 
that would lead to the end of discrimination in Germany.”114 Although Brundage 
garnered much criticism for his pro-German stance and anti-Semitic tendencies,115 his 
support for Olympism and action as the catalyst that brought the American team to 
the Berlin Games won him a seat on the IOC.116 
Carrying the same attitude from the Berlin Games—the Olympics enabling contests 
between individuals, not nations117—Brundage was supportive of South Africa’s 
ongoing inclusion in the IOC and participation in the Olympic Games. As Ramsamy 
mentioned, Brundage considered apartheid a domestic political issue whereby the 
IOC had no jurisdiction over the government’s actions and, therefore, could not 
sanction SANOC.118 Even after South Africa’s expulsion from the IOC and after 
Brundage’s retirement as President in 1972, he believed South Africa should be re-
admitted into the Olympic Movement.119 The interesting query remained: was 
Brundage’s justification of South Africa’s position sound and consistent throughout 
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the years, especially when he made bold statements regarding the violation of the 
Olympic Charter: 
If and when a Government determines to take over its national 
Olympic Committee there is, of course, very little effective opposition 
that can be offered by the national amateur sports organizations. The 
only correction for situation of this kind when the letter and spirit of 
the Olympic rules are not followed is for the rest of the world to 
refuse to play with countries which are in violation of Olympic 
principles.120 
There was abundant literature referring to Brundage’s politics and the impact he 
had as IOC President during the South African issue.121 However, the literature 
detailing the correspondence between Brundage and officials from the IOC, NOCs, 
ISFs, South African government, or other sport organizations was rare. To my 
knowledge, only a few important studies concentrating on the correspondence 
between Brundage and officials existed. Nonetheless, three areas of literature in 
regard to Brundage and the South African issue need to be discussed: (1) Avery 
Brundage’s life and work in the Olympic Movement; (2) sport, racism, and South 
Africa; and, (3) studies concentrating on the correspondence between Brundage and 
officials. 
4.2 Avery Brundage’s Life and Work in the Olympic 
Movement 
In a previous section, Avery Brundage and the IOC’s Position on Race and Sport, an 
account was provided outlining Brundage’s life and involvement in the IOC. However, 
even though I, and many others, 122 have profiled Brundage, it is worth briefly 
highlighting three authors who have examined the life of Avery Brundage. 
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In an extremely flattering book, Heinz Schöbel (East Germany’s [DDR] first IOC 
member) explored the four dimensions of Brundage: sportsman, sports leader, 
construction engineer, and art lover and collector.123 Schöbel chronicled Brundage’s 
young life as a good student and athlete devoted to both pursuits equally. After his 
career as an athlete, peaking as the United States all-round champion in athletics, 
Brundage began participating in the administrative side of sport. His work in the 
United States garnered much attention at the international level, where he became 
Vice President of the IOC in 1945 and President in 1952. Being aligned with 
Coubertin’s ideals for the Olympic Movement, he seemed to be the perfect fit for the 
job of IOC President. Schöbel painted Brundage as a President who fostered 
international growth of the IOC and development of domestic NOCs, while his ideals 
were anchored in fair play, sportsmanship, and amateurism. Published in 1968 while 
Brundage was still IOC President, Schöbel’s work was a favourable, positive 
interpretation of Brundage’s presence on the international sports scene, best 
categorized as hagiography. 
A biographical work about Brundage completed by Allen Guttmann in 1984 is the 
seminal reference on issues related to Brundage.124 The detail and breadth of 
Guttmann’s work advances far beyond Schöbel’s effort. Guttmann chronicled 
Brundage’s every step, from his humble beginning in Detroit to his death in a German 
hospital on 8 May 1975. Guttmann seemingly constructed the Brundage narrative 
from an objective viewpoint, highlighting both negative and positive aspects of 
Brundage’s life. Some of Brundage’s more controversial moments included the 
inclusion of the Soviet Union in the Olympic Movement and trying to keep South Africa 
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and Rhodesia involved as well. Furthermore, a chapter was dedicated to the Nazi 
Olympics, which discussed Brundage’s controversial support of Germany and, as a 
result, being labeled as an anti-Semite.125 Guttmann also included a large section on 
the South African issue, which detailed Brundage’s struggle to keep South Africa in 
the Olympic Movement. His efforts became so strong, he eventually was labeled as 
anti-black, as well. 
These two immediate examples of Brundage maintaining his firm stance of 
keeping politics and the Olympic Games separate can be seen as one of Brundage’s 
positive characteristics. For the most part, although one might not favour Brundage’s 
stances, he was consistent even during stressful, controversial situations. Not only did 
he have strong views on the separation of politics and the Olympic Games, he also 
supported amateurism and non-commercialism in the Games. Above all, Brundage 
considered the Olympic Movement as a ‘secular religion’ which all affiliated with the 
IOC had to support. When in power, Brundage’s perception of Coubertin’s ideals led 
the decision-making of the IOC and he made sure he was surrounded by those who 
shared the same perception of Olympism. It was not until his last term as President 
that he lost control of the IOC.  
There was only one other person who could possibly offer a more concise 
biography of Avery Brundage. Maynard Brichford was the leader of the team 
responsible for processing the Avery Brundage Collection (ABC) in 1975 at the 
University of Illinois.126 Brichford did not write a complete Brundage biography, but 
he has written a variety of articles based on ABC materials. Brichford considered eight 
aspects of Brundage’s life – student, engineer, financier, athlete, sports official, 
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ideologue, public symbol, and collector.127 Although Brichford did discuss each in his 
publications, two aspects specific to Brichford’s work garnered particular attention: 
Brundage’s ‘internationalization’ of the Olympic Games,128 and his stance on 
racism.129 
Brundage’s contribution to the international growth of the Olympic Movement 
was rarely celebrated in the literature. Brichford mentioned, “In 1960 alone, 
seventeen new nations emerged in Africa. Brundage presided over the first Olympic 
Games in Australia, Asia and Latin America, played a major role in establishing the 
Pan-American Games, and attended the first African Games.”130 Even though 
Brundage was severely criticized for this focus on internationalism, he continued to 
include countries in the Olympic Movement regardless of domestic and international 
politics. Unfortunately, Brundage’s perceived negative actions drew attention away 
from the much more positive actions which benefited the Olympic Movement. One 
recurring controversial theme was how Brundage dealt with racism. The Olympic 
Charter clearly stated that racism was not to be tolerated within the Olympic 
Movement. However, for Brundage, this ideal clearly clashed with the ideal of a non-
political Olympic Movement environment. Unfortunately, Brundage seemed to focus 
more on making sure the Olympic Games remained non-political, which clouded his 
judgement when evaluating domestic racism as a violation of the Olympic Charter. 
The biographical literature on Brundage helped identify what type of 
characteristics made up his personality and how those characteristics could have 
affected his decisions and proclamations when acting as the IOC President. How he 
dealt with the South African issue is the focus of this study. So, too, was how he reacted 
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to challenges relative to consideration of the state of sport and racism in South Africa 
during his tenure as IOC President.  
4.3 Sport, Racism, and South Africa 
Considering the importance of the South African apartheid issue, the range of 
articles and books discussing this topic was extensive. This section highlights some of 
the notable publications strictly pertaining to sport, racism, and South Africa. One of 
the earliest inclusive books on sport and race in South Africa was written by Mary 
Draper in 1963.131 It provided a detailed account of the then current laws and 
government policies affecting multi-racial sport and reminds the reader only actual 
law can be enforced, regardless of the government policies supported by the 
Nationalist Party. Draper discussed the Olympic Charter, the associated South African 
sporting bodies such as SANOC, SASA, and SAN-ROC, the stance of the IOC, South 
African Olympic and government representatives, and the general status of South 
Africa in the Olympic Movement. Of course, how the South African issue was discussed 
and detailed depended on the author’s viewpoint and information available to the 
author at the time. 
In 1970, when South Africa was expelled from the Olympic Movement, more 
valuable publications surfaced discussing the South African issue. Morgan Naidoo 
voiced his concern with the black sport situation in South Africa.132 The black 
community was interested in increasing involvement at every level in sport, but he 
was convinced whites were not interested in the welfare of black sport. Naidoo cites 
Braun, who was then President of SANOC, as one administrator who attempted to 
incorporate the black community. However, Naidoo believed it was just an attempt to 
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appease the IOC rather than having the welfare of black sport at heart. Taking a more 
optimistic view, Richard Lapchick argued that the issue of racism and the Olympic 
Movement had come to an end in 1970 after the long struggle which resulted in South 
Africa’s expulsion.133 
Dennis Brutus’ hardships, endured on behalf of the non-white South African sport 
movement, are well-documented in the literature.134 Brutus provided a close, 
personal perspective shaped by his in-depth involvement as a leader in the anti-
apartheid movement from the 1950s.135 Another detailed contribution about the 
South African issue came from Chris de Broglio.136 His booklet was an updated version 
of Draper’s 1963 book, which included additional details about the government’s 
continued attempt to appease the IOC while maintaining the apartheid stance in terms 
of other domestic and international matters. De Broglio’s insight was unique because 
it was informed by his athletic experiences as a competitive weightlifter and 
representative of South African weightlifting from 1949 to the early 1960s. He later 
joined forces with Brutus to form SAN-ROC and, as a result, was forced to leave South 
Africa, ultimately settling in England. 
The year following South Africa’s expulsion from the Olympic Movement, Peter 
Hain released a book documenting the Stop the Seventy Tour (STST) campaign,137 
which successfully forced South Africa from participating in most international rugby 
and cricket competition. Hain provided a concise historical background of South 
Africa and apartheid, and included South Africa’s struggle in the Olympic Movement 
to contextualize STST.138 In addition to discussing STST and providing multiple useful 
summaries, Joan Brickhill139 added something new by commenting on the South 
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African government’s attempt to rebrand apartheid sport as ‘multi-national’ sport in 
1971. As Brickhill notes, “multi-national sport entails competition (a) between the 
four main racial groups, each group being treated as a separate nation, and (b) 
between international teams and the four main racial groups.”140 The perception of 
multi-racial competition was just a ruse by the government to keep racial groups still 
segregated while maintaining the white status quo. 
Reflecting back on the campaign to isolate South Africa from international sport 
and its effect on the whole state of apartheid in South Africa, March Krotee and Luther 
Schwick141 and Krotee142 used personal observation, personal correspondence with 
South African sport officials, and secondary sources to examine the social and 
historical aspects to try to identify the external pressures which affected internal 
change. One such external factor was the involvement of the UN. Maxine Hunter 
focused strictly on the UN and its role in the anti-apartheid movement.143 After 
providing a summary leading up to the first UN resolution in 1968 that outlined 
sanctions against South Africa specifically pertaining to sport, multiple resolutions 
are highlighted in the study. Although the UN resolutions and declarations can be used 
to legitimize the protest or exclusion of South Africa from sporting activities, Hunter 
reminded the reader that UN resolutions and declarations were not lawfully binding, 
but only carried as much importance as countries attached to it. 
In 1982, Sam Ramsamy144 and Robert Archer and Antoine Bouillon145 added to the 
breadth of literature on South Africa, sport, and racism. Ramsamy’s work capitalized 
on many documents from the 1970s and 80s not previously provided in other 
publications. In addition to being a concise reference manual, Ramsamy included a 
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small chapter highlighting the role of sponsorship in apartheid and sport, which had 
not been done before. Archer and Bouillon provided a complete account of sport and 
racism in South Africa from the beginning of European explorers landing on South 
African soil on 5 April 1652 to the 1981 Springbok tour of New Zealand. Although 
sport was the focus, Archer and Bouillon also discussed in detail the socioeconomics, 
education, and politics in South Africa. A more recent version of Archer and Bouillon 
can be found in Douglas Booth’s account of sport and politics in South Africa. 
Published in 1998, Booth’s study brought the perspective of a new South Africa after 
the resolution of apartheid and a democratic election placing Nelson Mandela as its 
new leader.146 
Although the aforementioned literature on sport, racism, and South Africa was an 
integral part to frame the South African issue, it was the literature focusing on the 
correspondence between Brundage and officials which was of utmost importance to 
this dissertation. 
4.4 Correspondence between Brundage and Officials 
Focusing strictly on the rise of the African bloc in opposition to the IOC during the 
South African race issue, Shane Quick suggested a shift in power away from Brundage 
and the IOC to African and Third World representation.147 As Brundage expressed 
continually throughout his tenure on the IOC, politics had no place in the Olympic 
Movement, while, conversely, the African nations deemed sport, especially the 
Olympic Games, as an ideal venue to gain leverage and use the power of politics to 
make statements on an international stage about issues outside sport. Nonetheless, 
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the African nation-states’ increase of power, in part, was made possible by Eastern 
bloc support. 
At a meeting between the IOC and NOCs in 1959, dialogue ensued between 
Brundage, the Soviets, and South African representatives about apartheid and 
sport.148 Brundage was well aware of the pressure arising from apartheid in South 
Africa because the IOC had received letters of concern before 1959. In letters to 
SANOC officials, Brundage suggested a proactive approach to prevent potential 
political fallout.149 The IOC continued to support SANOC’s involvement with the 
Olympic Movement because of its firm stance of separating politics from the Olympic 
Games. Only after a vote to eliminate South Africa from the IOC was proposed and 
defeated in 1962, did Brundage issue a formal warning to South Africa to abide by the 
Olympic Charter by October 1963 in order to avoid suspension from the 1964 Olympic 
Games.150 South Africa’s invitation to the 1964 Tokyo Games was withdrawn as a 
result of SANOC’s non-compliance with the conditions contained in Brundage’s official 
warning. Quick pointed out that at the meeting where the invitation was withdrawn, 
the African bloc’s power was extended as NOCs of four African countries were granted 
full recognition by the IOC.151 Brundage continued to pursue communication between 
SANOC and the IOC in order to keep South Africa involved in the Olympic Movement. 
The report of a commission to assess South African sport indicated that SANOC was 
still not meeting the minimum standards for participation in the Olympic Movement. 
The majority of IOC members ignored this when voting to allow South Africa to 
participate, based on the fact that SANOC ostensibly was doing as well as could be 
expected under the political conditions existent in South Africa. This IOC decision 
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triggered the threat of a wide-spread boycott of the 1968 Mexico City Olympics. As a 
result, the invitation to South Africa was withdrawn once again and South Africa was 
eventually expelled from the IOC and Olympic Movement in 1970. 
Quick’s study clearly displayed the influence that the African bloc had on the 
expulsion of South Africa from the Olympic Movement. Quick focused on the voices of 
Brundage and South African officials to provide indication of the pressures on the IOC 
and SANOC which led to the expulsion of South Africa from the IOC. Quick attributed 
Brundage’s loss of power to the rise of power in the African bloc. Quick’s examination 
was helpful because the pressure from African nations was certainly one factor 
playing a part in the expulsion of South African involvement in the Olympic 
Movement. 
Donald Macintosh, Hart Cantelon, and Lisa McDermott discussed how the IOC, 
under Brundage’s leadership, acted as a transnational organization when dealing with 
South Africa in the Olympic Movement during the 1950s and 1960s.152 The IOC’s 
mission was to spread Olympism through NOCs without exhibiting much interest in 
the political ideology expressed by IOC members and hosting countries; thus, the 
IOC’s decisions were driven by the commitment to Olympism.153 Therefore, to have 
SANOC abide by the Olympic Charter was the IOC’s main interest. To provide evidence 
of the IOC’s attempt to keep the focus on the values of Olympism and the 
organizational procedures of the IOC, and away from the subject of apartheid in South 
Africa, ABC was used to highlight the correspondence between SANOC and the IOC 
officials. Letters between Brundage and SANOC officials discussing strategies to help 
South Africa comply with IOC rules appeared as early as the late 1950s. Macintosh, 
34 
 
 
Cantelon, and McDermott suggested that the ideals of Olympism were the main thrust 
for decision making within the transnational structure of the IOC, not Brundage 
himself. Brundage represented a brand of Olympism that enforced the non-political 
nature of the IOC, which ignored the internal policies of South African government, 
and, in turn, influenced the continual inclusion of South Africa in the IOC. Although 
the Olympic Movement was the most important factor directing the IOC, the conflict 
and struggle amongst IOC members regarding apartheid was created by how 
Olympism should be pursued by the IOC. By the time South Africa’s exclusion became 
a reality, the ideals of Olympism Brundage once enforced became extinct because of 
the gravity of the apartheid issue. Brundage felt strongly about his version of 
Olympism because of the charismatic legacy left by the founder of the modern 
Olympic Games, Pierre de Coubertin. 
Cantelon and McDermott made a connection between the decision-making of the 
IOC and the “charismatic legacy” of Coubertin.154 Indicative of this connection was the 
correspondence between Brundage and the South African representative to the IOC, 
Reginald Honey. It showed how Coubertin’s idealist vision of Olympism was ingrained 
in the IOC organization. In turn, that devotion to Olympism drove the decisions of the 
IOC on important matters such as dealing with the South African apartheid issue. 
Brundage expressed Coubertin’s Olympic ideals in his letters to IOC members, such as 
freedom from domestic and international political pressure. As South Africa’s 
representative on the IOC from 1948 until his death in 1982, Honey was an influential 
advocate of Brundage’s concept of Olympism.155 As an ideal IOC member who 
dedicated and volunteered much of his time to sport, Honey played an important role 
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in the South African situation and was devoted to Olympic ideals. Honey faced 
extreme pressure during the years leading to South Africa’s expulsion from the 
Olympic Movement in 1970. Although he had to defend South Africa’s racial policies, 
he was favoured enough to be asked to remain on the IOC after South Africa was 
expelled.156 According to the authors, Honey and Brundage shared not only the same 
devotion to the Olympic Movement, but similarities characterizing the membership 
of the IOC during the 1950s and 1960s: white, male, well-educated, and privileged. All 
these similarities between Honey, Brundage, and other IOC members added to the 
IOC’s cohesive strength in continuing the charismatic ideals of Coubertin. Further, and 
more importantly, Brundage trusted the support from those who shared these 
characteristics. It was only when opposition arose to Brundage’s and Honey’s version 
of Olympism that problems ensued with South Africa’s membership in the IOC. 
Cantelon and McDermott suggest that the correspondence between Brundage and 
Honey slightly favoured the white regime,157 not because Brundage and Honey were 
racists, but because they sought to uphold Coubertin’s vision of Olympism. There was 
a sense of entitlement given to SANOC to control all-things Olympic within South 
Africa because of its history with the IOC and commitment to the Olympic Movement 
since 1908.158 Cantelon and McDermott’s study was valuable because it provided 
insight into how those of Brundage’s and Honey’s persuasion made decisions within 
the IOC, and because it identified Honey as one source of input Brundage had on South 
Africa’s status. Despite Honey’s history as a representative of South Africa on the IOC, 
by the mid-1960s, he became more of a diplomatic figure.  
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Honey, however, was not the only IOC member Brundage confided in with regard 
to South African politics and sport. Identifying a different IOC member, Maureen 
Smith focused on Reginald Alexander’s correspondence with the IOC regarding the 
status of South Africa in the Olympic Movement. Alexander’s written exchanges span 
more than 25 years and involve three IOC Presidents, one of whom was Brundage, 
who considered Alexander an ally and trusted confidante.159 Elected in 1960, 
Alexander represented Kenya on the IOC. He and Brundage shared the same 
sentiment about domestic politics not infringing on participation in the Olympic 
Games. Therefore, not only should South African politics not prevent athletes from 
participating in the Games, it was, in fact, the athletes who were experiencing 
discrimination based on a violation of the Olympic Charter.160 In his letters, Brundage 
shared his optimism with Alexander about finding the right solution to help the non-
white sportsmen in South Africa. Brundage held Alexander in such high regard, he 
selected Alexander as part of the three man fact-finding commission to investigate 
South African sport before making a decision on South Africa’s status for the 1968 
Mexico City Games.161 Although Brundage was one IOC President discussed in Smith’s 
study, her primary focus was Alexander’s contribution to the South African issue, not 
the three IOC Presidents with whom Alexander communicated. Alexander’s 
correspondence with Brundage was valuable in providing a better picture of 
Brundage’s perception of the South African issue, but it was only one piece of the 
puzzle.  
These articles focussed on partial aspects of the topic proposed for this study, and 
as such are of value in the framing of the research issue. They do not, however, 
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represent the theme in its completeness, neither in the selection of its time period, 
nor in the focus of its questioning. The much more detailed investigation of the 
historical and archival record carried out in this study acknowledges this literature, 
but provides a more detailed as well as more in-depth investigation of the issue. 
5. Methodology and Methods 
Historiography attempts to recreate historical events of a past accessible only 
through the stories and narratives produced about them. In an important study on the 
work and methods of sport historians, Douglas Booth analyzes three models of the 
creation of narrative and historical inquiry in sport history: reconstructionism, 
constructionism, and deconstructionism.162 First, Booth argues, reconstructionists 
seek to reveal history through the interrogation and contextualization of historical 
facts taken as direct empirical evidence; it is the facts that ‘tell the story’ as much as 
the historian who produces it. Reconstructionists thus uphold that “history exists 
independently of the historian and that discovering the past is an objective process, 
uncontaminated by ideology.”163 Reconstructionists transform historical data, 
conceived as ‘objective facts’, into a narrative that most closely approximates the 
historical process as, in the understanding of the historian, it objectively happened. 
Secondly, constructionists, in a stance critical towards reconstructionism, argue 
that it is impossible to shape empirical historical facts into historical narrative from a 
completely objective perspective, and insist on the importance of theory in the 
production of narrative. In this view:  
…theory is fundamental in history for at least three reasons. … It 
provides frameworks and principles for selecting evidence and thus 
steers practitioners away from contradictions in their explanations. 
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Second, theory brings to the fore interrelations between the 
components of human experiences at given times and in so doing 
enriches historical accounts. Third,… identifying historical patterns 
invariably involves some form of abstract thinking and connections 
to theoretical explanation and interpretations.164  
That is to say, the historical narrative does not simply emerge through the historical 
data, but the treatment of the data itself is shaped by the perspectives and concepts 
provided through the specific theoretical lens used. 
Deconstructionists, thirdly, move away from an insistence on the preeminence of 
the data as shaping the historical narrative. They focus on the problems of creating 
historical narrative itself, and on the importance of language in the creative process. 
They acknowledge the possibility of multiple perspectives and reject the possibility 
that a single interpretation only can be applied to the data in a given case.165  
Booth’s model of sport historiography is helpful since it allows me to locate my 
own approach to the topic of this study. I adopt a reconstructionist approach since my 
aim is to trace and reconstruct the IOC’s treatment of the South African situation, 
through investigating specifically the correspondence of key actors, connected 
through a series of exchanges that centre on Avery Brundage and trace his 
correspondence with other actors playing important roles in this issue, and also 
tracing the interaction between these actors. Through this reconstruction, I unravel 
the perspectives and strategies of the actors that become evident in the voluminous 
correspondence developed on the issue. Conducting the analysis from the 
reconstructionist stance allowed me to identify and trace ‘three dominant voices’ in 
this debate that became influential as the debate unfolded in the correspondence; the 
thesis was structured to provide a perspective on the three dominant voices. This in-
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depth investigation of these central and influential actors contributes a new 
dimension to our understanding of the IOC’s approach to the South African situation, 
and the events leading to South Africa’s expulsion. 
Since this study’s research problem necessarily makes reference to issues of race 
and racial discrimination, my conceptual approach to these phenomena requires a 
brief explanation. Although the correspondence from Brundage and the IOC did not 
contain explicitly racist remarks, decisions made by the IOC in the context of the South 
African apartheid regime, had racializing implications, either challenging the effects 
of apartheid or confirming the status quo. The implicit racializing effects created by 
such decisions cannot be understood as expressions of racist postures adopted by 
Brundage or the IOC; neither can the implicit racializing effects be ignored. Paraschak 
and Tyrone, among other writers, have referred to such implicit or consequential 
racializing effects as “structural racism.”166 Such racism was not the result of explicitly 
expressed racializing positions or actions, but it emerged from the structural 
properties of the social system of South Africa within which people and organizations, 
the IOC among them, acted to effect certain outcomes in the area of Olympic sports in 
disregard of racially discriminatory consequences resulting from their actions.167 The 
racializing effects of the IOC’s, Avery Brundage’s, or the other relevant actors’ 
perspectives and strategies expressed in their correspondence during their 
involvement in the South African issue, merit extensive consideration in a separate 
study. 
The method for the empirical research for this study makes extensive use of 
archival sources. The IOC’s organizational structure defined the important positions 
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that had a bearing on the evolution of the South African situation, notably the position 
of President Brundage. In order to clarify why and how decisions were made by the 
IOC in regard to SANOC, a narrative was developed using the correspondence, 
dialogue, commentary, press examinations, and position statements from IOC and 
NOC officials, SANOC, South Africa’s domestic resistance representatives, and the 
international community. Early in the research process, three dominant voices 
emerged in dialogue with the IOC: (1) South African Olympic affiliates; (2) domestic 
resistance, and (3) international community. Therefore, the source materials were 
placed in one of the three categories to construct the narrative. The South African 
Olympic affiliates were any individuals and groups already associated with the white 
South African sport structure and culture. Domestic resistant forces represented any 
individuals and groups within South Africa that were fighting for non-white equality 
and equity in South African sport. Finally, the international community represented 
any individuals and groups from outside South Africa that were not associated with 
any South African Olympic affiliates or domestic resistant forces, and argued in 
support of, or against, South Africa’s participation in the IOC, Olympic Games, and 
Olympic Movement.  
6. Limitations and Delimitations 
It is possible that important documents on the South African situation have been 
placed in archives in South Africa. Should such documents exist, they may possibly 
have been written in Afrikaans, the dominant language of political exchange in the 
country at the time. Both those possibilities place a limitation on the scope of sources 
accessible to me for the completion of this study: I do not speak Afrikaans, and it was 
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logistically impossible for me to visit archives in South Africa that might have such 
documents in their holdings. Such documents thus were not utilized for this study. 
The study was limited to documents written in English. 
A delimitation on the scope of the archival sources to be investigated for this 
project emerged from the way I defined my main topic and perspective. Investigating 
the IOC’s viewpoint on the South African situation from the perspective of its most 
influential administrator at the time, IOC President Avery Brundage and his numerous 
correspondents on this issue, allowed me to concentrate my research effort on 
Brundage’s voluminous correspondence and related documents. This collection in its 
entirety is housed at the University of Illinois. In the 1970s, the German 
Bundesinstitut für Sportwissenschaften in Cologne arranged to have the entire 
collection microfilmed.168 A copy of these microfilms was acquired by the 
International Centre for Olympic Studies at Western University in London, Ontario. 
Western University’s copy of the Avery Brundage Collection emerged as one of two 
main archival sources of information used in this study; the second primary source 
was the Wolf Lyberg translations and summaries of the IOC Executive Committee 
Minutes and IOC General Session Minutes, also housed at the International Center for 
Olympic Studies.169 
The time line of this dissertation is delimited to the years 1955 to 1968. The year 
1955 was selected as the starting point because debates on the issue of racial 
discrimination in South Africa relative to the Olympic Movement first emerged at that 
time. The end date was defined by the IOC’s withdrawal of the invitation to South 
Africa for the 1968 Mexico City Olympic Games; these were the last Olympic Games 
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South Africa was eligible for prior to its expulsion from the Olympic Movement in May 
1970. South Africa never recovered from the controversy of the 1968 Grenoble vote, 
and the opposition had enough supporters in the IOC to ostracize South Africa until 
racial discrimination was satisfactorily reduced from South African sport. 
Since this study focusses on the thinking of the ‘three dominant voices’ on the issue, 
and since, therefore, their correspondence necessarily was the primary focus, 
newspaper material was included only to the extent that newspaper clippings were 
summarized in items of correspondence, and thus contributed to express the thinking 
of the primary players. The undoubtedly voluminous newspaper reporting on the 
issue thus lay outside the specific research focus of my study. It would require a 
separate study to carry out a content analysis of the newspaper reporting. 
7. Chapter Overview 
In the main chapters of this study, the correspondence between the IOC and other 
officials was retraced to understand the interplay between the IOC, the developing 
political situation in South Africa, and the influence of extraneous social 
circumstances, during three crucial phases of this development, within the relevant 
time line for this study. 
Chapter 2 covers the years 1955 to 1960, the time when the issue of South African 
racial discrimination and its significance for South African sports and the Olympic 
Movement first rose onto the agenda. It traces the beginnings of a divergence of 
opinions between the IOC and South African sport and government officials. Inquiries 
into apartheid were made by Avery Brundage and other IOC officials, internal and 
external pressure on the IOC began to mount, the Afrikaner Nationalist Party started 
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to establish official sport policies, and non-white resistant forces became better 
organized within South Africa. During this time period, the IOC thus had to renegotiate 
with SANOC concerning its status in the Olympic Games and the Olympic Movement. 
Furthermore, the IOC’s debates on this issue were influenced by the questions and 
accusations against SANOC from domestic resistance and the international 
community. 
Chapter 3 covers the years 1960 to 1964, which saw the growing strength of 
domestic, non-white resistance and the IOC’s first confrontation with SANOC, 
resulting in an official warning by Brundage to SANOC to comply with the Olympic 
Charter, in order to be included in the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games. Surprisingly, after 
being replaced in 1961, former SANOC Secretary General Ira Emery emerged as a 
valuable though unofficial source of information about the internal status of South 
African sport and South African governmental laws and policies.  Since SANOC did not 
comply with the terms of the IOC’s Baden-Baden resolution, the 1964 Tokyo Olympic 
Games marked the first time the IOC withdrew its invitation to South Africa.  
Chapter 4 examines the explosion of an international presence supporting the anti-
apartheid movement from 1964 to 1968. To help negotiate South Africa’s 
involvement in the IOC, Olympic Movement, and Olympic Games, Brundage organized 
a Commission to assess South African sport. The South Africa Commission report in 
conjunction with SANOC’s assurance of entering a mixed race team resulted in an 
absolute majority vote to include South Africa in the 1968 Mexico City Olympic Games, 
which caused the anti-apartheid movement to become stronger. With the threat of a 
significant boycott looming, political aspects began to dominate the IOC’s decision-
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making process, resulting in the withdrawal of the IOC’s invitation to South Africa to 
participate in the 1968 Mexico City Games. 
Chapter 5 offers the conclusions that emerge from this study. It will reflect on the 
changing relationships between the IOC and the South African sport community, in 
particular SANOC, and the ways in which this found expression in the thinking and 
reasoning of the ‘three dominant voices,’ as it emerged during the time period under 
consideration. 
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Chapter Two:  
Avery Brundage, the South African 
National Olympic Committee, and the 
Birth of the Non-White Resistance, 1955-
1960 
1. Introduction 
Although Avery Brundage was an avid believer in a non-political International 
Olympic Committee (IOC), Olympic Games, and Olympic Movement, the IOC itself was 
a transnational political body. Member individuals and countries are chosen based on 
the ability to spread the IOC’s ideological brand of Olympism. Further, the IOC was 
much about relationships between the members and countries which compose the 
modern Olympic Movement. Brundage’s connections to the IOC began while he was 
the President of the American Olympic Association. He became an IOC member in 
1936, and his importance within the IOC increased when he became Vice President in 
1946. It was during his tenure as IOC Vice President that relationships between 
Brundage and the South African representatives evolved, which, combined with 
Brundage’s Olympic Movement ideals, set the tone for his approach to the South 
African issue when he ultimately became President. When Brundage rose to the 
Presidency, he, in effect, became the face of the Olympic Movement. With this 
privileged position came the responsibility of dealing with people and organizations 
that wanted their voices to be heard. Therefore, not only was Brundage prompted 
towards developing a working relationship with IOC affiliates, he also had to deal with 
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internal as well as global developments. This was most certainly apparent in the case 
of South Africa in the modern Olympic Movement. 
There are four main forces to consider in examining the issue of South African 
participation in the Olympic Games and membership of the IOC: (1) President 
Brundage and the IOC itself; (2) the role of South African Olympic affiliates; (3) 
domestic resistance within South Africa; and, lastly, (4) the international community. 
As the South African issue developed from the mid-1950s to South Africa’s expulsion 
in 1970, the message and position of each of these stakeholders varied. 
Since a network of correspondents – centering on Brundage as IOC President, the 
IOC and extending out into the sphere of the international Olympic community – is 
the focus of this inquiry, he is posited and examined here as expressing the position 
of the IOC on the South African issue. Personal advice provided by other individuals 
involved with the IOC notwithstanding, it was ultimately Brundage who formulated 
the IOC’s message. Then, in the ten years leading up to the 1960 Rome Games, in 
addition to Brundage and the IOC, the position and message of the other three 
stakeholders began to develop. Brundage was challenged to manage and negotiate 
with these three voices to arrive at a stance and course of action that he could consider 
to be satisfactory. Therefore, in this and the two chapters that follow, I will provide a 
detailed examination of the message and position of the four stakeholders as 
expressed in the voluminous correspondence accessible in the Avery Brundage 
Collection (ABC). I will conclude each chapter with a discussion of Brundage’s 
resolutions and position on the issue as influenced by the exchanges with the 
respective stakeholders.  
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2. South African Olympic Affiliates 
Correspondence between Avery Brundage and the IOC representative for South 
Africa, Reginald Honey, commenced as early as 1949.1 In his first letter to Brundage, 
Honey requested his assistance for South African National Olympic Committee 
(SANOC)2 member, Dr. Ernst Jokl, during a visit to the USA. Almost two months later, 
Brundage responded in kind, pointing to correspondence with Dr. Jokl, and 
mentioning that he would do everything he could to assist Jokl. As well, Brundage 
stated that he looked forward to seeing Honey at the next IOC session in Rome.3 
Correspondence from the subsequent year, 1950, indicated another connection 
between Brundage and South African sports, namely, between Brundage and the 
Honorary Secretary of SANOC, Ira Emery. In Emery’s initial letter, dated 19 May 1950, 
he provided Brundage with a listing of the past and current members of SANOC and 
South African IOC representatives, as well as a detailed account of SANOC’s selection 
process for its national Olympic team. “The [South African National Olympic 
Committee] selects its South African team from the nominations received,” stated 
Emery, “in accordance with the money available at the time of selection.”4 What was 
unique about this particular letter was a series of questions posed by Emery to the 
IOC: 
(a) Can a National Body of Sport break away from the [South African 
National Olympic Committee] and enter direct to the Organizing 
committee of the Olympic Games and without reference to the 
National Olympic Committee. 
(b) If the National Olympic Committee refuses to forward all 
nominations for a National Body of Sport, may the latter send their 
entries direct to the Organising Committee. 
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(c) In effect, is it permissible for a National Body of Sport whose full 
entry is not forwarded owing to lack of funds, to raise their own 
funds and enter direct to the Organising committee without 
reference to the National Olympic Committee? If this is no it could 
mean that in this country a wealthy National body could send a large 
team and a poorer association could not raise funds to send a team, 
thus the entry from this country would not be representative of the 
sport of this country, and therefore not a truly National team for an 
Olympic Games. 
(d) It is pointed out that on no account does the national Olympic 
Council in South Africa alter the order in which National sports 
teams are nominated. For instance, if the National Athletic Union 
nominated 20 and we had only sufficient money to send 15 athletes, 
only the last five names would be deleted. Will the Organising 
Committee, in effect, accept only the entries forwarded by the 
National Olympic Committee of South Africa?5 
These questions sought to clarify the power and authority of a National Olympic 
Committee (NOC) domestically, as well as within the Olympic structure generally. 
However, could these questions also be interpreted as guiding the development of 
proactive measures in anticipation of things to come in South Africa – were some 
National Sporting Federations (NSF) beginning to challenge the authority of SANOC? 
Any such considerations are not evidenced in Brundage’s response to Emery; he 
merely referred Emery to the Olympic rule book and reaffirmed that the IOC only 
recognized the nominations and suggestions from the respective NOCs, who, in turn, 
received the nominations from NSFs.6 Brundage also offered suggestions on how to 
organize the funding and how to select South African participants to represent the 
country at the Olympic Games. Again, Brundage’s helpful reply to Emery regarding 
these questions suggested that Brundage did not count on SANOC harbouring ulterior 
motives behind its questions, but was only seeking clarification of Olympic rules and 
regulations. 
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Some of the early informal letters between Brundage and South African Olympic 
affiliates continued to express a positive relationship. When Emery asked Brundage 
to meet with a friend, E. Garson-Walker, who might call upon him while visiting the 
USA,7 Brundage replied: “Because of our warm relations in the field of sport for so 
many years, we have always felt very close to South Africa and any sportsman from 
your country is assured of a warm welcome.”8 Brundage ended his letter by asking, 
once again, that Emery convey his greetings to Honey. It was obvious that Brundage 
wished to keep a close connection with both Emery and Honey. Furthermore, there 
existed no evidence to suggest that Brundage and South African Olympic affiliates 
enjoyed anything other than an ongoing, friendly relationship prior to the period 
when the South African apartheid issue was to become a worry for the IOC. 
It was not until a 22 September 1953 letter from Emery to Brundage that negative 
press news about the Olympic Games entered the correspondence.9 “These articles 
speak for themselves,” stated Emery, “but I am sorry to say they are causing quite a 
deal of dissension. We are endeavouring always to keep the Olympic Movement in 
mind, but articles such as appeared here are not conducive to the public being at all 
pleased.”10 Brundage responded quickly: 
Sensational stories of this kind, of course, are not helpful to the 
Olympic Movement, but it is difficult to prevent newspapers from 
featuring articles of this sort even though they are quite ridiculous. 
We have the same trouble everywhere. That is why one of the most 
important duties of National Olympic Committees is to teach the 
public (and that means the newspapers also) the philosophy of the 
Olympic Games and the code of amateur sport.11 
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Emery’s letter, and Brundage’s reply, referred to amateur sport and paid athletes 
being allowed to participate in the Games, which was becoming a hot button issue 
within the Olympic Movement. 
In a subsequent letter from Emery to Brundage, their friendly relationship 
continued unharmed by such negative reporting.12 In his response, Brundage thanked 
Emery for the letter, and mentioned: “Our greatest troubles today come from 
commercial and political interference…. If they are ready to support the ideals of the 
movement, very good, but many seek to take and not to give. In a materialistic world 
it is a continuous battle to maintain our high standards.”13 This amicable interaction 
between Emery and Brundage created a relationship close enough also to exchange 
information on sensitive Olympic matters, such as Russia’s, Poland’s, and Hungary’s 
teams possibly training in China to prepare for the 1956 Games scheduled for 
Melbourne, Australia.14 
Nonetheless, this amicable relationship between Brundage and Emery was cast in 
doubt in January 1956, when a letter from Emery to Brundage, for the first time, 
focused on apartheid in South Africa: “I am given to understand you were more than 
diplomatic when the question of the ‘colour bar’ came up at the meeting of the IOC in 
Paris and in view of that I thought perhaps you might wish to be informed of opinion 
in this country from the highest levels of this very contentious subject.”15 Emery went 
on to hint at a potential future ‘overreaction’ by the IOC, using football as an example: 
“How far the present international football delegation will get with their enquiry in 
South Africa (they are at present in Johannesburg) I do not know but one has the 
feeling that if they are not exceedingly careful they will do irreparable damage to 
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European international sport in this country.”16 In his response, Brundage clearly 
reiterated his and the IOC’s position: 
I am more or less familiar with the problems in your country and, as 
a matter of fact, we have a situation here due to misguided legislation 
that is equally serious…. I do know that these situations are very 
delicate and have to be handled with the utmost care. We, of course, 
have the problem of our fundamental principle, which requires that 
we welcome the youth of the world regardless of color, creed or 
politics.17 
This initial interaction regarding the South African issue was telling. Brundage fully 
supported Article 1 of the Olympic Charter, which was a fundamental principle that 
included: “No discrimination is allowed against any country or person on ground of 
race, religion or politics.”18 Therefore, this and any future support for Article 1 
appeared to have signaled to Emery the possibility of a confrontation with the IOC. 
Nonetheless, the South African racial issue was not then as pressing for Brundage as 
one might expect in retrospect. In two letters to Reginald Honey in February and April 
of 1956, Brundage did not mention the South African racial situation even in 
passing.19 
The South African issue did not resurface until three months later. On 12 June 1956, 
Emery sent a follow-up letter to Brundage, updating him on the results of the football 
inquiry previously mentioned. “I drop this short note to you,” wrote Emery, 
“expressing my very great pleasure at the decision of the International Football 
Association not to accede to the demands by the Coloured Football Association for 
another two years.”20 Further, Emery added: “When I am in Melbourne I will tell you 
personally and confidentially the whole of the setup in this country, as I am not a 
member of the IOC and can express my views publicly. I am quite sure that if I speak 
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to you … a lot of bother might be saved.”21 The “whole of the setup” referred to the 
structure of the sport system and the politics surrounding the decisions made in 
reference to domestic and international sport in South Africa. Emery was willing, 
indeed eager, to explain the South African sporting situation to Brundage. 
Over a year later, the pace of events surrounding the South African issue increased 
as Emery asked for Brundage’s advice: 
You will see from my letter that it is quite impossible for non-
Europeans and Europeans to compete with or against each other in 
South Africa and if any International Federation were to demand 
that we must accept non-Europeans in our teams, we could not 
possibly do so. As you know, Uganda, Kenya and Algeria have 
separate Olympic Committees and perhaps you, yourself, could 
suggest a way out of this impasse. The position is very serious as the 
demands coming from the non-European bodies for affiliation to the 
European bodies and the right to compete with South Africans at 
trials for inclusion in Olympic teams are being fostered for political 
reasons…. As I write this letter in confidence, I can inform you very 
definitely that there would not be 1% of the millions of non-
Europeans in this country who would care to train with and compete 
with Europeans. You will notice further in my letter that extreme 
difficulty will be found for the Bantu, the Cape Coloured and the 
Indian ever to agree in policy if they had one Association 
representing them all.22 
Emery’s letter ended with an encouragement extended to Brundage to visit South 
Africa in order to “see for [him]self the position regarding the non-European and 
European policy in this country.’’23 No other interpretation can be gained from 
Emery’s letter than a request to the IOC to become involved in the South African 
situation. However, he did try to prevent the racial implications by choosing the labels 
‘European’ and ‘non-European’ instead of white and non-white. After all, Emery was 
mounting an argument to maintain the status quo without being racist. He was 
convinced that the white and non-white populations would not be able to cooperate, 
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afraid, too, that International Sport Federations (ISF) might try to force the two 
groups to mesh in South Africa, an act that would threaten the racialized state of 
domestic sport. Emery, feeling pressured from domestic groups, asked the IOC to 
recognize representation from both groups, although he ultimately argued that the 
non-white bodies requested representation for political reasons, rather than for 
sporting reasons. Further, despite Emery appearing to be certain that the number of 
non-white athletes interested in competing with white sportsmen was extremely low, 
and it would be virtually impossible to assemble a sport body to represent the three 
non-white groups, he could have been creating invalidated premises for his argument 
to maintain the racial status quo. 
Within the same 27 November 1957 letter given to Brundage, Emery provided 
further information, which included a copy of Emery’s personal letter to Eugène 
Gouleau, Secretary of the International Weightlifting Association (i.e., Fédération 
Internationale Haltérophile et Culturiste). Emery requested a favour from Gouleau: 
“You will recall also that you asked my help in the voting so that you would be 
appointed as President of the International Weight-lifting Federation. I pointed out to 
you the difficulty that would arise if your Federation demanded that non-Europeans 
must take part in sport against Europeans in South Africa.”24 There was little doubt 
that Emery was concerned with the rise of the non-racial South African Amateur 
Weightlifting and Bodybuilding Federation (SAAWBF): 
European Governing bodies of sport in South Africa have at all times 
offered assistance, financially and actively, in helping non-
Europeans to take part in amateur sport and it is mainly through 
Government subsidies and subsidies by various Public Bodies that it 
made it possible for non-Europeans to take part in amateur sport in 
this country. This is particularly the case in regard to the thousands 
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of Africans who are employed on the Mines. Insofar as these people 
are concerned, they have no wish to take part in sport outside their 
own areas and it is only a few people who are controlling the non-
European Weight-lifting Association who are pressing, and we think 
for political reasons only, their claims to take part with South Africa 
at the Olympic Games.25 
Here, Emery defended the racism of the white governing bodies by pointing out 
that white groups offered assistance to non-white groups to take part in amateur 
sport, and at the same time, critically stated that it was only the political motives of a 
select few from the SAAWBF who wanted representation at the Olympic Games. 
Further, Emery reminded Gouleau of issues that might arise by championing the cause 
of non-European sport bodies in South Africa and offered suggestions on how to deal 
with non-Europeans: 
I will suggest to you now that if you grant direct affiliation to your 
body by any non-European body in South Africa you will find that 
before long you will have applications for affiliation from the Bantu 
(native), Cape Coloured and Indians as we have found for years past 
that these three races will not agree among each other and I 
personally feel you will have extreme difficulty in having a 
recognised South African body among these three races. Since time 
immemorial, the non-Europeans and the Europeans have never 
mixed socially or in sport in South Africa. It is the policy of the 
country and a policy that will be never removed. I am suggesting to 
Mr. Avery Brundage that the question of the non-Europeans in South 
Africa must be discussed at a meeting of the International Olympic 
Committee to see if some way out cannot be found to permit the non-
Europeans from South Africa being represented at the Olympic 
Games even if it means sending two separate teams. The 
International Olympic Committee created a precedent by dividing 
China into Nationalist China and Communist China, allowing them to 
send separate teams. I have been Secretary of the [South African 
National Olympic Committee] for 45 years and it is only in the past 
12 months that we have received any applications for non-
Europeans to represent South Africa with Europeans overseas. I 
would suggest further that if your Association were to demand our 
accepting non-Europeans to travel with and compete with South 
African Europeans, we would not be able to do so and you would be 
losing the substance for the shadow.26 
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A month later Brundage responded to Emery: “Unfortunately, however, one of the 
fundamental principles of the Olympic Movement is involved and therefore I cannot 
give you an answer. I shall give more thought to the subject and perhaps discuss it 
confidentially at the next meeting of our Executive Board.”27 Brundage avoided 
providing a response to the now dramatically complicated situation. Although he 
hinted at discussing it at the subsequent IOC Executive Board meeting, the issue was 
not formally raised until the 22 May 1959 meeting in Munich.28 
Two months after Brundage sent his brief letter to Emery, the IOC President 
received a reply from Emery, further extending his argument that non-white groups 
would not be able to organize single representation. He also reminded Brundage that 
the South African issue was a domestic matter: 
I now send a cutting from to-days [sic] Johannesburg Daily 
Newspaper from which you will see that the Africans, that is Bantu, 
want less co-operation of Indians, coloureds and European interests. 
This bears out entirely what I have told Mr. Gouleau and I humbly 
suggest that your Executive does nothing at all in this matter until 
we write to you again an official letter in this connection…. We are 
doing our best to solve this problem ourselves, and we are the only 
people who can solve this problem, as nobody can solve it for us. We 
will write you fully after the 18th March and one of our Country’s 
representatives will endeavour to make personal contact with you 
or your Executive.29 
This was the first time that Emery requested Brundage and the IOC not to involve 
themselves in the South African issue. SANOC wanted to try to control the issue itself 
without IOC intervention towards a resolution of the situation. After not hearing from 
Emery for six weeks, Brundage wrote to Emery for an update: 
Pressure is mounting and I am receiving many protests and requests 
for official statements from all over the world. While our rules are 
quite clear, as you know, I have as yet made no pronouncement. 
Sooner or later, and probably sooner, the matter will be placed on 
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our agenda, and there can only be one result…. In your letter you say 
‘We are doing our best to solve this problem ourselves and we are 
the only people who can solve this problem, as nobody can solve it 
for us.’ I am sympathetic to your point of view because we have 
similar problems in this country, which have not always been 
handled wisely. I hope, therefore, that you can develop a policy and 
a program that will solve this thorny problem and that we will hear 
from you shortly.30 
Obviously, the South African issue and SANOC’s handling of the issue garnered 
greater attention from Brundage. He was well aware that something had to be done 
soon; he could only stall on the issue for a limited amount of time. To Emery, he again 
stressed Article 1 of the Olympic Charter. The pressure mounted intensely for Emery 
and SANOC to develop a policy and program to solve the racial discrimination issue. 
On 18 April 1958, Emery finally responded to Brundage. First, in a private addition 
to the official correspondence, Emery stated: 
I am quite sure that if you could persuade your Executive not to have 
this matter fully discussed until after the 1960 Games, I feel 
confident that there will be some solution as far as this country is 
concerned. It would be rather tragic if any action were taken that 
would compel us to withdraw from the Olympic Games in 1960…. 
You will remember in Melbourne you said as far as you could see no 
action would be taken in this matter to prevent South Africa taking 
part in the 1960 Games…. Again I state we are doing our best to 
overcome this difficulty, but it is not an easy matter and I will keep 
you posted as to what is happening.31 
Emery’s plea to Brundage to postpone the major discussion on the South African 
issue until after the 1960 Games, allowing South Africa to take part in the Games, 
insured their presence in Rome in 1960. 
In the official part of the 18 April letter, Emery provided a lengthy explanation of 
non-European and European participation in South Africa in regard to the Olympic 
Games. He explained that the South African Olympic team had consisted entirely of 
65 
 
 
Europeans because of traditional policy based on social grounds. Emery then 
proceeded to discuss the suitability of non-white athletes as members of the Olympic 
team. First, he made the point that most non-white sportsmen were professional, 
which excluded them from Olympic competition; and second, those who were 
considered amateur did not possess the necessary skills to compete on an 
international level. Then, Emery raised the issue of claiming unfairness for political 
purpose: 
In recent years the Non-European sportsmen in South Africa have 
adopted the attitude that they are unfairly excluded from 
participation in what can be called ‘International Sport’. Certain Non-
European Sportsmen have called into being, quite irregularly, 
‘sporting bodies’ and excluding the colour bar from their 
Constitution. These bodies are now making representations that 
inasmuch as the existing [South African National Olympic 
Committee] restricts competition to Europeans, the existing 
Association should be expelled from the International Olympic 
Committee and replaced by the wholly incompetent and useless 
bodies that the Non-Europeans have formed and are forming…. We 
in South Africa appreciate that these mushroom associations will 
never be able to accomplish anything useful, but unfortunately 
overseas opinion is tending to reprobate our traditional attitude…. 
The [South African National Olympic Committee] is well aware that 
the applications now being made by a few non-Europeans in this 
country for the right to compete with Europeans in the South African 
Team at the Olympic Games are being made mainly for political 
purposes.32 
To this, Emery added further details on the conditions and procedure for non-
white athletes to become legitimately considered for international competition: 
Several of the South African Governing Bodies of Sport in South 
Africa are willing to permit the affiliation of Non-European bodies to 
their Associations, providing their representatives are Europeans. 
The information which the South African Sporting Federations 
require before affiliation could be granted is as follows: (1) The 
Constitution of its Association and whether it includes BANTU 
(NATIVE), INDIANS and CAPE COLOUREDS. (2) The names and 
addresses of the officials of the Non-European Provincial 
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Associations. (3) The number of Clubs in each Province, the number 
of active competitors and the venues in which competitions are held 
by the Non-Europeans and under whose control…. Providing the 
South African Governing Bodies of Sport can obtain this information 
(WHICH THEY HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO DO SINCE 1947) affiliation 
would in all probability be granted. Also providing the Non-
European sports bodies in this country WERE PROPERLY 
CONSTITUTED AND REPRESENTED, that is the BANTU (NATIVE), 
THE INDIAN, AND THE CAPE COLOURED there would be no 
objection to one of their teams, or individuals, being given authority 
to compete in International Sport, PROVIDING THE EUROPEAN 
SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNING BODIES OF SPORT WERE SATISFIED 
WITH THE ABILITY OF THE NON-EUROPEAN COMPETITORS SO 
NOMINATED TO TAKE PART IN INTERNATIONAL SPORT…. when 
the so-called amateurs in the Non-European sections of sport have 
been judged by Europeans who are recognised officials it has been 
found that their performances cannot match up to the European 
standards in this country.33 
Finally, Emery recommended meeting with Reginald Honey if the issue required 
immediate attention. To add to his argument, in a subsequent letter, Emery quoted the 
Rhodesian Empire and Olympic Games Association minutes to help explain SANOC’s 
appeal to Brundage for his consideration in connection with this matter, by shifting 
responsibility to the respective sports governing bodies. Emery felt it was the 
responsibility of each NSF to choose the right time to augment the rules of their 
respective sports’ charters to accommodate multi-racial teams. 
After receiving the letters, Brundage responded to Emery by pointing out the 
urgency of the situation as the international pressure to resolve the South African 
issue increased: 
I don’t know how long we can defer action on this matter since we 
are receiving letters of protest from all over the world, and as you 
know, it has become an issue in Great Britain because of the 
Commonwealth Games this summer…. I read your report with 
sympathy because I am well acquainted with what happens in 
matters of this kind. You state that the individuals in question are 
neither amateurs nor of international class, and I am reasonably sure 
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you are correct. If you held separate tryouts, none of them would 
qualify on one ground or another, and you would comply with the 
rules. Why is this not the solution? … Someone may raise this 
question at our meeting and I hope Mr. Honey will be there.34 
Brundage suggested a ‘sporting’ solution to the problem that would be in full 
compliance with the rules for qualification (and thus sidestep the political 
opprobrium). Less than two weeks later, Emery responded to Brundage’s sense of 
urgency: 
From this letter you will see the attitude which has been adopted by 
our Government, and I think the last paragraph represents the views 
expressed in all our previous correspondence … nothing would 
please us better in this country if we could officially hold these 
separate Try Outs. At the moment it would be most unfair for us to 
attempt such Try Outs as the Non-Europeans’ Associations are not 
formed through the country. There are a few mushroom bodies as 
pointed out previously who would submit candidates for Try Outs; 
this would not by any stretch of imagination represent the Non-
Europeans in this country…. My Chairman and the members of our 
Council give you an assurance which you can pass on to the members 
of your Executive that the [South African National Olympic 
Committee] will do its utmost to comply with the rules of the 
International Olympic Committee, but your members must surely 
realise that until such times that the Non-Europeans are agreed 
amongst themselves as to what control they desire it is impossible 
for any European Association to arrange separate trials.35 
Clearly, Emery did not want the issue to be discussed at the IOC level because of 
the risk of being asked not to attend the 1960 Rome Games. Showing optimism, he 
even provided an example to support the progress he assured was being made: 
As a matter of fact a Non-European Soccer Team and Athletic Team 
will leave this month from South Africa to take part in competition 
in the Federation i.e., Northern and Southern Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland. This is a step in the right direction; as a result of this we 
are confident we will be able to lead the Non-Europeans into the 
right way of thinking in so far as International Sport is concerned.36 
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Emery needing to lead the non-white population “into the right way of thinking” 
indicated the non-whites were practicing the “wrong way of thinking” about 
international sport. Unfortunately, it was not clearly indicated by Emery if he was 
referring to a “white way” of practicing international sport or he was referring to how 
the international structure of sport and competition functioned in a certain way that 
the non-white population must learn. 
In an effort to be transparent, Emery admitted that SANOC had a problem with the 
population of Indian origin which was seeking affiliation with the International 
Football Association and the weightlifting association. Emery also included a nine 
page memorandum from the Football Association of Southern Africa to FIFA and 
another document to Brundage outlining South African government policy.37 Further, 
he left Brundage with a hopeful outlook on ways the issue could be resolved: 
My Association may ask Mr. Honey to attend your meeting in Monaco 
and I sincerely trust that for the sake of the European Population in 
this country that no decision will be taken by your Executive or the 
International Committee debarring us from competition in Rome…. 
We have given you our assurance that as soon as the Non-Europeans 
are organised in this country and are affiliated to our own South 
African Governing Bodies of Sport, trials will be given these people 
providing that they will accept such trials.38 
In addition to the “official letter” to Brundage, a personal and confidential letter 
from Emery also dated 6 May 1958, reiterated much of the same argument. Four 
months later, on 11 September 1958, Emery wrote yet another personal letter to the 
IOC President: 
I have been advised by a Mr. Brutus, a Coloured member of the non-
European Weightlifting Association, who describes himself as an 
International Correspondent, that you have written to him at the 
time of the International Committee in Tokyo, advising him that you 
are asking my Association for a report on South Africa. If this is the 
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case, I respectfully state that I have not received such a letter from 
you, but all the reports we have previously written you from my 
Association officially are the correct versions…. We have now 
obtained a list of the names and addresses of the Chairman and 
Secretaries of the Associations in South Africa of this non-European 
Weightlifting body, and it is the first time such information has been 
received since our first request in 1947. We have asked the official 
European South African Amateur Weightlifting Association to 
interview these Chairman and Secretaries and to ascertain if these 
Clubs are genuine or not.39 
This letter marked the first instance demonstrating a disconnect in the 
communication between Emery and Brundage. Indeed, and of critical notation, it 
marked the first occasion that the name Dennis Brutus entered the narrative. Brutus, 
a representative of the SAAWBF, was an activist gaining non-white organization 
recognition within South Africa. As will become clearly evident, he was less than 
popular with Emery and SANOC. Nonetheless, in a quick follow-up to his note of 11 
September, Emery sent another letter to Brundage suggesting evidence of the 
domestic struggle to organize non-whites. At the same time, he was trying to discredit 
Brutus and the SAAWBF: 
[From the attached newspaper cutting] you will see that in the South 
African Parliament the Cape Coloureds Representative, Mr. G.S.P. Le 
Roux, said that the coloureds demanded that Apartheid [sic] should 
be applied between them and the Natives. In the penultimate 
paragraph of this extract you will see that the Minister of Native 
Affairs and the Prime [M]inister of South Africa, Dr. Verwoerd, said 
that he agreed that Apartheid [sic] should be applied not only 
between Coloured and Native, but also between Native and Indian, 
and furthermore not only the Coloureds were asking for this 
apartheid, but the Bantu races, such as Zulus, were asking for 
protection against the Indian…. From this true extract from our 
South African Government you will see how difficult and dangerous 
it might be for any of the International Sporting federations affiliated 
to the International Olympic Committee to accept any direct 
application made by a Non-European Association from South 
Africa…. We are convinced that Mr. Brutus the international 
Correspondent of the Non-European Weightlifting Association is not 
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only concerned with the welfare of Non-European Weightlifters in 
this country.40 
With all this in mind, a restive Brundage tried to allay Emery’s concerns about the 
South African situation, while at the same time reminding him of the urgency of the 
situation: 
Rest assured that the International Olympic Committee is not going 
to intervene in your domestic affairs. In any event, we do not 
recognize National Federations…. The only question is whether we 
can continue to recognise the [South African National Olympic 
Committee]. The subject has not yet been raised officially, but it 
probably will be in the near future, since we have begun to hear from 
other countries on this subject…. I am fully aware of your problems 
and the difficulty of solving them. I should think that perhaps the 
simplest way would be for the National Federations to have two or 
more sub-organizations to handle independently the different 
groups. Then for international competition each group could hold its 
own tryouts and a composite team could be selected from the 
winners of these tryouts soon…. I hope that you are making effort to 
solve this problem, since it will undoubtedly be placed on the agenda 
of one of our meetings.41 
Brundage’s remark on the question of the expulsion of SANOC quite possibly 
reflected the pressure felt by the IOC from other countries. Brundage encouraged 
Emery to solve the problem and again suggested to have separate tryouts organized 
by NSFs. In his response a few weeks later, Emery presented a new idea: 
I am quite sure that sooner or later we will overcome this difficulty, 
but the only way is for the International Olympic Committee to 
permit two teams from South Africa…. We will keep in close contact 
with you in this matter, particularly in regard to when meetings of 
the International Olympic Committee are held, and then at your next 
meeting we will suggest how we think this matter can be overcome 
more expeditiously.42 
Emery’s optimistic tone hinted that SANOC’s solution might be the only course to 
follow. For the moment, he appeared to forget who was in charge of the Olympic 
Games, in effect, the IOC, not SANOC. Attached with Emery’s letter was a copy of a 
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letter sent from Emery to SAAWBF, in which he noted that SAAWBF could not request 
affiliation to any international sports governing bodies because the South African 
Amateur Weightlifting Union (SAAWU) was already affiliated with SANOC. SANOC 
could not compel any Association to accept affiliation, but if SAAWU accepted 
SAAWBF, SANOC would have no objection. Further, Emery reminded SAAWBF 
secretary G.R. Smith: 
The [South African National Olympic Committee] is doing its utmost 
with international Bodies to overcome the difficulties of the colour 
bar insofar as South Africa is concerned…. The [South African 
National Olympic Committee] would have to be satisfied if you 
become affiliated to the S.A. Amateur Weightlifting Association that 
your Association caters for all Non-Europeans, i.e. Bantu, Cape 
Coloured and Indian, and we think that this assurance will be asked 
for by the S.A. Amateur Weightlifting Association…. I do not think any 
good purpose will be served by dealing with your typewritten 
review of our discussions seriatum, and I can assure you that the S.A. 
Governing Bodies of Sport (European) are doing their utmost to try 
and overcome the colour bar insofar as overseas Teams are 
concerned. It is not possible to hasten this question more than we 
are doing at the moment. Perhaps more patience by your own 
Federation will bring better results.43 
After reviewing Emery’s newest letter, as well as the attachment of the 
correspondence to the SAAWBF, Brundage reminded Emery of the urgency of the 
situation, emphasizing the value of having South African representation at future 
meetings: 
I note that you are still trying to find a solution to the thorny race 
problems and I hope that you will be successful. I am reasonably 
sure, however, that the IOC will not accept two separate teams from 
your or any other country. I still think that separate tryouts with an 
impartial jury, as I suggested in my previous letters, might be the 
answer…. In any event, I hope that Mr. Honey will be present at our 
coming meeting in Munich next May. There is more and more 
pressure, as I told you, coming from different directions on this 
question and there should be someone present with a thorough 
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firsthand knowledge of the subject to present your point of view 
when it is discussed.44 
A week later, Emery once again assured Brundage that SANOC‘s actions would not 
cast doubt on the respectability of the IOC. “We appreciate the kind thoughts you 
express in your letter,” wrote Emery, “and we are certainly taking action as far as this 
country is concerned so that your International Olympic Committee will not be 
embarrassed.”45 Emery followed up with another letter soon thereafter, maintaining 
the optimistic tone:  
I am pleased to tell you that our Mr. Honey will attend the meeting of 
the International Olympic Committee in Munich next May. By that time 
I am convinced that the arrangements we will make regarding the 
competition by Non-Europeans will be satisfactory to the International 
Olympic Committee, and also to the International Sporting 
Federations…. Meantime it is our earnest request that nothing is done 
in the matter by your Committee until such time as our full and final 
report is placed before you in May.46 
Once again, Emery projected confidence that a consensus would be reached 
satisfactory to the IOC. Referring to public opinion, Emery enclosed a news item: “I 
send for your information a page from a Johannesburg paper, regarding the colour 
bar…. You will see even the Press are anxious that we can find a solution to this vexed 
question, and which I am sure we can do.”47 Such optimism might have been 
overstated, as reflected in a letter from Emery to Brundage less than a month later: 
For your information I append an extract from a letter received from 
the S.A. Cycling Federation dated 22nd November, which will again 
give you the difficulties we are encountering in having the Non-
European Associations applying for affiliation to any South African 
Governing Body of Sport…. I am still convinced that the Bantu, Cape 
Coloured and the Native in this country will never mix insofar as 
control for Non-Europeans is concerned, and I again state that the 
only troubles we are having are from a few non-European people in 
Port Elizabeth, not numbering more than one dozen, bringing all this 
matter up for political reasons.48 
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A month later, to strengthen his case about the difficulties South Africa was 
experiencing to properly integrate the non-white population into the current sport 
system, Emery provided further newspaper article evidence that suggested to pursue 
the incorporation of the non-white population with caution: 
This article indicates how extremely careful we must be in South 
Africa in the admittance of Non-Europeans to Governing Bodies of 
Sport until such time as we are certain that the Non-European Bodies 
will be able to adhere to the amateur rules and regulations which are 
required by International Bodies.49 
Mr. Bourquin [manager of Durban’s Native Administration 
Department] says that growing tensions in Native sports 
organizations may – unless rectified – lead to serious disturbances…. 
In a two-page report Mr. Bourquin says that the Durban and District 
African Football Association, because of growing internal dissension, 
is ‘becoming difficult to control and therefore represents a threat to 
law and order.’50 
A week later, Brundage received a letter from Emery with an attached letter that 
had been circulated to all ISFs and the British Empire and Commonwealth Games 
Federation (BECGF).51 In the circular, Emery discussed the affiliation of non-
European sport associations. He announced that the first application made by the 
South African Bantu Amateur Athletic Association to the South African Amateur 
Athletic Association, had, in principle, been approved by satisfying three conditions: 
(1) The South African Bantu Amateur Athletic Association will be 
considered as a federation of clubs or associations and as such will 
be entitled to two representative votes on the parent body. 
(2) All competitive meetings organised by the non-European 
association are to be conducted in accordance with the recognised 
policy of trusteeship relating to non-European affairs practiced in 
South Africa. 
(3) Any problems in regard to racial questions which might arise will 
be dealt with in consultation with the Union Government.52 
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Further, Emery provided details to all ISFs to explain what was happening in South 
Africa. Two weeks later, Brundage wrote a brief letter to Emery, reiterating that he 
was “… well aware of the difficulties presented by the racial problem in your country 
and I am glad to note that it has your continued attention. It is most important that 
Mr. Honey attends the next session of the IOC in Munich this coming May.”53 
Unable to avoid the South African issue within the halls of the IOC any longer, 
Brundage realized that in Munich penetrating questions would be asked about South 
Africa. The issue was becoming more public and global by the day – Brundage referred 
Emery to a feature article, The Tragic Story of South Africa, in the 30 January 1959 
issue of U.S. News & World Report.54 Emery’s response a week later, presented 
concerns relative to Brutus’ involvement in the South African situation: 
… I wrote you recently saying that application had been accepted by 
the South African Amateur Athletic Association of the Non-European 
Body, which is comprised of the Bantu (Native). You will see … that 
our friend Mr. Brutus is again being difficult in this matter, and trying 
to upset the very fair arrangements which have been attempted. Mr. 
Brutus is an Indian, and insofar the applications for affiliation by the 
Non-Europeans have been most difficult. It is this type of gentleman 
who is causing the trouble in this country for the affiliation of the 
Non-Europeans. As you can see he does not wish to accept a 
subservient status. They want full control the same as the table 
tennis got and which has killed this sport in South Africa.55 
Clearly Emery viewed Brutus as an antagonist in South Africa, as well as a deterrent 
to unifying the non-white population to achieve affiliation to NSFs. Shorter and curter 
responses from Brundage began to signal exasperation and the erosion of their close 
connection. As the situation became more serious and entered the IOC’s agenda, 
Brundage’s correspondence tone became more formal. For example, in Brundage’s 
next letter, he thanked Emery for the informative newspaper clippings, since the 
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clippings, “… indicate the difficulties that you face in trying to find a solution to the 
serious problems in your country;” he went on to “suggest that when Mr. Honey comes 
to our meeting in Munich next May that he is well supplied with information of this 
kind.”56 Brundage’s message conveyed the challenge to South African Olympic 
affiliates to defend themselves against the accusation of racial discrimination within 
the sport system. 
Two months later, Emery responded in a lengthy communication to Brundage. It 
included two attachments: one, a report from SANOC that dealt with the applications 
for affiliation for non-European sporting bodies; and, second, a letter from Emery to 
the Secretary of the International Athletic Federation.57 In his personal letter, Emery 
had much to report, much of it of dire concern: 
… it would appear that the question of Colour Bar at the 1960 
Olympic Games in Rome is to be discussed by the International 
Committee during its meeting in Munich in May 1959…. An 
Association has been formed in Durban naming itself the South 
African Sports Association and this association, we understand, is 
making application for direct affiliation to the International Olympic 
Committee for recognition as a controlling body of sport throughout 
South Africa. The [South African National Olympic Committee] gives 
you an absolute assurance that this body is comprised of a half a 
dozen non-Europeans (mostly Indians) and they cannot possibly 
control sport in the union of South Africa. They are not organised to 
do, they have no facilities, and they would not, on any consideration 
whatsoever, be accepted by any of the South African Governing 
Bodies of Sport in this country…. Here then is the crux of the whole 
position, where a few coloureds and Indians are endeavouring to 
upset the affiliation of the properly constituted Bantu Athletic 
Association. This resolution is indicative of the attitude being 
adopted by an International correspondent, Mr. Brutus, who is 
mentioned in the attached report and who has had direct 
correspondence with you…. No doubt it will be asked why non-
European have not been accepted in International Teams from South 
Africa previously. The reason is that, in the first place, until 1957 
none of the non-European Bodies, whose sport is on the Olympic 
programmes, had been properly constituted and controlled, and 
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individual non-European had no desire or wish to attend or to apply 
for membership of European clubs. It was only at the end of 1957/58 
that any organised non-European association had applied for 
affiliation. Naturally, none of the South African Governing Bodies of 
Sport could accept applications from mushroom non-European 
bodies that were being formed, one in opposition to the other, as has 
so repeatedly been stated to you, it being extremely difficult for the 
non-European who is Bantu, Coloured or Indian to agree among 
themselves as to the control of their particular sport. Irrespective of 
what Mr. Brutus or the correspondent for the South Africa Sports 
Association, or the South African Amateur Athletic and Cycling 
Association, may state in a memorandum to you, the [South African 
National Olympic Committee], which has been affiliated to the 
International Olympic Committee for nearly forty years suggests 
that if any consideration whatsoever is given to the thought that non-
Europeans could control the whole of the sport in South Africa, is 
ridiculous, and would be the complete end of international sport 
between South Africa and countries overseas…. Our Mr. Honey does 
not speak with a mandate from South Africa and will give his own 
views as a member of the International Olympic Committee, but in 
view of the fact that a few non-Europeans (not the South African 
native) but Coloured and Indians are forcing this issue, I am sure you 
will reason with Mr. Honey on this most difficult question…. Finally, 
the [South African National Olympic Committee] gives you an 
assurance that when the non-European amateur associations are 
properly constituted, and control the various section of non-
Europeans’ sport in South Africa, they will be accepted as affiliated 
members of the South African Governing Bodies of Sport. The 
assurance is also given that no obstacle will be placed in the way of 
any non-European competitor, in any event including the British 
Empire and Olympic Games, of taking part in these events if the 
controlling body nominates him to the [South African National 
Olympic Committee].58 
This statement marked the first mention of the South African Sports Association 
(SASA), which was a group trying to promote non-racial sport and defame SANOC. 
Emery immediately endeavoured to discredit it in order to protect SANOC from any 
challenges in respect of control of sport in South Africa. He pointed to Brutus as the 
cause of the continued fight against SANOC as the legitimate NOC. Emery, in 
customary fashion, again cited the lack of interest by non-white groups to partake in 
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Olympic programmes at least until 1957, and the lack of non-white organizations, as 
reasons for low or no non-white participation. The notion of non-whites controlling 
South African sport, in Emery’s view, was ridiculous. He hoped his assertion that non-
white amateur athletes would face no obstacles towards competing internationally, 
once proper affiliations were made to the South African Governing Bodies of Sport, 
would assure the IOC’s cooperation. 
The five-page attachment from SANOC on the subject of SANOC and non-European 
affiliations stated that SANOC’s constitution, dating to 1920, did not exclude non-
whites. The attachment’s list of the South African Governing Bodies of Sport indicated 
that the only non-white associations interested in affiliation were weightlifting, 
athletics, cycling, boxing and football. SANOC described these sports in detail and 
provided updates on the status of the non-white affiliation process with regard to 
each association. It was clearly stated that there were no restrictions on non-white 
athletes to compete internationally if each respective sport were to form a national 
association representing all non-whites, which, in turn, would then be accepted by the 
NSFs, providing that all athletes were confirmed amateurs, and that the athletes 
involved achieved international standards. 
To provide a specific detailed example of the affiliation process, Emery provided a 
copy of his correspondence with D.P.T. Payn, Secretary of the International Amateur 
Athletics Federation (IAAF).59 Further, Emery confirmed the legitimacy of the South 
African Bantu Amateur Athletic and Cycling Association (SABAACA), which was an 
affiliated non-white member of the controlling bodies of athletics and cycling in South 
Africa. To provide proof of SABAACA’s legitimacy, Emery included a letter from its 
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secretary, D.F. Botha60 indicating SABAACA’s acceptance of the terms of the South 
African Cycling and Athletic organizations. Botha stated: “We have been assured that 
when any of our athletes or cyclists reach the standard required for international 
competition that they will be included in South African teams selected for the 
Commonwealth Games and/or Olympic Games. My association is very pleased about 
this and we feel that this is a step forward in athletics and cycling among non-Whites 
in this country.”61 Emery also attempted to warn Payn about the danger of, he argued, 
illegitimate and non-approved associations attempting to attain international 
recognition, again warning against Brutus’ activities: 
There is a certain Mr. Brutus of Port Elizabeth to whom reference is 
made in the memorandum of the Olympic Games Association and 
who is causing a considerable amount of annoyance in South Africa 
with his letters to International Federations on behalf of the non-
Whites. I respectfully ask your Federation not to be misled by any of 
these mushroom associations which are being formed by non-
Whites in this country, many for political reasons, but to know that 
the present South African Amateur Athletic Association controlled 
by Europeans and who have accepted the non-White South African 
Bantu Amateur Athletic and Cycling Association as an affiliated 
member, is the one body in South Africa in whom you can have the 
utmost faith in the promotion of athletics for both White and non-
white people in this country.62 
It was obvious in his lengthy letter to Brundage that Emery was assuming 
ownership and control of the situation. He constantly provided Brundage with fodder 
to support SANOC’s progress. 
Emery also continued to provide material showing the disunity among non-white 
sporting bodies. For example, he sent two documents to Brundage highlighting a 
quarrel between SAAWBF and another representative from a seemingly false 
organization trying to affiliate with SANOC.63 In addition, as SASA tried to become 
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more noticeable, Emery again attempted to discredit it, enlisting one Sol Cruste, who 
in A Plea for Co-Ordination on 1 May 1959, claimed that the SASA was not 
representative of non-European sporting bodies; a new sports co-ordinating body 
was recommended.64 Emery advised Brundage that the letter from Cruste: 
… makes it perfectly plain that the South African Sports Association, 
non-White, who have submitted a report to you, does not in fact 
exist. It has not been formed and is not representative of 0.001% of 
non-Europeans in South Africa … I am sorry to have to give you all 
this trouble, but unless you have the true facts of the position 
regarding non-Europeans in South Africa and their endeavours to 
take control through a few political leaders, you or some of the 
Members of the international Olympic Committee at your previous 
meeting, may have been misled.65 
Brundage may have harboured doubts as to Cruste’s authority to make such claims 
since his position – an unspecified association with a Vocational Training Centre – 
only appears at the bottom of the letter. There existed no additional correspondence 
to Brundage identifying Sol Cruste as a trustworthy and authoritative source. 
Brundage was also kept appraised of the way the issue was received in the South 
African public. He received a copy of a letter sent to Otto Mayer from A.G. McKenzie, 
who was a representative of Johannesburg’s daily The Star. In the letter, McKenzie 
thanked Mayer for the information on the proceedings of the IOC General Session in 
Munich, where the South African issue was formally discussed.66 McKenzie also 
included The Star article in which Mayer’s remarks were cited. The article stated that 
South Africa and Rhodesia would continue to be a part of Olympic Movement on the 
condition that each do everything possible to develop non-white sport. A lofty 
statement, perhaps, but it became clear that the IOC’s patience in the matter was being 
sorely tried. For instance, Mayer was quoted: “‘In future the committee will maintain 
80 
 
 
a strict check on what has been promised by Mr. Reginald Honey…. If the committee 
has not taken action before, it is because the problem was not so important. Sport 
among the Coloured people of South Africa was not so developed as it is now.”67 The 
Star article also focussed on South African IOC member Reginald Honey: 
Mr. Honey’s defence of South Africa’s practices was two-fold: He said 
that the South Africa Olympic Games Association would encourage 
non-European sport and the non-Europeans would automatically be 
included in the South African teams if they reached Olympic 
standards…. The executive board asked Mr. Honey for a statement in 
view of the representations it had received from the South African 
Sports Federation (a mixed organization) and from the British-based 
campaign against race discrimination in sport and in view of the 
attack which Mr. Alexis Romanov one of the Russian delegates had 
made in Rome last week…. Mr. Honey said non-European sport had 
evolved slowly in South Africa and gave a formal assurance that 
South Africa complied strictly with the Olympic charter…. When Mr. 
Honey added that any non-European athletes who reached the 
required standards would be included in South African Olympic 
teams, Mr. Brundage asked whether they would get visas to leave the 
Union…. Yes, replied Mr. Honey. He had recently had an assurance to 
that effect from the Minister of the Interior.68 
Brundage accepted Honey’s assurance as the IOC could only request that the South 
African NOC find a solution in keeping with the Olympic Charter. By now the South 
African issue within the context of the Olympic Movement had escalated to a level 
where representatives from both sides began to issue public statements. Prior to the 
IOC making its public statement Mayer informed SANOC that the IOC wished to issue 
a statement to the press addressing the subject of racial discrimination in South 
Africa: “Before [issuing a statement] we wish to submit [to] you our text with the 
request that you let us know your approval or your eventual remarks as soon as 
possible.”69 The IOC deferred to SANOC on the wording of this following proposed 
statement that addressed racial discrimination in South Africa: 
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… while [SANOC] does not control all South African bodies and 
therefore cannot dictate their policy, it is taking active steps to 
ensure them to accept the view that all peoples in South Africa are 
entitled to compete in international sport and particularly in the 
Olympic Games. It has made a public statement that if any non-white 
amateur athlete proves through tests that he is of international or 
Olympic standard, no objection will be raised to his being sent to 
take part in these over-sea competitions…. It has informed us that 
the government of South Africa will raise no objection to this 
problem, and that passports will be issued…. the N.O.C. of South 
Africa has informed us that they are proceeding to assist in providing 
training and coaching facilities and organization leadership to non-
whites.70 
Indirectly addressing Mayer’s letter, a frustrated Emery wrote to Brundage, 
indicating the increasing divergence of their opinions on this issue: 
It is, of course, quite impossible for the [South African National 
Olympic Committee] to accept the affiliation from two separate 
Bodies, and the South African Sports Federation must now apply to 
the various South African Governing bodies of Sport for affiliation of 
their various sections. I am sure you will also realise that the South 
African Governing Bodies of Sport will not accept affiliation from any 
Association that is not properly constituted.71 
Emery thus, in part, contradicted Mayer’s press release, noting that it would not be 
easy for non-white amateur athletes to prove that they were of international or 
Olympic competition standard. Emery remained unmoved on the process of non-
white associations first becoming affiliated with the respective NSFs recognized by 
SANOC, before being able to nominate non-white atletes for tryouts. From Emery’s 
point of view, the IOC press statement was an oversimplification of the process, which 
would increase pressure on SANOC to admit those who were not prepared to compete 
on the international stage. 
However, in his subsequent letter to Brundage, Emery provided an official update 
on SANOC’s deliberations.72 At SANOC’s meeting of 18 June 1959, Honey recounted 
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his meetings in Rome with NOCs, and with the IOC and ISFs in Munich. His message to 
them, assertively delivered, was that SANOC would not entertain the idea of two 
Olympic Games Associations in South Africa, and that SASA had been advised that 
non-white bodies of sport must affiliate to the South African Governing Bodies of 
Sport, which were, in turn, affiliated with ISFs. Further: 
The [South African National Olympic Committee] has advised the 
South African Sports Association (non-white) that they cannot in 
future have any further dealings with this Association, as it has no 
say whatsoever in the selection of Teams for the Olympic Games, as 
these selections are made, as in all other countries, by the Governing 
Bodies of Sport concerned. My Association is quite confident that all 
people of South Africa will be given the opportunity of competing in 
international events overseas and as mentioned in the statement to 
be issued by the Chancellor of the International Olympic Committee 
any non-white who reaches the standard required by South Africa 
for sending a team to international sports will be sent…. My 
Association trusts that, in view of the assurance that we have now 
given, correspondence between the South African Sports Association 
or any non-white Association which refuses to accept affiliation by a 
recognised South African Governing Body of Sport which has been 
affiliated constitutionally to their International Sports Federation 
should be returned to South Africa.73 
But there was more. Emery, desiring to maintain strict control of sport in South 
Africa, reiterated this point with the IOC and the international community. In addition, 
to avoid any confusion, Emery clarified the selection process for South African teams: 
The South African Governing Bodies of Sport, whose event figure on 
the Olympic or British Empire & Commonwealth Games programme 
conduct their own trials, and after these trials have been completed 
forward their nominations in order of merit to the South African 
Olympic and Commonwealth Games Association [SANOC]. My 
Association then deals with the nominations received and sends the 
Team according to the amount of money it has available for that 
purpose. If the occasion arises when the [South African National 
Olympic Committee] has not sufficient money to send the full team 
nominated by the various Governing Bodies of Sport, the teams 
nominated are cut but the order of merit is not changed. In fact if, for 
instance, the athletes nominated ten people and through lack of 
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funds the Olympic Council could not send the full team No. 10, 9 and 
8, as the case may be, would be dropped. This instances what has not 
been made clear to the various Associations who attended the 
meeting in Rome and Munich by the people who opposed South 
Africa’s continuance at the Games.74 
Prompted by continuing unrest on the issue, Emery invited Brundage to visit South 
Africa and see the situation for himself, “… you will be able to see more from your own 
personal observations than all the letters in the world can convey to you. It will be 
possible for you to meet the Non-European Association, if you so desire, and this 
invitation is sent with all our best wishes.”75 Brundage, however, declined the 
invitation, pointing out that his schedule prevented a visit at that time.76 Since 
Brundage declined to visit South Africa at that time, Emery was left with reinforcing 
SANOC’s position by continuing to repeat his arguments about the unpreparedness of 
non-whites for international competition. He sought to offer an example from cycling: 
This information which we have given the International Cycling 
Federation, bears out conclusively the statement that we have 
repeatedly made to the International Olympic Committee, and 
confirmed at your meeting in Rome by your representative for South 
Africa, Mr. R. Honey, that the non-whites at the moment, are 
nowhere near the standard required for international competition…. 
You will also see that the promises made that South Africa would do 
all it could for non-white sports are being carried out.77 
To further embellish this example, Emery attached a letter he planned to send to 
the International Cycling Union.78 In this letter, Emery provided an update of the 
Bantu Association’s involvement in cycling competitions. He listed the finish times of 
the winners of the non-white competition and offered a comparison to the South 
African record. He pointed out that non-white athletes were far too behind 
international standards and far too inconsistent to be sent to the Olympics. SANOC’s 
best interests, he stated, were to send competitors to represent South Africa who, at 
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the very least, reached international standard times. In closing, Emery reiterated 
SANOC’s promise that if non-white South Africans could reach international 
standards, they would be allowed to compete overseas. 
Emery’s point of view insinuated that SANOC had done all it could to help integrate 
non-white athletes and better the sport situation in South Africa. He belaboured 
Brundage, asking him to read the letters written by SANOC to the International 
Amateur Boxing and Weightlifting Federations,79 and the newspaper clippings of a 
cricket match between white and non-whites, as an example of SANOC’s efforts to 
honour Honey’s statements.80 Yet not all news was positive from Emery’s perspective, 
as evidenced by a personal and confidential letter to Brundage, with newspaper 
cuttings on a riot of 2000 mine-workers attached. Emery’s patience appeared to be 
wearing thin: 
… this again shows how difficult it would be to get this tribal 
difference sorted out if ever you demanded a competition of mixed 
races from South Africa at the Olympic Games…. We are doing our 
best to educate these non-whites to the standard of education and 
living which would warrant them being mixed with competitors 
from other nations at the Olympic Games, and when the time comes, 
and this has been successfully organised, South Africa will gladly 
consider discussing the matter again with the International Olympic 
Committee.81 
Despite Emery’s growing frustration, he stood firm on SANOC’s place in the current 
IOC structure, standing firm against forces attempting to reconstruct the IOC and 
sport in South Africa on their own terms: 
We have received circular letters from the Olympic Committee of the 
U.S.S.R., one dated 29th April 1959 and the other, 30th November, 
1959 regarding their proposal for the alteration of the composition 
of the International Olympic Committee. This Matter will be 
discussed by my Executive on the 26th January and I will report to 
you the result of the discussions…. It is my own considered opinion 
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that Russia and the non-white countries are endeavouring to get 
control of the IOC and I do not think we will support the proposals…. 
P.S. South Africa still awaits your reply as to whether you and your 
good lady will visit us.82 
Brundage resumed the correspondence with some brief supportive remarks, some 
four months later,83 and with the 1960 Rome Games on the horizon, Emery once again 
pleaded SANOC’s case, now to IOC Chancellor Otto Mayer, seeking to separate sports 
from politics in a way that would confirm his argument: 
… we are doing our utmost to get the non-whites organised so that 
whatever Association is formed, will represent all the non-whites in 
this country and not only one section. The South African Sports 
Association, as we told you before, does not and never will be able to 
represent the whole of the non-whites in South Africa, and it is for 
this reason we sincerely trust that your Committee will not grant 
such an interview as being asked for…. P.S. STRICTLY 
CONFIDENTIAL: You no doubt have heard of the trouble going on in 
this country just at the moment, but might I assure you that all the 
amateur sports bodies in this country are completely non-political. 
We are doing our utmost to have our men properly trained and 
money raised to send them to Rome in 1960. I can assure you that 
none of us wish to be drawn into political arguments and we give the 
assurance that when the non-Whites are willing to co-operate with 
us in amateur sport devoid of all political reasons, we will be happy 
to meet them. It might not be long before such a state of affairs will 
come about.84 
Emery tried to paint SASA as a political body more so than a sporting body. If and 
when a non-white association might be formed legitimately, Emery opined, then the 
non-white community would be in the position of being taken seriously in the South 
African sporting community. It was clear whom Emery wished to be regarded as the 
main obstacle to progress towards a solution: 
… the South African Sports Association was not so much interested 
in the organising of non-White sport, as they were with political 
matters…. The Action of the Security Police bears out this statement 
very completely, as no other non-White sports body has been 
screened, to our knowledge…. In view of the fact that Mr. Brutus has 
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again forwarded correspondence to the International Federation 
and others whom we do not know, these new developments should 
make it clearly understandable that the [South African National 
Olympic Committee], who is not concerned whatsoever in politics, 
cannot accept the affiliation of such a body as the South African 
Sports Association under the present conditions…. when the non-
Whites form themselves into a sporting body and not a political body 
and represent the non-Whites in the country who are interested in 
sport, they would be affiliated to the various associations in this 
country…. when any non-White Association is properly constituted 
and represents the whole of the non-Whites, and not merely a 
section, they would be accepted as members of the associations 
concerned…. You will realise therefore, if the European Associations 
accept the wishes of the IOC and cut their teams to a minimum and 
to keep them within international standards, we cannot be expected 
to send non-White competitors whose performances are so far 
below those of the White competitors…. The [South African National 
Olympic Committee] has no dealings whatsoever in politics, and we 
are doing our utmost to see that the team which will take part in the 
1960 Games is representative of all the branches of sports in which 
we take part in this country. Insofar as the non-Whites are 
concerned, the only sports which they take part in nationally, is 
athletics, cycling, weight-lifting, and boxing and all four of these 
sections are being given trials under the supervision of officials who 
have been accepted by the respective International Federations…. I 
am quite sure that the present position with the [South African] 
Sports Association is such that [South African National Olympic 
Committee] will be able to have far better dealings with the genuine 
non-White sports associations who are not tainted with any political 
motives…. I can say without hesitation, that if the South African 
Sports Association is disbanded for its political activities, non-White 
sport in this country will go ahead by leaps and bounds.85 
The article Emery attached detailed a police raid of the homes of SASA President 
Dennis Brutus, the secretary and the assistant secretary, resulting in the seizure of 
letters, pamphlets, and documents.86 The article also noted that among Brutus’ 
correspondents were Avery Brundage and Otto Mayer, President and Chancellor of 
the IOC, respectively. 
In the face of non-white South African representation planned for the upcoming 
Games in Rome failing to materialize, Emery offered an explanation to Brundage from 
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the President of SABAACA stating that non-Whites could not reach the standards 
required for the Olympic Games.87 This explanation was based on the performance at 
the cycling trials and athletics trials, trials presided over by both “European” and 
“non-European” officials. Since during these trials no non-white athlete met Olympic 
standards, no nominations for the South African Olympic team had occurred.88 The 
President of SABAACA explained that they were trying to improve standards – he 
hoped for continued assistance and support from SANOC and the IOC in this regard. 
In Emery’s next letter to Brundage, he included reports from a non-white newspaper 
as proof that there was not a single non-white athlete near international standards in 
amateur boxing; however, progress was occurring: 
You will see that the S.A. Athletic and Cycling Union is endeavouring 
to have a Coach imported to teach the Non-White Athletes. I am quite 
sure that this article should give you plenty of scope to squash any 
further attempts by our Mr. Brutus in this country, and other people 
in other countries who are waiting to have the policy discussed by 
the International Olympic Committee.89 
A month later, just before the 1960 Olympic Games opened in Rome, a seemingly 
exasperated Emery sent a note to Mayer concerning the difficulty of uniting the 
different coloured races: “This is only one of many instances [an enclosed newspaper 
article] where the opposing teams fight it out instead of playing it out. Only last week, 
the whole of one non-White football team was charged with the murder of three of 
the opposing players…. So much for Mr. Brutus saying that they have not been given 
the opportunity of competing.”90 Mayer responded to Emery with congratulations on 
progress, while noting that complete resolution of the issue was still a long way off: 
I am very pleased that the South African Rowing Federation has 
modified its rules and that no difference is now existing between 
White and coloured members. I informed Mr. Anthony Steel in 
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London about it. But I send him also the paper cutting showing the 
fight during a football match between non-whites and in presence of 
27,000 non-White spectators!91 
3. Domestic Resistance 
G.R. Smith, Secretary of the SAAWBF, was the first person to write to Brundage 
about the South African race issue.92 On 11 November 1954, Smith requested 
information to help SAAWBF gain international recognition so its affiliated athletes 
might take part in world championships. In addition, Smith asked for Brundage’s 
advice regarding the limited opportunities for non-white athletes: 
In our country another body exists. This organisation caters for 
athletes with white skins only and you can see how many ‘dark’ 
skinned athletes are deprived from real chances. The other 
organisation has obtained international recognition but does not 
comply with the true aims of Physical Education. With this in mind, 
you will no doubt see the urgency of the appeal that we are lodging 
with you. We seek your expert advice on this matter…. We sincerely 
trust that you will be sympathetic towards our appeal, and trust that 
you will view it in the light of real Physical Education. We now look 
forward to you[r] comments which we trust will be received by us at 
your earliest possible convenience.93 
The “true aims of physical education” to which Smith referred were the “all-round 
development of all men, irrespective of colour, sex, or creed.”94 Brundage’s response 
encouraged Smith and SAAWBF to write a similar letter to the ISF in France. Said 
Brundage: “For your information, so far as the Olympic Games are concerned, one of 
the fundamental principles is – ‘no discrimination is allowed against any country or 
person on grounds of color, religion or politics’.”95 Brundage stood firm on Article 1 
of the Olympic Charter, supporting those who strove for such an ideal. 
The discussion between SAAWBF and the IOC continued intermittently. Almost 
two years later, on 1 October 1956, IOC Chancellor Mayer responded to a letter 
89 
 
 
received a month earlier from SAAWBF,96 in which SAAWBF gave notice of its plan to 
apply for admission to the Olympic Games in Rome 1960. Mayer’s response reiterated 
applicable rules and regulations and included the restatement that it must become a 
member of the NSF sponsored by SANOC. Thus, the IOC recused itself from 
consideration of the issue. The SAAWBF, stated Mayer, should confer with SANOC for 
further instruction. Over a year later, Brundage received a letter from Brutus with an 
attached copy of a report submitted by SAAWBF to K.S. Duncan, the Honorable 
Secretary of BECGF.97 The key points of the report to Duncan were as follows: 
With regard to our efforts for Olympic participation, we have been 
advised by one of the affiliates to the IOC that it is ‘with us every inch 
of the way in your request for admission to the Olympic Games to be 
held in Rome in 1960’…. We applied to the South African Amateur 
Weightlifting Union and were advised ‘no non-Europeans may 
affiliate to our Union’. In a further letter we were advised that: ‘My 
Union has been in communication with the [South African National 
Olympic Committee] about the application for affiliation. As an 
association affiliated to the S.A.O.G.A [i.e., SANOC] we can naturally 
not amend our Constitution without its approval. However, the latter 
association has assured us that they are giving the matter immediate 
attention with a view to coming to an agreement which will suit 
everyone concerned’. On the 20th of this month, Press reports 
appeared of a decision taken on this matter at the Executive meeting 
of the SANOC and our Secretary has written requesting confirmation 
and clarification of reports that the Association has resolved not to 
admit any non-white sportsmen or sporting organizations to the 
SANOC … We are still awaiting a full reply to our request for 
confirmation of statements attributed by the Press to Mr. Sims, 
Chairman of the SANOC on the 28th August…. While all Press reports 
agree that the SANOC has resolved to refuse membership to all non-
white sport bodies in the country, divergent reasons are given as 
follows: (1) that the SANOC must maintain the policy of apartheid, 
not only because it is the policy of the present Government, but 
because it has always been the policy of the country; (2) that it is 
against the constitution of the SANOC; (3) that it is contrary to the 
laws of the country for Europeans and non-Europeans to take part in 
competitive sport together and it was therefore impossible for the 
Association to sanction such competition…. It is reported that a 
memorandum is to be drawn up either by the Secretary or by a 
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committee, its purpose being reported variously to be (a) to explain 
the policy of apartheid in sport, (b) to explain the section in the 
constitution which excludes non-whites and (c) to explain the laws 
which forbid competitive sport between white and non-white…. We 
have written to the SANOC asking ‘would you kindly let us know 
what we must do now to have our sportsmen represented’, as we felt 
that this flat refusal can hardly be regarded as the ‘agreement to suit 
everyone concerned’ which we were promised…. We have also 
queried other statements attributed to Mr. Sims, viz.: 1. If 
international sporting associations decide to penalize us because of 
our stand, it will be just too bad: 2. If one sporting association should 
lose international recognition as a result of this stand, then the 
SANOC would withdraw all the other sporting bodies it embraced: 3. 
That the non-whites are not prepared to accept white 
representatives in their controlling bodies; 4. That the non-whites 
do not want help but status.98 
Brutus’ letter casted doubt on Emery’s interpretation of sport in South Africa. 
Further, although Brutus went to some length to explain that the statements given by 
SAAWU to justify the exclusion of non-whites were complete nonsense, Brundage was 
both brief and curt in his initial response to Brutus: “We shall no doubt hear from the 
South African Olympic Association on this subject in due time.”99 Brundage, seemingly 
unperturbed, was apparently satisfied by his discussion with SANOC. A month later, 
Brutus wrote to Brundage for clarification relative to his (Brundage) communication 
with SANOC: 
My Federation is a little puzzled by your statement: We shall no 
doubt hear from the South African Olympic Association on this 
subject in due time. We have been negotiating with the South African 
Olympic and Commonwealth Games Association [SANOC] since 
August of 1956 and we would like to know if they have not advised 
the International Olympic Committee of our attempts to secure 
recognition…. We have also the precaution of advising the 
Chancellor, M. Otto Mayer, of our efforts and we trust that they will 
be given due attention.100 
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Despite not receiving response from Brundage or the IOC for a further two months, 
Brutus continued to look to the IOC for guidance and support. In a letter to Brundage 
in April 1958, he noted: 
Further to our inquiry whether the matter of our efforts to secure 
international recognition had not been previously discussed by the 
International Olympic Committee, I have to inform you that inquiries 
have also been directed to the South African Olympic and 
Commonwealth Games committee, and to the Chancellor of the IOC, 
M. Otto Mayer…. Since we were informed on the 23rd December by 
M. Gouleau of the International Weightlifting Federation that it was 
a matter for the International Olympic Committee, we are very 
anxious to have the matter discussed. Could you please advise us 
whether it will be possible to have the matter raised at the May 
meeting of the Congress in Tokyo? … We would also appreciate 
advice on how to act in this matter.101 
Brutus and SAAWBF, having tried without success to communicate with various 
sources on their plight, and generally ignored regarding the matter of international 
recognition, conducted a turn towards the IOC. However, when Brundage finally 
responded two weeks later, he only noted: “We do not intervene in national affairs 
unless our regulations are violated. We have asked our representatives in South Africa 
for a report. The situation will be re-examined when that report is received.”102 
Brundage’s response appeared to be at odds with Article 1 of the Olympic Charter and, 
as we have seen in the earlier section of this chapter, Brundage discussed Article 1 
with Emery as early as February 1956.103 Obviously, Brundage was stalling, trying to 
buy time for SANOC as a courtesy for its long history with the IOC and its assurances 
of trying to right the race situation. 
Emery wrote to G.R. Smith to expedite the non-white inclusion process: 
… every South African Governing Body of Sport affiliated to the 
[South African National Olympic Committee] has had the courtesy to 
send us the names and addresses of the Chairman and Secretaries of 
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their Associations together with Clubs affiliated to their Provincial 
Bodies. There seems little reason why we cannot receive this 
information from you and for which we have asked repeatedly.104 
Emery also mentioned that the proper authorities had been advised in regard to 
SAAWBF requesting affiliation, but that the necessary information to be considered 
for admission to SANOC had not been provided. Emery did, however, notify Brundage 
of receiving the pertinent information needed from SAAWBF.105 In the same letter, 
Emery queried Brundage on a report he (Brundage) was supposedly awaiting from 
SANOC, while days before, Brutus had asked about the same report: “My federation is 
anxious to know whether the report has been received,” wrote Brutus, “whether its 
contents will be made available to us, and whether any decision has been taken by the 
International Olympic Committee.”106  
Regardless of the existence of a report, Brutus provided a copy of an extremely 
detailed letter submitted to the weightlifting ISF to provide further support for 
SAAWBF’s application for membership. 107 This focussed Brundage’s attention to the 
issue. In his next letter to SAAWBF, he asserted that a report was being developed, but 
that it would take some time because of the complicated nature of the issue: 
In reply to your letter of September 8, as we advised you previously, 
we requested a report from the South African [National] Olympic 
Committee on the situation in your country. We have just recently 
heard from this organization that the situation is a very complicated 
one, with a number of different groups seeking recognition. We have 
been assured that they are continuing to study this involved problem 
and endeavoring to find a solution in line with Olympic regulations…. 
In any event, the International Olympic Committee does not 
recognise national organizations other than National Olympic 
Committees.108 
This statement is important because here Brundage reasserted the structure and 
processes of the IOC in no uncertain terms. Veiled in his words was a polite request to 
93 
 
 
stop writing the IOC directly and funnel its information through SANOC. Ignoring this 
advice, Brutus continued to keep Brundage updated. Brutus, it became obvious, and 
not without reason, did not trust SANOC. Brutus notified Brundage of a round table 
conference organized by SAAWBF for national sporting organizations to take place on 
5 October 1958 to discuss the entire issue of non-white sport in South Africa.109  
The round table conference did indeed take place. Following the conference, Emery 
reminded G.R. Smith that SAAWBF could not request affiliation to any international 
bodies because SAAWU already represented South Africa. SANOC could not compel 
any association to accept affiliation, but if SAAWU accepted the provincial branches 
of the SAAWBF, SANOC would have no objection.110 The assurances mentioned by 
Emery and his request for patience notwithstanding, Smith was not content, as 
became evident in a letter to Brundage: 
While my Federation agrees completely that the situation is very 
complicated, we are not satisfied that the S.A. Olympic Committee is 
truly ‘endeavouring to find a solution in line with Olympic 
regulations’ and we will continue to press for a full examination of 
the position by the International Olympic Committee…. We note that 
a report has been sent to the International Olympic Committee by 
the S.A. Olympic and Commonwealth Games Association, and are 
anxious to have a copy of this. We are thus applying to the SANOC for 
it and failing that, must request the International Olympic 
Committee to furnish us with a copy. A copy of our request for this 
report is enclosed for your information…. It was also agreed at our 
Annual General Meeting in East London that a report of the position 
should be submitted by our Federation, and this will be forwarded 
in due course.111 
In his letter requesting information from SANOC, which was included with his 
letter to Brundage, Smith continued to seek the answers: “… there are three important 
points requiring clarification: a. ‘a number of different groups are seeking recognition’ 
b. ‘that they are continuing to study this involved problem’ c. that they are 
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‘endeavouring to find a solution in line with Olympic regulations’ … Could you please 
enlighten us on these points? If necessary we are prepared to send a representative 
to Johannesburg.”112 The confidence displayed by the SAAWBF in this missive was 
surprising, the requests are expressed in a bold, firm, and, at times, seemingly 
overbearing manner. 
On the subject of rising domestic resistance, Brundage received official word of the 
new organization – South African Sports Association (SASA). It came from the 
Secretary of SASA’s steering committee, R.S. Govender: “The South African Sports 
Association, a newly formed organisation representing every major Non-White Sports 
Body in the country, is holding a National Sports Conference in Durban on the 10th 
and 11th January, 1959, for the purpose of co-ordinating the work of different sports 
codes in an effort for international recognition.”113 
A month later, Brundage responded to Govender: 
… I note that the South African Sports Association has been 
organized to endeavor to find a solution to the problems existing in 
your country… So far as Olympic rules are concerned, there can be 
only one National Olympic Committee in a country and it should 
include all the National Federations which are members of the 
International Federations which govern sports on the Olympic 
program.114 
Brundage stood firm and consistent. His message to Govender enunciated the IOC 
structure and its rules. However, when Brundage sent a copy to Mayer, he added a 
notation: “There should be something in our rules to indicate that there can be only 
one NOC in a country. This is something we have overlooked.”115 This note revealed 
that sports organizations might have been led to assume that more than one NOC per 
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country could exist within the IOC, so clarification in the IOC rules was needed to 
rectify this confusion. 
Two weeks later, Brutus provided an update to Brundage regarding SASA: 
The South African Sports Association will be taking up the matter of 
international recognition actively, in addition to its internal work of 
co-ordinating the work of the National Sports Federation in South 
Africa. As you are aware, the South African Olympic and 
Commonwealth Association which might do this work, excludes 
non-white South Africans…. The SASA is already supported by ten 
national non-racial sporting bodies and we expect the number to 
increase in the near future.116 
Brutus and the SASA were forcing the issue of international recognition with an 
organization, the IOC, which already recognized a national body. For the SASA to 
become the official body representing South Africa, first, SANOC would have to be 
expelled, and second, SASA had to be accepted by the IOC. Brutus’ letter to Brundage 
included a copy of a letter sent to Mayer. The letter to Mayer stated the resolutions 
adopted at the conference on national non-racial sporting bodies. Each of the National 
Sports Federations supporting the conference was seeking international recognition. 
Brutus directed Mayer’s, and in turn, Brundage’s, attention to Resolutions 5 and 6, 
which fell within the purview of the IOC: 
Resolution No. 5 – In view of the fact that the International Olympic 
Committee has called for a report in the South African situation, the 
South African Sports Association resolves to submit a 
comprehensive memorandum on the subject and calls on all National 
Sports Federation to supply relevant data for inclusion in the 
memorandum. 
Resolution No. 6 – This Conference of the South African Sports 
Association believes that it is the inherent right of every South 
African to compete on merit for the right to represent South Africa 
in international sport and calls on all organisations controlling 
international sports to afford representation only to bodies truly 
representative of all South Africans.117 
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In the letter to Mayer, Brutus also summarized SASA’s aims and motivations: 
It is the attention not only of the IOC but of all international bodies 
which we desire, and we will therefore be sending copies of the 
resolutions to all international bodies … We hope to have the 
memorandum ready well in advance of the next congress of the IOC 
and will also circulate it to your affiliates. We trust that you will give 
it due consideration and that you will be prepared to interest 
yourself in our plight and that the IOC will grant us the redress we 
are not able to find anywhere else.118 
In Brundage’s subsequent response to Brutus and the SASA, he remained factual. 
At the bottom of the letter, attached to Mayer’s copy, was a note to obtain more 
information and to reiterate that the organizations supporting the SASA remained in 
question: 
Referring to the letter addressed to you by this Organization under 
date of January 23, I suggest that you write and ask them how many 
organizations belong to the various Federations, Associations and 
Unions mentioned, how many individual members each one of them 
has and what activities they have promoted and who participated. 
You might also point out that the organizations which are mentioned 
can have no direct connection with the International Olympic 
Committee, although we shall appreciate information on their 
activities.119 
Shortly after Brundage sent his remarks to Brutus, Emery informed Brundage of 
the continued difficulties caused by Brutus.120 To advance from “no representation” 
to “equal representation” was a bold move, but to gain equal control right away may 
have been unrealistic.  
In the context of this negative news, Brundage received another letter from Brutus, 
providing additional information: “I am enclosing clippings relating to the work of the 
Sports Association. The Minutes of our Conference will be sent to you as soon as they 
are available…. We will arrange to keep you fully informed of our activities and thank 
you for your interest.”121 In like manner, Brutus responded to Mayer’s 10 February 
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letter, in which he provided information on SASA, mentioning a membership of over 
70,000 and the support from ten national bodies.122 All the national bodies, stated 
Brutus, staged national events every year – some had been in existence for five years, 
many more than ten. “Most of these bodies consist of various provincial units drawn 
from the provinces of South Africa, but it is the policy of the South African Sports 
Association to offer membership only to the parent national bodies, and only to bodies 
which are opposed to racial discrimination and are working for its removal.” 123 
Brutus concluded his letter by assuring Mayer that a comprehensive memorandum of 
the facts and figures would be sent, as well as the SASA constitution, then under 
preparation. 
The flow of information from SASA persisted. A statement by SASA President G.K. 
Rangasamy was sent to Brundage.124 The statement noted Mayer mentioning that the 
IOC would discuss South Africa’s colour bar issue at the next meeting, focussing on 
Article 1 of the Olympic Charter. As welcome as that information was, three important 
goals remained for SASA: 
1. All national bodies must stand together in this fight and help to 
present a full case to the IOC on our position. 
2. We must expose misleading statements such as that of the 
Chairman of the South African Olympic Association, Gen. Klopper, 
that subservient affiliation is as good as full recognition. 
3. We must fight against attempts to make us accept racial 
discrimination in sport, and against its acceptance by the South 
African Cricket Board of Control.125 
This strong language marked a rising confidence and commitment by SASA to 
strive for more equal representation in South African sports. SASA continued to press 
its case, sending a letter to Mayer, which included an abridged copy of the 
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memorandum to be submitted to the IOC. A full version of this memorandum would 
also be distributed to many countries affiliated with the IOC before the May 1959 
meeting in Munich. A final remark by Brutus re-enunciated a desire to be present at 
such time as the IOC debated the South African issue: 
I am aware that much of the material sent does not fall within the 
jurisdiction of your Committee, but we are anxious to present a full 
picture of the situation in our country and of our activities, in order 
to avoid being wrongly represented or reported…. Please advise me 
at the earliest convenient time if it will be possible for an observer 
or spokesman to attend the meeting on behalf of the South African 
sportsmen who are at present excluded from participation at the 
Olympic Games.126 
Brutus’ request was denied. As a rationale for denial, Mayer noted that 
recommendations must first be made by the Executive Board to the General 
Session.127 Brutus persisted nevertheless. Though expressing appreciation for 
Brundage’s interest in upholding the principles of the Olympic Games and his 
willingness to discuss the problem, Brutus attempted to summarize the issue into one 
core issue: 
We believe that basically our problem is a simple one: the prejudice 
of sports administrators being expressed in a colour-bar in sport 
without the justification of law, tradition or the wishes of sportsmen 
generally. But this simple issue is so obscured by other, secondary 
issues, that it is extremely difficult to discuss it fully and fairly. It is 
for this reason that we have applied to the International Olympic 
Committee for permission to have a representative or observer at 
the Munich meeting.128 
By this point the racial situation in South Africa had become well known in 
international circles, prompting Brutus to pursue a South African “presence” at future 
IOC meetings on the issue, which he conveyed to both Brundage and Otto Mayer: 
I must point out that with the exception of two very small sections in 
Soccer and Athletics, the 10 million non-whites of South Africa are 
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completely without representation on the International Olympic 
Committee and no accurate account of their plight or of their 
activities can be given in the absence of a spokesman on their behalf. 
I realize that the International Olympic Committee can only deal with 
recognised national Olympic Committees, but it is hoped that this 
will be treated as a special case, because of the special circumstances, 
and that your Executive will agree to someone speaking on behalf of 
the non-white South Africans when the matter comes up for 
discussion.129 
Brutus concluded his request for “special consideration” by asking that Mayer send 
a message by cable once the Executive Board had reached a decision on this request 
to admit a representative to speak on behalf of the non-white community in South 
Africa at the next IOC General Session in Munich. Again, Mayer responded negatively, 
informing Brutus that it was not necessary to send an observer or spokesman since 
the whole problem first had to be discussed by the IOC Executive Board.130 
Brutus and the SASA were not without international supporters in their struggle to 
gain recognition. For instance, Mayer responded to a letter from Antony Steel, 
Secretary of an organization based in London, England, called the Campaign Against 
Race Discrimination in Sport (CARDS), telling him in no uncertain terms not “… to 
send an observer or a representative to our Munich meeting, as this problem has first 
to be discussed at our Executive Board meeting. Therefore please don’t take the 
trouble to send a Member of the British Parliament to attend on [SASA’s] behalf.”131 
Dealing with SASA did not only fall to Mayer alone, Brundage, too, became immersed 
in the issue. Brutus provided Brundage with an advance abridged copy of the 
memorandum SASA proposed to submit for consideration at the Executive Board 
meetings in Rome as well as the Munich General Session scheduled for 23 May. Brutus 
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noted: “It will give a fair idea of the nature of our case, and the manner in which we 
will present it.”132 
Brutus’ persistence translated to mounting annoyance for the IOC administration. 
First, Mayer told Brutus, once more: “As I told you already in my last letter that 
problem will be studied by our Executive Board in Munich and not in Rome…. With 
reference to my last letter I wish to confirm that it is not necessary that you send your 
representative to Munich.”133 Brundage, likewise, adopted a stern stance with Brutus, 
telling him bluntly: 
I think it is safe to say that the International Olympic Committee is 
not going to deviate from its fundamental principle that there shall 
be no discrimination against any country or person on grounds of 
race, religion or politics. This must be done, however, within the 
framework of our rules and regulations, without altering the 
structure of international sport, which is already complicated … It is 
not necessary for you to send a representative to Munich. In any 
event, the meetings of the International Olympic Committee are 
closed. We hope to be able to solve this thorny problem insofar as 
the Olympic Movement is concerned with justice to all.134 
Since SASA was denied a representative at the forthcoming IOC general meeting, it 
decided to release a circular to affiliates, sporting bodies, and all interested persons: 
The decision of the International Olympic Committee earlier this 
year, to examine the question of the colour-bar in South African 
sport, was hailed by SASA as the beginning of the most decisive 
phase in the fight for international recognition of all South Africans 
in sport…. The submission of a Memorandum to the IOC by SASA has 
taken the fight a step further, and it will serve as the basis for 
discussion in the period of controversy and debate which now 
probably lies ahead before we reach our ultimate goal…. It is 
expected that the IOC will not give a decision at this stage – its 
machinery is too immense for speedy action – but that it will give the 
closest attention to the South African problem in the coming months 
before the Olympic Games at Rome in August of next year.…135 
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This circular pressed the IOC to discuss and if possible solve the South African sport 
issue in the immediate future, rather than stalling indefinitely. 
The IOC was not the only organization confronted by SASA. To hold those in charge 
of South African sport true to their expressed goals, Brutus sent a follow-up letter to 
Emery on behalf of the bodies representing SASA, “… I was directed to advise you that 
the SASA welcomes the recent assurance by Mr. Reg. Honey, President of the 
S.A.O.B.E.&C.G.A. that non-whites will be considered for selection in South African 
teams at the Olympic Games if they prove themselves fit for selection.”136 
Furthermore, Brutus asked for assurance on a variety of points: 
1. What method will be used when considering them for selection? 
2. Will it be necessary for such candidates to be members of your 
affiliated national bodies? 
3. What will be the position if it is not possible for them to be 
affiliated to one of the national bodies because of clauses excluding 
them from membership? 
4. Will membership be granted only to such candidates, or will it be 
granted to other non-whites participating in the code of sport 
concerned?137 
A day later, before receiving a response from SANOC, SASA released another 
statement: 
SASA expresses its appreciation to the IOC for considering the 
question of racialism in South African sport. The outcome of the 
discussions of the International Olympic Committee is hailed by 
SASA as a signal victory in the fight for true non-racialistic sport in 
our country…. SASA would have been content if the IOC had merely 
consented to inquire into the position. Instead, our South African 
administrators have been served due warning, through the IOC 
Resolution, that the position will be closely watched, and racial 
discrimination will not be tolerated or countenanced in the Olympic 
Games…. To those like Mr. Reg Honey who have told the world that 
there is no racial discrimination in Springbok teams, there is nothing 
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SASA can say: we must leave them to try and reconcile their 
consciences with the facts. To those who have been excluded by 
racial discrimination in the past, SASA has two things to say: Do not 
be deluded that entry into non-racial sport will be easy; a period of 
delicate and difficult negotiation lies ahead, in which it will be 
necessary to stand firm, and not to be duped into accepting inferior 
or unequal status…. The way is clear for non-white sportsmen to 
stake a bold claim, on merit, for inclusion in teams representing our 
entire country. Only merit will count, and it is up to them to make 
resolute efforts to prove their worth…. The glittering prize of 
international honours, in equal competition with the best in the 
world, is now within their grasp.138 
This statement publicly praised the IOC for at least taking note of the issue of 
racism in South African sports, challenged the current South African sport bodies and 
administrators to hold true to their words, and encouraged non-white athletes to take 
advantage of the opportunities to compete while keeping expectations reasonable. 
After SASA publicly claimed its stake in the fight for equality in South African sport, 
Brutus attempted to be civil and cordial when asking Emery whether it would be 
possible for SASA to arrange a meeting with Brundage or hosting him during a visit to 
South Africa.139 In a letter to Brundage, Brutus extended an invitation by SASA to 
welcome Brundage as its guest during his visit, paying careful attention to the value 
of his visit: “It is our considered opinion that it will only be possible for you to form a 
complete picture of the situation in sport in our country after you have met 
representatives of various sporting bodies, many of whom have been unable, up to 
now, to secure membership of the national Olympic Association.”140 
Unfortunately for Brutus and SASA, Brundage replied that he had no plans to visit, 
but when he would, he would be happy to meet with representatives.141 In 
anticipation of the upcoming Munich General Session, Brutus also asked to arrange a 
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meeting between SASA officials and SANOC executive members in the near future to 
discuss the session in Munich. 
Some five months later, as related by Brutus to Brundage, the friendly overtones to 
SANOC had fallen on deaf ears. A thoroughly frustrated Brutus cabled Brundage, 
reporting no change in the racial discrimination and sporting practices in South 
Africa: 
In the name of Olympic ideals fair play and sportsmanship urgently 
request IOC direct attention to continued racial discrimination in 
South African sport despite assurances Rome May 1959. Racial 
discrimination in affiliation and trials being imposed though not 
legally required. Entreat remedial or disciplinary action before 
Rome Olympics.142 
Not receiving any response from the IOC for two months, Brutus on 13 April 1960 
again pleaded with Brundage to draw attention to the South African issue by 
discussing it at the next meeting and allow a spokesman on behalf of the non-white 
population to present its case: 
The South African Sports [A]ssociation formally requests, on behalf 
of the thousands of non-white South Africans who are excluded from 
the national sport of their country on grounds of race, that the 
Congress of the International Olympic Committee consent to discuss 
this issue and that permission be granted to a spokesman to present 
the case on behalf of these sportsmen…. You are doubtless aware 
that a considerable mass of information has already been submitted 
and is in the hands of the Chancellor of the IOC, M. Otto Mayer. Since 
the meetings in Rome and Munich last year, there has been further 
evidence of the determination of the administrators of the nationally 
recognized bodies in South African to exclude sportsmen on racial 
grounds, or to admit them under conditions which would preserve 
the racial structure of sport in South Africa contrary to the principles 
of the International Olympic Committee.143 
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Brutus, in some exasperation, even reached out to Reginald Honey for help. 
SAAWBF and SAAWU had reached a deadlock in negotiations and Brutus attempted 
to enlist Honey’s assistance: 
… we are anxious that non-white weightlifters should be considered 
for the national representative team to take part in the forthcoming 
Olympics at Rome…. The South African Amateur Weightlifting Union 
is only prepared to permit this if we agree to affiliate to them on 
conditions which are racially discriminatory and which are contrary 
to the principles of the IOC, that is, that we should agree to be a 
subservient body, racially segregated from them, unequally 
represented in comparison with the white unions (provincial) which 
are affiliated to them, and that we should only be represented on 
their national council by white South Africans. This is blatant racial 
discrimination, to which the IOC is strongly opposed, and we must 
therefore ask you to interest yourself in the matter…. we have 
indicated to the S.A.A.W.U. that we are perfectly willing to work with 
them on condition that we are not forced to affiliate under conditions 
of racial discrimination: to this offer there has not yet been a reply…. 
I must point out that we had hoped to have some information and 
assistance from the South African Olympic and Commonwealth 
Games Association [i.e, SANOC] on this issue: so far none has been 
forthcoming.144 
To this plea, Brutus attached a letter to C. Oehley, Chairman of SAAWU, which 
contained a detailed account of the discussion between the two weightlifting 
associations.145 It was evident that Brutus and SAAWBF were at an impasse, due 
mainly to the fact that SAAWBF refused to be treated as inferior to SAAWU and its 
members. Through a later SASA statement, it became obvious that Honey did not wish 
to become involved in the weightlifting quarrel.146 
In a reply to the 13 April 1960 letter, meanwhile, Brundage reaffirmed to Brutus 
where the IOC’s allegiances lay: 
… the International Olympic Committee is concerned solely with 
Olympic affairs and we have been assured by the South African 
Olympic and Commonwealth Games Association [i.e., SANOC], which 
we recognize, that no citizens of South Africa of Olympic calibre will 
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be barred from the South African team by reason of race, religion or 
political affiliations. Since this is in conformity with Olympic 
regulation, we see no purpose in a conference such as you suggest.147 
Adhering to the status quo, Brundage leveraged IOC rules, supporting SANOC based 
on its assurances. Although societal racial discrimination that hindered non-white 
sporting success was beyond the control of SANOC, it was clear that Brundage knew 
what governmental and sport institutional obstacles SANOC could overcome to 
include non-whites on the South African team. Brundage trusted that SANOC would 
do everything it could to remove the racial barriers for non-white inclusion. 
Confirming what Brundage had been informed of in an earlier letter from Emery,148 
SASA finally released a statement detailing the police raids on the homes of SASA’s 
President, secretary, and assistant secretary.149 This act, though not proof of a SANOC 
violation of Article 1 of the Olympic Charter, did, however, send conflicting messages 
of how Brundage and the IOC should handle the South African situation. In its 
“released statement,” the resilient, determined, and obstinate SASA announced 10 
observations to help their case.150 Though the SASA announcement displayed a 
collection of acknowledgements, sent letters and appeals, and notes of rejection, 
ultimately, the IOC recognized SANOC, not SASA, as South Africa’s Olympic 
representative. Despite assurances made to the IOC by SANOC, Brutus continued his 
focussed attack: “… we have fresh evidence that racial discrimination was practised 
in the selection of the South African Olympic team. It is this evidence we wish to 
present for discussion by your Committee. Further the South African representative 
of the IOC, Mr. Reg. Honey, has gone on record, in an official interview with the London 
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‘New Statesman,’ as defending racial discrimination at present existing in South 
African sport.”151 
Some two months following Brutus’ last letter to Brundage, G.K. Rangasamy 
formally charged SANOC of violating the Olympic Charter because of the racial 
discrimination in South African sport.152 Rangasamy assured that non-racial trails 
were not conducted to determine the composition of the South African Olympic team 
and non-white organizations had to accept racial discrimination as a condition to 
affiliate with the white dominated national bodies. 
In the same letter to Brundage, Rangasamy made a request to put these charges on 
the agenda of the IOC meeting in Rome, and for SANOC to answer the charge. He also 
requested the opportunity to submit evidence, as well as a representative to be 
permitted to attend. The “charges” laid against SANOC by SASA appear in complete 
contradiction to the progress stated by Emery in his correspondence with the IOC. 
Brutus, in an effort to uphold Article 1 of the Olympic Charter, extended SASA’s 
position in the fight for the removal of racial discrimination in South African sport. 
Brutus formally charged SANOC with practising racial discrimination. He also wanted 
SASA representatives at the next IOC meeting and he pointed out that in spite of the 
assurances given in Rome that discrimination was not practiced by SANOC, 
discrimination continued in South Africa.153 A week later, a SASA statement from 
Brutus indicated that Rangasamy and Brutus, desiring to go to Rome to attend the IOC 
meeting, had their applications for passports denied.154 At that point, an appeal was 
sent to all the countries affiliated with the IOC for assistance to achieve 
representation. 
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Since Rangasamy and Brutus were prevented from attending the IOC meeting in 
Rome, Rev. Michael Scott was chosen to speak on behalf of SASA and CARDS. Before 
addressing Olympic officials, Scott wrote to Brundage, hoping for a meeting to discuss 
the issue.155 However, there is no record of a Scott - Brundage meeting. Nonetheless, 
in the address presented to the International Olympic Games Committee in Rome 
August 1960, Scott did indeed mention that Brutus was unable to attend because of 
the refusal to issue a passport to him.156 Scott went on to note the absence of free 
competition, the unequal conditions of competition, and the lack of facilities for non-
white athletes. He cited examples from boxing and weightlifting, identifying non-
white athletes who could not qualify for the Rome Games even though they performed 
better than white athletes. SANOC, Scott argued, remained in breach of Article 1 of the 
Olympic Charter, despite Honey’s assurances that no athlete of Olympic calibre would 
be excluded from the South African team. Competition was not open to all members 
unless one was affiliated with the South African national sport bodies that, 
unfortunately, operated a colour bar.157  
This statement by Scott on behalf of SASA and CARDS claimed to expose as farce 
the actions of Honey and SANOC. SASA and CARDS demanded action – a ban of the 
South African team. A dictum was issued directly before the 1960 Rome Olympic 
Games. A lack of support for SASA’s and CARDS’ position resulted in SANOC not being 
banned from the Games.  
What other support did SASA have in its battle against SANOC? One measure of 
support came from international activists and organizations. I now turn to an 
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examination of their activities, through the lens of Avery Brundage’s correspondence 
and his view of these developments. 
4. International Community 
Avery Brundage’s concern relative to the South African issue was evident from the 
correspondence with SANOC and SASA. However, it was questionable whether 
Brundage’s concerns about the negative publicity of the international voice and 
pressure really affected how he perceived and dealt with the South African situation. 
Nonetheless, the first international inquiry into the South African issue from a party 
not directly involved in the primary discussion about the South African race issue 
came from Olaf Ditlev-Simonsen, the IOC member from Norway. At the end of October 
1956, before the Melbourne Games, Ditlev-Simonsen requested more information on 
the South African issue. He sent Otto Mayer a detailed letter, providing an impression 
of the public climate in Norway on the issue: “The Norwegian papers are very strongly 
stating that they think the IOC ought to take steps towards the South African National 
Olympic Committee to prevent them from excluding ‘black people’ from their sport 
associations and thus exclude them from taking part in the Olympic Games.”158 
Two months later, Mayer sent a response, attributing the IOC’s slow pace in dealing 
with this matter to the South African government’s political prerogatives: 
As regard to the South African situation concerning the exclusion of 
coloured people from the selection of their Olympic Team, I must say 
that the IOC, and especially our President Mr. Avery Burndage, has 
lengthily dealt with this matter. It has been given us to understand 
that this was a question concerning an internal Government’s 
question in which the IOC should not be mixed in … the Laws of a 
country cannot be altered by the IOC – Mr. Brundage has had long 
correspondence with South Africa in this matter and I wish you 
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would inform the Norwegian Press that up to now we have not been 
successful.159 
This is the first time that a response from an IOC representative identifies the South 
African government as the responsible party, as well as being a clear expression of the 
IOC’s stance of non-involvement in political and domestic matters. Further, in the 
same letter, Mayer noted what the IOC’s position would be: 
I proposed to our President to exclude the South African [National] 
Olympic Committee unless it recognizes our rules which are 
absolutely clear on this subject: ‘no discrimination of race’. We have 
done so for Argentine, Puerto-Rico and Cuba while the Governments 
of those countries wanted to interfere in the Olympic affairs of those 
resp. countries. Why should we not do the same for South Africa? 
But, as we cannot control the legislation of every country, the 
attention of the legislator should be drawn to the necessity of 
modifying certain laws, so that they may conform to the principles 
that we are defending. In suspending the South African [National] 
Olympic Committee are we going to change the situation? I am afraid 
not. We shall only stop those athletes for taking part in the Games. I 
quite agree with your point of view and I think an action should be 
taken. Therefore I shall inform Mr. Brundage about it, with copy of 
this letter, asking him to bring the matter on discussion at our 
Melbourne Session.160 
Mayer did have a different interpretation than Brundage as to how to deal with 
South Africa. He did not want to become involved in a country’s domestic politics, but 
SANOC had to discover a way to separate it from government policies imposing 
apartheid.  
As discussed in Chapter 1, Brundage had been accused of anti-Semitic and anti-
black biases. More than ever, in dealing with the South African issue at this juncture, 
Brundage had to maintain a non-discrimination stance, both personally and as the 
head of the IOC. One example of his concern for the IOC’s public profile during this 
time was Brundage’s demonstrated desire for Olympic growth in Africa. In response 
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to a letter from the Secretary-General of the Milo Academy of Health and Strength 
mentioning plans to organize a Pan-African Amateur Sport Federation in order to hold 
a Pan-African Games every four years,161 Brundage exuded optimism. Also, Brundage 
sought to secure the influence of the Olympic Movement in these developments: “I 
note that you hope to be able to hold Pan-African Games. We observe that there is a 
great and growing interest in international competition and the Olympic Movement 
in African countries. You should consult with the National Olympic Committees in the 
countries involved.”162 Furthering the growth of the Olympic Movement in African 
countries was of strategic importance for the IOC, faced, as it was, with international 
criticism of its stance on the South African issue. 
Letters from the public and concerned groups began to arrive at the IOC. The first 
of many such letters, forwarded to Brundage by Mayer, was from Wales sent on behalf 
of 1100 Welsh people.163 The author appreciated that the IOC was abiding by its rules 
and organizational structure in regard to the South African issue. However, due to 
such a governing sport system, the IOC had been limited to ensure that South Africa 
fielded a team representative of its population. This letter was indicative of an 
increasing international public and critical awareness of South African issue and the 
IOC’s position, that the IOC could not fail but to take notice of – the author ultimately 
wanted the IOC to take the lead in this issue and either force SANOC to makes 
necessary changes or expel it from the Olympic Movement. 
In a similar vein, and of potentially greater concern to the IOC, it did not take long 
for an organization in the United States to contact Brundage on the South African 
issue, indeed making reference to the intervention originating from Wales. John 
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Williams, Director of Information of the American Committee on Africa (ACA), wrote 
a letter to Brundage on 22 April 1958 upon ACA having been notified that non-white 
weightlifters would not be considered by SANOC for the 1960 Games because of their 
race.164 He reminded Brundage that the apartheid laws in South Africa forbade racial 
mixing. Williams was also aware of the campaign in Wales to ban South Africa from 
the Commonwealth Games and, furthermore, reiterated the belief that the IOC had to 
take a stand to influence the abolition of racial discrimination in South Africa. 
However, Williams’ plea did little to influence Brundage’s position of playing for time: 
“The situation in South Africa has been referred to us, and while we do not intervene 
in national affairs unless our regulations are violated, we have asked our 
representatives in that country to investigate and report to us.”165 
Much later, Brundage was once again reminded of the international voice on the 
South African issue. In a letter from Lord Hemingford of The Africa Bureau, the 
following was noted: 
Knowing that the International Olympic Committee upholds the 
principle that there should be no discrimination on grounds of race 
among the members of the teams representing the various countries, 
I am writing to ask that you consider at your meeting in May the firm 
application of this principle. I have the case of the Union of South 
Africa particularly in mind and trust that you will no longer regard 
this as a domestic matter for the South African branch….166 
The international message remained consistent – enforce Article 1 of the Olympic 
Charter and examine the entire issue at the next IOC session. In his response to 
Hemingford, Brundage again provided his stock answer: 
… [I] can safely assure you that the International Olympic Committee 
has no intention of deviating from its fundamental principle that 
there shall be no discrimination against any country or person on 
grounds of race, religion or politics…. However, this problem in 
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South Africa is a most complicated one and not easy to solve with 
justice to all. Moreover, it has unfortunate political implications. In 
any event, it has our serious attention.167 
Though the IOC was certainly alert to the issue’s political significance, the specific 
obstacles that Brundage response claimed existed, made the situation difficult to 
resolve without penalizing athletes and SANOC, who had no control over 
governmental laws and policies. 
Letters continued to arrive at the IOC. A note from a resident of Surrey, England 
expressed a sense of disappointment to Brundage for not defending non-whites in 
South Africa. The author added: “South Africa is like a concentration camp to us 
Coloureds…. We are not allowed to participate in any games and sometimes we are 
even barred from watching them play. The prejudice is very bad for us.”168 
Given Brundage’s US citizenship, it appeared to some concerned citizens that the 
progressiveness they saw at work in America should translate to the IOC. In a long 
missive to Brundage, Thomas Hodge from White Plains, New York, took a similar 
approach.169 Hodge’s note pointed out several of the many issues that remained to be 
resolved, notwithstanding SANOC’s claims to the contrary concerning changes in 
South African sport. Although the announcements from those in charge of sport in 
South Africa sounded promising, the country’s racial policies continued to prevent 
non-whites from enjoying the full freedom that their white counterparts experienced. 
Furthermore, the existing sport system that offered funding and training for non-
white athletes was glaringly inferior to that of white athletes. Hodge insisted that 
simply providing an opportunity to non-white athletes to compete in the Olympic 
Games was unsatisfactory because of the fundamental inequity that made it virtually 
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impossible for non-white athletes to prepare properly in South Africa and to even 
reach standards to qualify for international competition. It was the IOC’s duty to deny 
South Africa participation in the Olympic Games until SANOC could truly support a 
non-segregated sport system. 
Antony Steel of CARDS, meanwhile, raised an issue that went to the core of 
organized competitive sports, namely, that of meritocratic participation. Non-white 
athletes that reached the required qualifying levels of performance, he argued, must 
be admitted: 
Following the recent assurances made by the South African authorities 
that in future there will be no obstacles placed in the way of the 
participation of any person regardless of his race or colour in South 
African Olympic teams, the Campaign Against Race Discrimination in 
Sport … would point out that those bodies accepted for affiliation by the 
South African Olympic and Commonwealth Games Association 
[SANOC], and from which the team must be selected, all maintain a 
strict colour-bar by regulation or in practice, permitting only European 
membership. It can therefore be seen that not only does the difficulty of 
selection present itself, but facilities for coloured sportsmen to practice 
their sport are severely limited. It is clear that before South Africa can 
claim that there is no racial discrimination in sport, these ‘European-
only’ clubs must be opened to enthusiasts of all races…. This Campaign 
… intends to obtain full details of performances of any coloured 
sportsmen who reaches Olympic standards, and will challenge the 
South African Olympic and Commonwealth Games Association 
[SANOC] to honour their statement.170 
With watchdogs such as CARDS on the alert, the challenge for SANOC and the IOC 
to right the race issue in South Africa portended great difficulties. Echoing an 
argument made by Hodge, Steel indicated the race issue went far beyond accepting 
qualified non-whites for international competition. The sport structure ingrained in 
South African society continued to impose restrictions for non-white athletes to 
become successful. 
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In a letter from Sven Ekström,171 to the IOC, he characterized the debates unfolding 
in Sweden being based on the “crimes against humanity in South Africa.”172 There had 
been serious discussions in Sweden of playing South Africa in the Davis Cup, where, 
ultimately, it was decided to play the match. Ekström continued to provide examples 
when human rights were violated, such as the atrocities performed by the Nazis and 
Soviets, whereby, in his opinion, no major international organizations, including the 
IOC, expressed an explicit stance against such violent acts. The South African case 
contained obvious facts and evidence highlighting a racist sport system that should 
provide reason for action from international sport organizations. 
Though the IOC and Brundage were fully aware of all the issues raised by Ekström, 
the IOC clung to its position of being non-political. Nonetheless, due to all these 
concerns, Ekström’s sport editorial department had a few questions for the IOC. He 
asked how apartheid can coincide with the Olympic Charter and if the IOC would make 
a pronouncement condemning South Africa?173 Since many of these questions were 
addressed privately in the correspondence between IOC representatives and those 
closely involved with the South African issue, Ekström saw fit to send Brundage a copy 
of the letter he himself had sent to the IOC. He encouraged a reply. At the bottom of 
the copy of the Ekström letter was Brundage’s handwritten response. Brundage wrote 
to Ekström that the IOC was concerned with the rules and regulations only in the 
context of the Olympic Movement and Olympic Games. Further, since SANOC assured 
the opportunity of non-white athletes, the IOC had confidence in SANOC to fulfill its 
obligations.174 Though this was not an official response from Brundage, it was clear 
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that the IOC had specific directives and was working with SANOC to achieve a 
compromise with the South African government and non-white athletes. 
Meanwhile, Mayer received a letter from Antony Steel of CARDS requesting that 
the question of racial discrimination in South Africa be included on the agenda of the 
IOC meeting to follow.175 His request would have involved the IOC much more closely 
with the politics of South Africa by connecting it to Article 1 of the Olympic Charter. 
Recalling the police raid on SASA, and pointing to the complete lack of communication 
with SASA representatives Brutus and Rangasamy, Steel expressed the concern that 
they might have been imprisoned without trial. Steel wrote: “… speaking quite 
personally … I sincerely hope that the latest events in South Africa and the ruthless 
suppressing of the South African Sports Association because it presses for interracial 
sport will awaken many members of the IOC to the urgency of enforcing Article 1 of 
the Olympic Charter and requiring all countries either to accept it or get out of the 
Olympic Games.”176 
Steel’s emotionally charged letter reflected the hardening consensus of the 
international sporting community. In Mayer’s response to Steel, he reiterated the 
IOC’s standard response that it would not involve itself in political matters: 
According to that rule, we have had a long discussion on that 
problem, regarding the situation in South Africa, at our Session in 
Munich last year. Full assurances have been given to us that all 
coloured man sports Associations, may be affiliated to the South 
African existing National Federations and therefore, to the South 
African Olympic and Commonwealth Games Association [SANOC]. 
Furthermore assurance has been given to us that all coloured 
athletes may take part in the Olympic Games with the South African 
team, as long as it is proved that they are of Olympic or international 
caliber. It seems that this is not the fact at the moment being…. As 
you can judge, our Committee has done all what was in its power and 
it has received full assurances on this matter. More, I think, we 
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cannot do. Our President has informed shortly Mr. Brutus by 
letter.177 
Although assurances had been made by SANOC to accommodate non-white 
participation, Mayer conceded that such assurances had not been fully met. The 
stance of the IOC was reiterated when Brundage officially addressed Ekström’s 
questions raised in the 10 May letter: 
… please be advised that the International Olympic Committee is 
concerned solely with the Olympic Movement and it does not 
intervene in other fields…. One of our fundamental principles is that 
no discrimination is allowed against any country or person on 
grounds of race, religion or politics. We have complete confidence in 
the South African [National] Olympic Committee, which is 
responsible for Olympic affairs in South Africa and which is well 
aware of our Rules and Regulations. It has assured us that no South 
African of Olympic calibre will be barred from the South African 
Olympic team by reason of race, religion or political affiliation. 
Moreover, the South African Government has agreed to issue the 
necessary exit papers…. The South African [National] Olympic 
Committee is also trying to promote athletic competition for all 
segments of the population.178 
It was obvious that a disconnect existed between the IOC’s position and assurances 
given by SANOC. Though the IOC claimed to shun involvement in a country’s political 
and domestic matters, it was those matters that eventually impinged on the principles 
of the Olympic Movement. 
International response continued unabated. John Papandrew, Minister of the 
Community Church of New York, registered his protest against the inclusion of South 
Africa in the 1960 Rome Games. In a letter to Brundage, Papandrew opined: 
The leitmotiv of the Olympic Games of Ancient Greece was to bring 
people together not to separate them. South Africa and its system of 
apartheid included in this year’s Olympics is a mockery in the light 
of the official policy of the South African government. Going against 
all that is meaningful to the games and inherent within them is a 
deeper sense of religion, your acceptance of such a team from the 
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Union of South Africa is an affront to the very spirit which undergirds 
these games.179 
Papandrew’s letter underscored a common theme emerging from the international 
narrative of criticism reaching Brundage and the IOC: that the IOC’s ongoing 
association with South Africa risked sacrificing of values which undergirded the 
Olympic Games. Likewise, when A.J. Ayer, Chairman of CARDS, wrote to the IOC, he 
argued that Honey had not lived up to his statements made at Munich in 1959.180 He 
pointed out specific examples of athletes who had performed better than their white 
competitors and reiterated the inequality and inequity experienced by non-white 
athletes that created a competitive disadvantage and a lack of opportunity. 
Nonetheless, SANOC claimed: “(1) it does not believe in discrimination but its member 
organisations do…. (2) that the performances [of the] coloured athletes have been 
exaggerated.”181 Ayer, of course, was convinced these points were ridiculous based on 
the current state of the sport system in South Africa. 
Marshall Knappen, a member of the American Committee on Africa, shared Ayer’s 
stance, writing Brundage to protest that the all-white South African team’s 
participation in the 1960 Olympic Games was in violation of Olympic rules because no 
non-white athletes had even been permitted to try out. He added: “From past 
experiences I know that the drafters of such manifestoes are inclined to overstate 
their case, but if the facts are as represented I hope that the South African team is 
barred if its organizers have not conformed to ‘Olympic rules’.”182 
Whether a violation of the values of the Olympic Movement, or an infraction of 
actual rules of the Olympic Charter was at issue, the international message was clear: 
resolve the racial discrimination or expel SANOC. The pressure felt by Brundage and 
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the IOC was clearly increasing, and to slightly appease the public outcries, Mayer 
confirmed receiving Ayer’s 8 June letter, sending copies to Honey and Brundage to 
remind them that the assurances from SANOC had not been upheld properly.183 
Meanwhile, Brundage informed Papandrew of the current situation, reiterating yet 
again the standard IOC response, but providing the added argument that no 
sufficiently qualified non-white athletes had been located: 
One of the fundamental principles of the Olympic Movement is that 
there shall be no discrimination by reason of race, religion or politics. 
The South African [National] Olympic Committee is well aware of 
this and we are assured that any South African athlete of Olympic 
Calibre, regardless of color, will be included in the South African 
team…. Apparently you have been misinformed…. P.S. We have 
copies of native African newspapers admitting that there are no 
negro athletes at this time of Olympic calibre.184 
Brundage clearly seemed to feel the rising pressure, when in a letter to Marshall 
Knappen, he expressed his rising annoyance with the entire South African affair: 
Since I have received several letters similar to yours of June 11, I 
concluded that I was being made the target of a campaign. 
Apparently the organizers of this campaign are as you surmise, 
ignorant of the facts…. If you will be good enough to transmit this 
information to the American Committee on Africa, which might have 
saved everyone a great deal of trouble had it approached us directly, 
it will be appreciated. Of course, it must be understood that the 
International Olympic Committee is concerned solely with the 
Olympic Movement and does not intervene in other fields. It is 
trouble enough to keep your own house clean these days.185 
There is no doubt that Brundage’s alarm, prompted by “uninformed international 
opinions,” was mounting. Accommodating Brundage’s request with regard to ACA, 
Knappen replied: “In accordance with your suggestion I am forwarding your letter on 
to the American Committee on Africa headquarters, with the request that they submit 
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directly to you the evidence they claim to have that ‘no Africans are permitted even to 
try out for the South African team’.”186 
Brundage was not the only person involved who was growing increasingly 
frustrated trying to solve the racial issue. Emery, in particular, became increasingly 
angered by outside, as he viewed it, uninformed opinions without any authority. He 
wrote to Steel in a curt tone: 
Your remarks regarding the [South African National Olympic 
Committee] are impertinent. I will not have this letter placed before the 
Council of the [South African National Olympic Committee], as my 
Council is not interested in dealing with individuals…. I am writing this 
letter quite personally and suggest that until such time as you are in a 
position to obtain authentic reports from the so-called National Sports 
Federation for non-Whites in this country, you should keep your 
remarks to yourself…. I am sending a copy of this reply to His Grace, The 
Archbishop of Cape Town, Rev. Joost de Blank, who I understand is 
connected with your campaign.187 
Steel, not to be rebuffed by letters requesting proof, informed Mayer that the 
constitution of the South African Amateur Rowing Union, whose oarsmen would 
represent South Africa in the Olympics, contained an important stipulation: “‘No 
Association shall admit to membership nor permit clubs to it affiliated to admit to 
membership any person who is not a European and an amateur and every association 
shall rigorously apply the definition set out and enforce the same, and require clubs 
to them affiliated to do the same’.”188 
Steel then interjected: “This clause in the constitution is completely contrary to 
Article 1 of the Olympic Charter and must surely exclude at least the South African 
Amateur Rowing Union from representing its country in the Olympic Games.”189 Ann 
Morrissett of the ACA also responded to Brundage’s insistence on factual proof, albeit 
in a somewhat more conciliatory manner: 
120 
 
 
… individuals … received replies to the effect that you are satisfied 
that the South African representation in the Olympics is non-
discriminatory…. We understand that you are in a very difficult 
positon and would like to clarify for you that we and those who may 
write to you are not conducting a ‘campaign’ against you personally. 
Nor are we ignorant of the very complex situation in South Africa 
which has resulted in the selection of whites only in a manner over 
which you and the International Olympic Committee no doubt have 
little control, since this is considered an ‘internal matter’…. If you will 
read through the enclosed sheet, however, I think you will have a 
better understanding of the situation as we see it and have been able 
to summarize it to the best of our knowledge. It is our hope that in 
this one international area the policy of apartheid may receive still 
another challenge and possible further reconsideration by the South 
African government before it is too late for all concerned.190 
The item concluding this correspondence before the 1960 Rome Games between 
the IOC and international organizations, consisted of an exchange between Steel and 
Mayer. Steel supplemented his previous letter, casting doubt on the reliability of the 
Drum newspaper previously referenced by Brundage and Mayer in support of their 
position. Steel argued that the Drum, although targeted at a non-white readership, was 
owned by a white millionaire and “edited by a Brit.”191 Instead of accepting the Drum’s 
potentially biased and skewed reporting, Steel recommended the Golden City Post, 
which carried articles in opposition to the views expressed in the Drum. The Golden 
City Post had identified two weightlifters and six boxers worthy enough to compete 
for South Africa,192 and Steel highlighted an example of a non-white weightlifter 
“drastically” out-lifting a white opponent, but the white athlete, nevertheless, being 
selected. How could it have been possible, Steel demanded, that in 64 years not a 
single African, Indian or Coloured had merited a trial? And further, if current 
administrative bodies were opponents of racial discrimination, why could a non-
white athlete not simply join such organizations? In addition, the terms of affiliation 
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with sports organizations were discriminatory for non-whites, as evidenced by the 
fact that ten non-white votes were equal to one white vote. Further, all committee 
representatives had to be white, and non-whites actually had to join separate clubs. 
Such dictums stymied “mixing.” Ultimately, Steel cautioned Mayer not to be duped: 
Please do not believe that the SANOCGA sincerely believes in the 
Olympic principles. If it did it would do something about the colour-
bar in associations affiliated to it. It is only the total of the affiliated 
organizations and the officials and officers are the same. It is only 
grudgingly starting to make excuses now because of the attacks of 
outsiders who detest the colour-bar in South African sport. Why did 
it do nothing before? We have written numerous letters to the 
SANOCGA and other South African sports bodies and often get no 
reply at all.193 
Mayer simply responded to Steel’s letter about the South African Rowing 
Federation,194 by reporting that the Federation changed its constitution to 
accommodate both white and non-whites equally.195 
5. Discussion: Developments during the Phase 1955-
1960  
The dialogue, commentaries, press examinations, and position statements 
discussing the South African situation from 1955 to 1960 generated ‘three dominant 
voices’—South African Olympic affiliates, domestic resistance, and international 
community—that provided much evidence to understand the IOC’s stance in regard 
to South Africa by the eve of the 1960 Rome Games. Each voice had a distinct message. 
With this multiplicity of voices, three factors shaped the final decision regarding 
South Africa’s participation in the 1960 Rome Games. First, Brundage and the IOC’s 
responses consistently reverted to Article 1 of the Olympic Charter, which included: 
“No discrimination is allowed against any country or person on ground of race, 
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religion or politics.”196 Article 1 became the main element in the definition of 
Brundage’s and the IOC’s position on the South African situation. Second, the protocol 
and structure of the IOC was strongly defended in the correspondence, which defined 
an unrelentingly formal position to provide a rationale for the IOC’s actions and 
positions. The NOCs represented Olympic matters in their respective countries, and 
the IOC trusted the NOCs to have the ideals of the Olympic Movement and the IOC’s 
rules and regulations in mind when making decisions regarding participation in the 
Olympic Games. Further, all domestic organizations had to proceed through their 
NOCs in communication with the IOC.  Third, the IOC maintained a firm position to not 
involve itself in political and domestic issues of any country. In view of these three key 
points, the question arose: why was South Africa still part of the Olympic Movement 
by the time of the 1960 Rome Games? 
According to the literal interpretation of Article 1, it is reasonable to conclude that 
SANOC should have been excluded from the 1960 Rome Games. Racial discrimination 
was forbidden and SANOC clearly violated Article 1. In Chapter 4, it becomes evident 
why Brundage and the IOC overtly ignored the literal interpretation of Article 1. 
However, based on the correspondence from 1955 to 1960, Brundage’s and the IOC’s 
decisions were dominated by: (a) IOC protocol and structure, and (b) the IOC’s 
strategy not to involve itself in member countries’ domestic matters. Focussing on 
these two points helps to understand why South Africa was allowed to remain a 
member in good standing of the Olympic Movement. 
From the time the South African Olympic affiliates’ voices were being heard, it was 
anticipated that the South African situation would quickly be resolved because of two 
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factors: (1) Article 1, and (2) assurances from SANOC that the issues would be 
resolved in due time. SANOC, though consistently mentioning the difficulties 
encountered from organizational, governmental, and athletic talent standpoints, was 
steadfast in the desire to bring about a solution by its own resolve and action, without 
external interference. The IOC administration was initially satisfied that SANOC 
would do this – after all, NOCs must take care of domestic concerns in regard to 
“domestic” Olympic matters. In this case, however, the South African government 
played such a large role in the issue that the IOC, ultimately, could not help but be 
involved. Although the IOC administration allowed SANOC considerable flexibility, in 
time it became impatient because matters did not move towards a resolution in an 
expedient fashion. The requests by SANOC to delay discussions on the South African 
situation until after the 1960 Rome Games were finally rebutted by Brundage who 
refused to delay any longer. Brundage reported on racial discrimination in South 
Africa for the first time at the 1959 Munich IOC Executive Board meeting.197 At that 
time, a report was rendered by Honey and consequently discussed at the IOC General 
Session following.198 Dialogue on racism in South Africa continued in the Executive 
Board meeting and General Session held in Rome 1960. The report of the General 
Session mentioned that a delegation of South African activists presented itself in 
Rome to confer with the Executive Board.199 On that occasion, the Executive Board 
heard from Rev. Michael Scott, as discussed in the Domestic Resistance section of this 
chapter. A debate ensued which concluded with two findings: (1) SANOC had made a 
reasonable effort to implement the undertakings proposed by Honey at the 1959 
Munich Sessions; and (2) considering the effort and “amiable attitude” from both the 
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current South African sport bodies and the organization of non-white associations, 
future misunderstandings from the current South African sport bodies in regard to 
non-white inclusion should be minimal.200  
Brundage’s and the IOC’s trust in SANOC to resolve the racial issue was not 
necessarily violated in their eyes because it was interpreted that SANOC had done its 
best to resolve the complicated situation. On the other hand, SANOC’s efforts clearly 
were failures in the mind of domestic resistance and international constituents. 
However, did its rising unrest matter? Not to Brundage and the IOC, who wanted 
SANOC to solve the issue on its own, keeping the IOC out of political and domestic 
involvement. Abiding by IOC protocol and structure, and a policy to be non-political, 
the voices of the domestic and international resistance were heard, but no action 
resulted. The information from domestic and international sources, though valuable 
to Brundage, did not prompt him to meet the issue “head on,” but he managed to delay 
its resolution until after the 1960 Games through a policy firmly focussed on formal 
procedure and institutional arrangement. The IOC was concerned with SANOC and its 
commitment to the Olympic Charter. Domestic resistance, the international 
community, and even the South African government’s laws and policies had minimal 
influence on the immediate decision to not ban South Africa from the 1960 Rome 
Games. 
Despite Brundage and the IOC insisting that they stood by the non-discrimination 
ideals expressed in Article 1 of the Olympic Charter, their implicit acceptance of South 
Africa into the Olympic Games in full awareness of SANOC’s complicit actions, 
amounted to institutionalized racism. Such racism, as was mentioned above, was not 
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the result of explicitly expressed racializing positions or actions, but emerged from 
the structural properties of the social system within which people and organizations 
act: people act to effect certain outcomes while disregarding racially discriminatory 
consequences resulting from their actions. Since the rules and regulations of the IOC 
permitted and encouraged SANOC to ignore the domestic politics of South Africa in 
order ‘to keep sport and politics’ separate and thus be able to participate in the 
Olympic Games, SANOC’s actions, directed at adhering to this foundational IOC 
dictum, amounted, if not to outright active support for apartheid policies, then at least 
to an indirect support of the status quo by ignoring its racializing implications.  
Whatever explanation was offered by Brundage and the IOC, any arrangement to 
accommodate South Africa’s participation in the IOC, Olympic Games, and Olympic 
Movement that did not include the complete abolition of racial discrimination can be 
interpreted as accepting racism in South African sport. 
My task in the next chapter, treating the 1960-1964 period, will, therefore, be to 
discover how – and if so, to what extent – the messages from the ‘three dominant 
voices’ changed and how the Brundage and the IOC negotiated with those voices to 
affect SANOC’s existence and South African sport. 
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Chapter Three:  
Avery Brundage and the IOC’s First 
Confrontation with the South African 
National Olympic Committee, 1960-1964 
1. Introduction 
The dialogue between the International Olympic Committee (IOC), South African 
Olympic affiliates, domestic resistance forces, and the international community 
continued with substantial force between the 1960 Rome Games and the 1964 Tokyo 
Games. Each voice remained strong, their respective messages about the status of 
non-whites in South African sport were consistent. To appease the IOC, the South 
African Olympic affiliates, represented primarily by the South African National 
Olympic Committee (SANOC), engaged in limited efforts to integrate non-white 
athletes and organizations into the current white-dominated sport system. The 
integration process, handled with extreme caution, was ultimately directed by South 
African government policies. Domestic resistance entities maintained a contradictory 
stance to SANOC’s feeble efforts and the South African government’s apartheid 
restrictions. Those supporting the domestic resistance network vied to take control 
of SANOC as the legitimate National Olympic Committee (NOC), or, at the very least, 
to have SANOC suspended until the South African situation was corrected. The 
international community persisted to advocate for the domestic resistance. Until 
SANOC abided by IOC rules and regulations, the international community petitioned 
for SANOC’s suspension or expulsion and a new non-racial NOC to be established in 
South Africa. 
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As these voices became more vigorous with their messages enunciated more 
clearly, it became apparent how they shaped the responses and decisions affecting 
SANOC’s position and South Africa’s participation in the IOC, Olympic Games, and 
Olympic Movement. The years of correspondence, information, and action leading up 
to the 1964 Tokyo Games yielded a different result than the years approaching the 
1960 Rome Games. By 1964, Brundage and the IOC did not trust SANOC’s 
commitment and ability to resolve the racial issues in South African Olympic sport. 
The result was a firm decision to retract the invitation to South Africa to participate 
in the 1964 Tokyo Games. 
2. South African Olympic Affiliates 
Immediately following the 1960 Rome Games, Emery thanked Mayer and 
Brundage for how they dealt with the South African case. His comments were 
optimistic: “I do sincerely hope that you will realise that all the information I have 
given both you and Mr. Brundage has been completely honest…. Our team from the 
commencement to the completion of the Games, met with nothing else but courtesy 
and friendliness from all the competing nations, irrespective of race, colour or creed.”1 
Mayer’s response to Emery assumed a “business as usual” manner.2 
Four months later, SANOC extended its activities against the upstart South African 
Sports Association (SASA) in order to retain power in South African Olympic sport. 
Emery reaffirmed SANOC’s position to Brundage by attacking those in charge of SASA: 
The efforts by Brutus and Rangasamy are absolutely political…. 
Their demands that we be expelled from the Olympic Games of 1964 
will again be made to the IOC and it is going to be the same thing over 
again and we must deny their allegations and again give our promise 
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that if any of the non-Whites are good enough at the trials, they will 
represent South Africa in international sport.3 
Emery did not think that these activities by SASA could be overcome without the 
IOC’s cooperation: “It would be appreciated if your Chancellor could send us a copy of 
any report that may be received by him from Brutus, as they studiously avoid letting 
us know what they have said to the IOC. To this date we have not yet received a copy 
of the long report they placed before the IOC 12 months ago.”4 To mitigate the 
controversy associated with SANOC, Emery deferred all other issues in order to 
maintain focus on SANOC’s goal of repairing its image. To this end, Emery announced 
the affiliation of two non-white sports associations in boxing and athletics, with the 
current national bodies, placing this move in the context of his opposition to Brutus: 
“In the opinion of my Association it would be wrong for the proposition forwarded 
you by Mr. Brutus to be placed on the agenda for the meeting in Athens, as we have 
repeatedly told you this is a political body and does not control non-White sport in 
this country.”5 SANOC evidently was frustrated from having to continually defend its 
position on non-white sport in response to Brutus’ and SASA’s political activities. 
To maintain a certain level of transparency and dialogue, Emery openly discussed 
with Brundage the correspondence sent to Mayer and Brutus. Mentioning once again 
SANOC’s goals of current affiliation and future affiliation of the non-white Olympic 
sporting bodies, Emery continued to attack Brutus and SASA: 
We again give you an assurance that the [South African National 
Olympic Committee] is doing all possible to meet the wishes of the 
IOC in regard to all races being recognised and you will appreciate 
that the affiliation of the above two bodies is proof of this…. It is the 
opinion of my association that it would be wrong for the Notice of 
Motion forwarded by Mr. Brutus to be placed on your agenda in 
Athens, as we have repeatedly told you and given you facts that the 
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South African Sports Association is more interested in political 
matters than in promoting sport for the non-Whites. We have 
repeatedly asked this body to give us the names of their so-called 
affiliated bodies, the name and addresses of their secretaries, and 
what sports meetings they have organised. We still have had no reply 
to this question…. From this you will see that events are moving in a 
direction the IOC requires, and we ask you again not to be fooled by 
Mr. Brutus or any member of his committee or any person such as 
the Rev. M. Scott who knows nothing of the actual conditions 
regarding our efforts in having the non-Whites properly 
represented.6 
Emery insinuated that SANOC was doing everything possible to fulfill the promises 
made towards change in South African sport. On the same day Emery wrote to 
Brundage, Mayer responded to Emery’s 9 February 1961 letter, pointing to certain 
discrepancies between Emery’s public and private stance: 
There seems to be a little contradiction in your letter compared with 
the press article, when you say that it will permit proper trials for 
the selection of your future teams. While in the cutting it is said that 
trials are prohibited and that they should take place somewhere in 
Rhodesia or in private. In my personal opinion there should be open 
trials in the Union. This might also be an important problem for you 
to study in view to find a satisfactorily solution…. Regarding Mr. 
Brutus’ letter I am expecting Mr. Brundage’s suggestion before 
replying. I just received today another letter from him sending a 
protest against efforts to secure recognition by the IOC for the 
International World Judo Federation…. it is not Mr. Brutus’ business 
to interfere in this problem …7 
Although Mayer responded to Brutus on this matter assuring that the IOC only 
recognized one International Sports Federation (ISF) in each sport and that any 
National Sport Federation (NSF) might apply to an ISF,8 Brutus was undoubtedly 
overestimating SASA’s influence and power with the IOC. 
This increase in the international correspondence on the South African issue, and 
the issue's resulting increased international profile could be regarded as progress of 
sorts, but it was still questionable as to how the IOC viewed Brutus, SASA, and those 
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in charge of the domestic movement. For example, after thanking Emery for the 
update on the current advances in various South African sporting circles, Brundage 
reassured Emery that there was no salient reason to include Brutus’ motion on the 
agenda for the upcoming June IOC General Session in Greece.9 Brundage may have felt 
that Brutus was not an important voice, or that the South African issue was actually 
improving. Regardless of Brundage’s own thoughts on Brutus, Emery persisted in 
seeking to disavow Brutus while supporting SANOC’s place in the Olympic Movement, 
pointing to what he identified as Brutus’ “not very helpful” actions .10 As evidence, 
Emery provided an article discussing the development of non-white athletes, as well 
as his most recent correspondence with Brutus in which Brutus and SASA, had given 
SANOC an ultimatum, pointing out that SASA was “fully determined that all sportsmen 
shall be given fair and equal treatment, particularly in matters of organisation, 
representation, facilities and trials.”11 Emery responded by reaffirming SANOC’s 
authority: 
The [South African National Olympic Committee] deals only with 
South African Governing Bodies of Sport who are affiliated to their 
individual international federations…. Your reference to the 
International Olympic Committee is noted and a photostatic copy of 
your letter is being sent to the IOC … The IOC has been advised that 
non-white associations for athletics, cycling and boxing have been 
affiliated to the S.A. Governing Bodies of Sport. When further non-
white associations affiliate to the respective S.A. Governing Body as 
has been done by the three mentioned, the IOC will be advised 
accordingly.12 
SANOC remained in control of South African Olympic sport, due to South Africa’s 
impending separation from the Commonwealth on 1 June 1961, but Emery wondered 
whether the end of South Africa’s participation in the Commonwealth Games would 
have Olympic implications.13 After hearing that there might be a possible connection 
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between the Commonwealth Games and the IOC through South Africa’s IOC 
representative Reginald Honey, Emery asked Brundage, should he be contacted by the 
Commonwealth committee, to advise it of the progress of non-white athletes and 
organizations in South Africa. Emery appeared to need this support from the IOC 
because of the opposition’s widening scope, now counting the newly formed All-
African Sports Federation among its members. Pointing to news reports, Emery noted 
that the Federation had decided that:  
… if a team from South Africa [was] selected for international 
meetings which ha[d] been dictated by race, the Federation [would] 
withdraw all African entries…. The threat implied … that Afro-Asian 
sporting associations would then appeal to British and other 
organisations to take similar steps, thus forcing South African White 
sportsmen, and women out of world class athletics…. We in South 
Africa, do not know the make-up of this All-African Sports 
Federation, but I, personally, am of the opinion that Mr. Brutus 
through the South African Sports Association has representation on 
this body.14 
Clearly, such a development would have left SANOC in a difficult situation. To 
solidify South Africa’s stance, Emery confirmed that, if possible, Reginald Honey 
would personally advise the IOC on the South African position, either at the meeting 
in Athens, or in a personal conversation with Brundage.15 In support of SANOC’s 
position, Emery provided Brundage with an example of the progress he saw occurring 
in South Africa,16 drawing attention to the remarks by then current SANOC President, 
General H.B. Klopper: “If and when a non-white sportsman in South Africa reaches 
world standard, the Olympic Games Council will do all in its power to get him overseas 
for international competition…. We encourage sport among all races in the Union, 
within the traditional policy of South African.”17 Nonetheless, South African policies 
forbade mixed sport, so to divert responsibility from SANOC, General Klopper added 
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that SANOC did not make policy, but that the NSFs were charged with addressing 
mixed sports and the affiliation process of non-white associations. Shifting 
responsibility to the government and NSFs did not release SANOC from its obligations 
to enforce change, but it weakened the strength of the example used by Emery. 
When Brundage responded to Emery, he reassured the latter of two issues: first, 
the subject of South Africa would not be on the upcoming agenda for the IOC General 
Session in Athens; and, second, the IOC had no connection with the British Empire and 
Commonwealth Games, but, if asked, the IOC would be glad to give its opinion on any 
progress made in South African sport.18 This support from Brundage echoed Mayer’s 
somewhat livelier letter in regard to Emery’s concerns about the Commonwealth 
Games: “In my opinion, we have nothing to do with the Commonwealth Games, as they 
never asked our patronage and they prefer to ignore us (all the best for the IOC). Why 
should we now interfere when there is some trouble??? … They should look into their 
own affairs. I think the South Africans are mistaken if they think that the British will 
ask us anything!”19 
Relieved by the assurances from Brundage, Emery remained optimistic, “It is going 
to be a slow battle, but I am convinced that ultimately at least when the Tokyo Games 
are held, South Africa will have overcome the racial prejudice in sport.”20 He offered 
newspaper reports as evidence of SANOC’s efforts to overcome the colour bar, 
pointing to examples where, as he saw it “…South African white officials are doing 
their utmost to get the non-whites well trained in athletics and other sports…. Sooner 
or later when the non-whites are properly trained and coached, we will find one who 
can represent South Africa.”21 
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According to SANOC and the IOC, there was absolutely no confusion about who was 
in charge of the Olympic Movement in South Africa. Mayer reminded SANOC of its 
responsibility to control IOC intellectual property from being used by outside 
organizations, such as a Johannesburg club naming a competition Olympiad of the 
Hellenic in Africa: “This is an abuse of the terms which are our property and should 
not be allowed. It is the duty of the National Olympic Committees to control such 
abuses and we do hope that such terms which have no connection at all with such 
competitions will be cancelled”.22 
The ongoing dialogue between the IOC and SANOC confirmed the stability of the 
relationship. Nonetheless, later that month, Mayer wrote to the new Secretary General 
of SANOC, L.M. Francey, to remind her that the IOC kept a constant watch, raising 
specific criteria of athletic performance and “required standards” in conjunction with 
the problem of racial exclusionary policies as the underlying issue: 
I note with satisfaction that your Executive have asked you to 
reiterate your policy as previously given to us, that you will stand by 
your undertaking that should non-white sportsmen be up to the 
required standard he will be considered for inclusion with teams 
sent overseas. If this is already an important step, I must say that one 
hears often that the White Sports Organizations in South African do 
nothing to help non-whites to reach that required standard and that 
they are even not allowed to train with white athletes, nor can a 
white athlete race with a non-white. As an example I may mention 
the case of that young white cyclist who followed only (without 
taking part) a race of non-white cyclists and who has been 
suspended. Those are the facts which are making very bad publicity 
over here and in the World…. I have also read today in the European 
press that the South African Football Association has been 
suspended by the International Body (FIFA) just because of those 
racial discriminations…. Therefore the problem is, in my opinion, not 
at all settled.23 
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Mayer remained apprehensive about SANOC’s willingness to improve South 
African Olympic sport for non-whites. At the bottom of Brundage’s copy of the above 
letter, Mayer characterized as “ridiculous” SANOC’s argument about the deficiencies 
of non-white athletes’ performance standards since SANOC “[did] all they can not to 
help them to reach that standard.”24 
Mayer’s reservations of SANOC’s ability to improve South African sport were 
confirmed in a handwritten letter from Reginald Honey explaining South Africa’s 
woes. Although SANOC was trying hard to abide by IOC rules, Honey believed the 
troubles with Olympic officials continued to increase. Especially with the foolish 
statements from the government, which continually put pressure on SANOC in an 
already difficult situation.25 Brundage agreed with Honey and informed him that the 
South African situation will be one of the topics discussed at an upcoming IOC 
Executive Board meeting. Based on the many newspaper clippings from South Africa 
and the letters of protest received by the IOC, the situation was far from becoming 
better.26 
Attempting to keep the dialogue going forward, Francey sought to update Mayer 
before submitting a formal report based on the next SANOC Executive Board meeting 
on 27 March 1962. She informally advised Mayer on a number of issues, such as the 
movement towards integrating white and non-white athletes and organizations, 
SANOC’s renewed commitment to the promises of Reginald Honey, the improvement 
of non-white athletes’ performances, and the increase in multi-racial teams for 
international competitions.27 In addition, Francey reported the challenges posed by 
Brutus and SASA: 
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We seem to find it most difficult to make him understand that as an 
Association controlling a number of sports they cannot have direct 
affiliation to our Association, but that the individual sports can 
become affiliated to the various S.A. Governing Bodies of Sport, and 
have equal membership. We have a South African Sports Federation 
(White Association) and the Maccabi Games Association who are 
interested in various sports but they do not demand affiliation to our 
Association – we are all autonomous bodies but we try and assist 
each other when the occasion rises…. there is nothing to prevent the 
South African Sports Association to affiliate the sections which are 
applicable to the S.A. Governing Bodies of Sport, which have direct 
representation on our Association.28 
Francey strove to keep SANOC at a distance from SASA, whereas SASA seemed to 
wish to ignore that SANOC was in charge and that SASA had to go through the same 
channels as all other organizations to gain representation in South African Olympic 
sport. In the main, SANOC remained as confident as ever about its capabilities to 
retain control over the transition process in South African Olympic sport. However, 
according to Francey, since progress was happening in South African sport as a result 
of the continual effort to welcome non-white athletes and sporting bodies, SANOC was 
perplexed when receiving news from the IOC Executive Board that no progress had 
been made in regard to the inclusion of the non-white population.29 Francey insisted 
that SANOC was abiding by its promises: “… we have no intention of diverting in the 
very least from the Olympic ideal, of selecting the best athletes in all Olympic sports 
irrespective of colour, provided such athletes reach standards laid down by the 
International Olympic Committee,” and the relationship between SANOC and the IOC 
was being tested by “a politically inspired controversy aimed at the breaking of [their] 
good relations.”30 
In response, Mayer reiterated the IOC’s position and in particular the obligations 
arising from Article 1 of the Olympic Charter forbidding discrimination on grounds of 
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race, religion, or political affiliation. ”Unfortunately,” Mayer noted, while somewhat 
exonerating SANOC itself, “facts are there to prove that the elimination of non-whites 
athletes is still in mind in several circles, but probably not in the idea of your 
association, who still keeps the responsibility, where Olympic matters are 
concerned.31 
Both Francey’s and Mayer’s letters bespoke the mindset of SANOC and the IOC, 
respectively. Although each letter seemed confrontational, Gen. Klopper noted the 
IOC’s reluctance to break the current relationship, reassuring Mayer that SANOC 
would pursue a steady policy course of action.32 However, Mayer’s official update to 
SANOC after the 1962 IOC General Session in Moscow, and in response to Reginald 
Honey’s report at the General Session as well as to new political developments in 
South Africa, was anything but reassuring – the threat “immediate exclusion”33 was 
voiced: 
… in Rome in 1960, we were assured that your Government would 
permit the inclusion of coloured athletes on your team for the 
Olympic Games. Now we understand the situation has changed and 
that your Government has forbidden such a mixed team. In this 
event, of course, you cannot fulfill your obligations as a National 
Olympic Committee recognized by the International Olympic 
Committee…. It was decided therefore that you must be warned that 
unless your Government withdraws this prohibition so that you can 
carry out your work in full conformity with Olympic statues, before 
October 1963, the date of our next Session in Nairobi, that we will be 
forced, much as we dislike to take such a drastic action against one 
of our loyal National Olympic Committees, to suspend the South 
African [National] Olympic Committee until it can function 
correctly.34 
SANOC, so it appeared, had rather overestimated the effectiveness of its own 
efforts. Indeed, its future position with the IOC seemed to be uncertain, but ultimately 
a more expanded time line was defined to resolve the issue; Emery expressed his 
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appreciation, insisting again on the convenient stance of sport being a non-political 
entity:  
 … as long as the Group Areas Act is in being in the Republic, Whites 
and non-Whites will never be permitted to compete in trials against 
each other…. I take this opportunity of congratulating the IOC on 
giving South Africa at least 12 months to make up their mind about 
inter-racial sport…. I am not a politician, nor do I take sides in any 
political matters, but if we belong to the IOC surely we must abide by 
the rules or if we cannot abide by the rules, we should gracefully 
withdraw.35 
Complications, meanwhile, also arose with regard to direct political opposition 
resulting from the actions of Brutus: Mayer advised Francey of Brutus’ aim “to form a 
new ‘Non-racial South African [National] Olympic Committee’ which would ask for 
recognition by the IOC … I [understand] that your South African Government is not 
going to stop the racial discrimination in sport, which is very unfortunate.”36 
Brutus’ non-racial organization might had challenged the legitimacy of SANOC, 
already weakened by the actions of the South African government. In response, 
SANOC member Jan Botha advised Mayer of the evolution of SANOC’s efforts, 
downplaying the legitimacy of the new organization: 
I can, in the meantime, assure you that large sums of money are being 
spent on the development of sport for our Coloured people and that 
the European officials and sportsmen are making a real effort to 
assist them in coaching, officiating and administration…. The so-
called South African Sports Association does not represent any 
appreciable proportion of the Coloured people and virtually 
amounts to a self-proclaimed group. The majority of our Coloured 
people are happy to co-operate with the existing governing bodies of 
sport and the [South African National Olympic Committee].37 
About a month later, Botha followed up with the lengthy documentation of 
favourable comments by a track coach in the United States conerning the opportunity 
and assistance given to non-white athletes in South Africa,38 but Mayer dismissed the 
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veracity of Botha’s source: “… I must say that we have other sources of information 
which do not quite correspond with [his] opinion.”39 
By early November 1962, Francey had become concerned with determining the 
degree of Mayer’s involvement with SASA in forming the South African Non-Racial 
Olympic Committee (SAN-ROC). Had the IOC Executive in fact decided, without 
informing SANOC, to forward a copy of their rules to SAN-ROC, “this unofficial body 
who are trying to undermine the good work done by this body”? 40 SAN-ROC, after all, 
merely consisted of “small splinter groups who are not accepting affiliation to the 
recognised National Sports Bodies.”41 Francey pursued the same line of investigation 
with Brundage himself, endeavouring to determine at what level of authority the IOC’s 
exchanges with SAN-ROC had been authorized. We “would like to know upon whose 
instructions [Mayer] is corresponding with this unofficial body; whether it was upon 
the instructions of your Executive or not,” she criticized the IOC, “I can assure you that 
my Council are most unhappy about the position which appears to exist between the 
IOC and this splinter group…. We are most anxious to maintain the happy relationship 
which has existed between the IOC and the Association since 19[08], and we should 
like to be reassured that no official negotiations have been ordered by yourself or your 
Executive with the unofficial body.”42 Francey attached clippings from the South 
African Rand Daily Mail and Dagbreek newspapers which, she explained, indicated the 
degree of confusion and mistrust created by the IOC’s ambiguous position. She urged 
Brundage “to look into this matter as soon as possible, and let me have your airmail 
reply.”43 
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In his response, Mayer sought to allay some of SANOC’s concerns, adopting the 
formal position that “[u]p to the time of writing we have not received any application 
for recognition from SAN-ROC. As long as your Association remains recognised by us, 
there is no reason to recognise another body as we can recognise only one Olympic 
committee in a country. “44 Mayer went on to emphasize that the IOC’s discussion 
relative to the position of SANOC had until then focussed on “suspension … this still 
does not mean that your association will be expelled. … Furthermore, may I add that 
I did not correspond at all with SAN-ROC of which I ignore the existence by [sic] the 
time being. It is certain that if they write and if I should have to give them a brief 
answer you will get a copy of our letter as we always have done in the past.”45 Mayer 
ruled out negotiations with SAN-ROC in the near future.  Brundage also responded to 
Francey’s missive, expressing sympathy for SANOC’s difficult position but expressing 
the hope that “somehow the necessary adjustments can be made to permit you to 
function according to the Olympic code, and we have no intention of dealing with 
anyone else. Since the difficulty seems to rest in the laws or policies of your country, 
it is doubtful that any other organization could function any better than you can.”46 
As a strategic goodwill gesture, Francey and SANOC extended an invitation to 
Mayer to visit South Africa.47 Mayer cited his busy schedule as preventing him from 
accepting the invitation himself, but suggested the new delegate for African affairs 
instead, who would report back to Brundage himself. 
South Africa’s political position seemed to shift somewhat over two months later.  
It became known to Francey that Mayer was waiting for SANOC’s reaction to a letter 
by the Minister of the Interior who had stated: “Should there be Non-Whites who 
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qualify for inclusion in the South African contingent which will participate in the next 
Olympic Games, application for travelling facilities should be made in good time and 
each application will then be considered on its own merits and in the light of 
Government policy.”48 It seemed that the Minister gave SANOC the green light to 
include non-white athletes, but now it would be up to SANOC to make sure that if non-
white athletes were selected, they made it to the Olympic Games. Final responsibility 
with issuing the necessary travel documents, however, would remain with the 
Minister, who would ensure that “white and non-white citizens of South Africa 
seeking passports …ha[d] a clear character.”49 SANOC was elated with the Minister’s 
statement because it meant both white and non-whites would have equal opportunity 
for selection to and participation in the Olympic Games. To add to the positive news, 
Francey also referred to a press release mentioning that members of SANOC had 
engaged in informal discussions earlier in January with representatives from SASA.50 
SANOC’s President subsequently reaffirmed that if a non-white athlete reached 
international standard, she or he would be considered for Olympic participation, but 
points of contention remained over the organizational implementation of such 
improved relations: 
The President likewise indicated how non-white sportsmen could 
improve their standards of achievement and offered all the 
assistance available to the [South African National Olympic 
Committee]. The representatives of the South African Sports 
Association indicated that they would not be satisfied with any form 
of parallel affiliation with the National Governing Bodies of Sport, 
and would maintain their opposition to the [South African National 
Olympic Committee] unless integration from club level up was 
forthwith enforced. This is clearly quite beyond the purview and 
powers of the [South African National Olympic Committee]…. The 
Executive of the [South African National Olympic Committee] wishes 
to point out that the greater majority of non-white sportsmen are 
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enjoying the benefits referred to above through their affiliation to 
the existing National Governing Bodies of Sport.51 
The objective of all this was to demonstrate the growth of non-white participation 
in sport, but SASA’s constant dissatisfaction was impossible to ignore, and the initial 
goodwill diminished such that two months later Francey complained to Brundage 
about being ignored by SAN-ROC, and the latter’s inappropriate use of the term 
‘Olympic.’ 52  
In his first letter to newly elected SANOC President Frank Braun, Mayer remained 
unsympathetic towards SANOC’s position: “[M]ay I tell you that following the press, I 
read that the racial discrimination in your country is still worse than ever. That makes 
me think that in Sport one follows the Government’s instructions too?”53 The 
unauthorized use of Olympic symbols by organizations such as SAN-ROC, likewise, 
was a consequence of the flawed political regulations in place in South Africa: “If you 
had a law in South Africa forbidding unauthorized organizations to use the Olympic 
words and symbols, such as there are in the United States and in other countries, you 
would be able to take action against SAN-ROC.”54 Francey, in response, insisted on the 
“tremendous progress” made by non-White sports organizations that had affiliated to 
the national sports organizations: “Where athletes are accepting affiliation, help and 
guidance from the official National Sports Federation, they are making excellent 
progress.”55 
Mayer acknowledged the difficulty of pursuing a solution without involving SANOC 
in political dealings, a foundation of the IOC’s approach to keep sport and politics 
apart: “… if the South African Government issues laws of racial discrimination, I don’t 
think that you can go against them in spite of the fact that you don’t wish to mix 
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politics to sport.”56 Instead, Mayer mooted the possibility of coming to an 
arrangement in the area of sports exclusively, through a rapprochement between 
SAN-ROC and SANOC: “I am sure that you have no difficulties with the Non-white 
sporting bodies who have affiliated to your National Sports Federation …. But I think 
that all your efforts should be put in the view of having ALL the Non-White National 
Bodies affiliating to the existing Organization. Why does the SAN-ROC remain in its 
position? Is it not possible to include their leaders into your Organization?”57 
Despite their criticism, both Mayer and Brundage wanted to aid SANOC, putting the 
issue on the agenda of the upcoming session in Nairobi, where the IOC hoped to 
receive a report from SANOC that would restore its standing. “[D]on’t forget that we 
must have strong arguments in your favour and that we have to expect several 
interventions on the subject,” Mayer advised, “do mention also in your Report how 
many National Bodies have included Non-Whites and how many not, while 
mentioning the name of those Federations.58 To assist SANOC reclaim its place as a 
legitimate IOC member, Mayer gave permission to send the President, one delegate, 
and two observers to the upcoming meeting in Nairobi.59 Francey showed herself 
appreciative of Mayer’s good faith, but could not hide her concerns regarding the 
plans of SAN-ROC, pointing to one John Harris’ hope to attend the meeting on behalf 
of SAN-ROC, and place “their propaganda before your members. Great play is being 
made in certain newspapers of the fact that this SAN-ROC representative has managed 
to get in ahead of us with an address to the IOC, and has been able to side-step my 
Association, which is your official representative in this country… My Executive Board 
has the greatest confidence in your handling of this gentleman and his unofficial 
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approach to the IOC, especially after his London representatives have been told that 
the IOC will not receive them at its meeting.”60 
It was obvious that SAN-ROC’s unilateral action concerned Francey, who 
bemoaned the lack of co-operation between the two organizations, “an appeal to them 
to work with us in achieving the above aims [the development of sport in South Africa] 
was refused.”61 The whole issue, Francey argued, could have been laid to rest if 
SANOC’s earlier offer of co-operation for the non-white organizations had been 
followed through on: “At that time the whole question was one of affiliation, and a 
promise was made to your President and members that all athletes of Affiliated 
Bodies would be considered in every way for equal privileges as members of South 
African teams, provided they belong to affiliated sports and reach international 
standards…. I take this opportunity of placing on record once again that everything 
possible is being done to encourage the affiliation of non-white groups to the 
recognised Governing Bodies of Sport…”62 In his response, Mayer pointed out that the 
meeting between IOC members and John Harris, the SAN-ROC representative, had 
been of an informal nature only:  
In spite of the fact that we asked the SAN-ROC Organization to send 
no representative to our Lausanne Olympic meetings of June 5th and 
6th, the South African Non-Racial Committee delegated Mr. Harris 
who arrived on the eve of our meetings. I informed him that he could 
not meet the IOC Executive Board, because the problem of South 
Africa was not on the agenda and would only be discussed in Nairobi, 
after the recognized South African [National] Olympic Committee 
would have sent us a report…. Mr. Harris insisted and waited for 
hours behind our meeting room. After the meeting was closed, we 
agreed out of courtesy and owing to the fact that Mr. Harris had made 
such a long journey, to let him talk for 5 minutes when our meeting 
was over. Several members of the Executive Board had already left 
the room and therefore Mr. Harris was not received officially and no 
mention about his presence will appear in our minutes. Mr. Harris 
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spoke for about three minutes and handed over some documents to 
the members still present…. I wanted you to know the truth which 
seems to have been distorted by Mr. Harris when he gave 
information to the press.63 
The IOC’s fairly cooperative stance towards SANOC notwithstanding, Brundage 
himself soon thereafter increased the pressure on SANOC to reach a solution of the 
issue, advising Francey that “unless you can produce evidence that it is possible for 
you to comply with Olympic regulations … the International Olympic Committee 
would be forced to remove your name from the list of recognized Olympic 
Committees.”64 Francey reassured Brundage that SANOC was in a position “to present 
acceptable evidence to show that we comply fully with all Olympic rules.”65 Mayer 
offered the additional suggestion “that you bring along some of those coloured or 
negro men with your delegation to testify what you have done in providing facilities, 
coaches, etc. It may help in your case to have some negro testimony.”66 At the same 
time, he acknowledged that South African race legislation which rendered the mixing 
of white and non-whites illegal, ultimately over-ruled any arrangements the sports 
organizations might have attempted. “I think,” he concluded, “that it would not be a 
wise politic from us to suspend the present Olympic Committee in South Africa. It 
would make more trouble than good.”67  
In fact, he suggested, based on a tendentious report from Swiss journalist Rudolph 
Balsiger, that “the coloured men seem to be very happy there although, personally I 
am against any discrimination in sport. One thing I don’t like there is that difference 
they make between whites and coloured men, where training in sport is concerned. 
Why don’t they mix them together? Of course there are Government Laws against 
which nothing can be done.” 68 Mayer’s message to Brundage thus was somewhat 
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ambiguous, on the one hand rejecting racial discrimination, while at the same time 
making a case in SANOC’s favour based on Balsiger’s report. 
Permitted to go anywhere and meet with anyone, Balsiger’s report was initially 
confidential, but he decided to make it public, since the facts as he saw were at great 
variance with other representations of the issue appearing in other print sources. 
Balsiger was clearly pro-SANOC, pointing to the development of sports activities 
among non-whites that had commenced over 10 years previously.69 His published 
report included a brief historical synopsis in which he made light of “the ‘Apartheid’”, 
noting that its depiction in the media was “far away from the truth.” Apartheid 
according to Balsiger was, in fact, not a discriminatory regime, but the,  
… separate, calm and systematic development of the white and the 
Bantu, each group within its own geo-political homeland, according 
to inherent characteristics and talents. Both races are far apart in 
cultural, ethnographical and social-political ways and a joint 
development of the two is completely out of the question. … The 
difference between the primitive culture of the Bantu and the Atomic 
Age is so great that no resolutions of the UN Security Council, threats 
of boycotts or decisions to suspend (IOC) would do any good or have 
any constructive value. … Apartheid in Sports favor Black and 
Colored [sic]. Anybody who knows anything about the young African 
countries can readily see that the living standard of the Black in 
South Africa is far higher than anywhere else.”70 
Mayer used Balsiger’s report to cast doubt on SAN-ROC’s position as a genuine 
sports organization, referencing Balsiger’s opinion that “SAN-ROC [was] trying to 
infiltrate the sports with politics to make the South African sports a tool of some shady 
political ambitions. … The ‘representations’ are a document which would not 
originate from a sports authority but rather originate in the kitchen of the communist 
party."71 Balsiger was convinced that should SAN-ROC succeed at the IOC, the present 
financial support for “the Bantu sports would stop immediately. The victims would 
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only be the Black[s] themselves.”72 Mayer concluded with a rhetorical question that 
may have implied his concurrence with Balsiger: 
Is it not an insult to the Olympic idea when a small number of 
opportunistic politicians who exploit the present insecurity which 
could have possibly been caused by the IOC decision in Moscow. … 
South Africa will be thrown into chaos and anarchy if Apartheid [sic] 
is not maintained. Maybe 100 years from now the Bantus will be able 
to provide the necessary understanding to share equal 
responsibilities. A racial unity is much easier achieved in sport, 
especially when all political influences are kept from it.73 
Mayer himself remained ambiguous about the content and direction of Balsiger’s 
report, but its public release just prior to SANOC submitting its own report, must have 
seemed fortuitous for the South African organization.74 SANOC’s own report detailed 
its claimed progress and current position on South African sport. The report resulted 
from the resolution at the 1962 IOC General Session in Moscow and two subsequent 
letters by Mayer and Brundage, written in June 1962 and August 1963, respectively.75 
SANOC’s report included its interpretation of the Moscow resolution: 
From the aforementioned Resolution taken in Moscow and the 
letters … it would appear that there is no charge or allegation that 
the South African [National] Olympic Committee is responsible for 
any breach or disregard of Fundamental Rule No. 1. It is gratifying to 
note that the South African [National] Olympic Committee enjoys the 
confidence of the International Olympic Committee. We take this 
opportunity to re-affirm that it has always been and still is the policy 
of the South African [National] Olympic Committee to abide by this 
rule … It would appear, however, that the International Olympic 
Committee is under the impression that Governmental prohibitions 
limit the freedom of action and prevent the observance by the South 
African [National] Olympic Committee of this Olympic Rule.76 
An ambiguous position emerged from the report. SANOC argued that it had not 
breached Article 1 of the Olympic Charter. It was ‘governmental prohibitions’ that 
were seen as the cause of the problem, but, in reality, “… there [was] no justification 
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nor any valid basis for the charge made against the South African Government.”77 To 
justify its claims, SANOC cited three examples as evidence. First, a statement had been 
made by the Minister of the Interior on 18 January 1963: “Should there be Non-
Europeans who qualify for inclusion in the South African contingent which will 
participate in the next Olympic Games, application for travelling facilities should be 
made in good time, and each application will then be considered on its own merits 
and in the light of Government Policy.”78 This statement did not directly identify 
discrimination against participation, but it did not specify what ‘government policy’ 
might entail; the latter, as the IOC well knew, underscored racial discrimination. 
Second, the report listed a variety of international events that had been held where 
both South African whites and non-whites participated: (1) boxing in Rhodesia 
(December, 1961) and the U.S.A. (March, 1963); (2) athletics in Britain (July, 1963); 
and (3) weightlifting in Stockholm and the Mr. Universe contests (September, 1963). 
Unmentioned, however, were occasional controversies at these international events, 
such as the case of black weightlifter Precious McKenzie, who qualified to compete, 
but due to his refusal to join an association affiliated with SANOC, was not invited to 
the competition. Third, obtaining passports and international travel was mentioned 
as encountering no difficulties, but individual decisions remained entirely at the whim 
of the government. Those athletes and sporting personnel who did not receive 
clearance were not allowed to leave the country.  
The second significant issue emphasized in SANOC’s report was the adherence to 
IOC rules and regulations. It was established IOC principle that the IOC did not 
interfere with the internal policies of countries, and that its chief concerns were the 
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maintenance of amateur regulations and the rejection of exclusion from participation 
for racial reasons. SANOC reaffirmed that athletes selected on merit and with proper 
affiliation would be included in the coming Olympic Games. A complete list of bodies 
affiliated to SANOC, each of which provided for the inclusion of non-white 
associations, was provided. Also specified were the non-white organizations of 
Olympic-type sports, each of which had affiliated to the national controlling bodies.  
Thirdly, the issue of material and financial support was raised. SANOC argued that 
“[c]onsiderable financial assistance has been made available both by Government and 
Local authorities, as well as by private industry, particularly the mining industry, to 
the non-white South Africa sportsmen for their benefit and welfare.”79 Therefore, the 
organization concluded, “phenomenal advancement and improvement in the various 
branches of sport in which the non-whites are interested has been accomplished in 
recent years.”80 Multiple examples of assistance that, in SANOC’s view, benefited non-
whites in sport, were listed. 
SAN-ROC, unsurprisingly, but also some IOC members remained dissatisfied with 
SANOC’s report, and Brundage invited a select group of IOC members to join him for 
a conference on 16 October 1963, to discuss the South African question.81 Resolution 
proposals were drafted by Sir Arthur Porritt (New Zealand),82 Mr. Alexander 
(Kenya),83 Mr. G.D. Sondhi (India),84 Mr. Massard (France),85 and Marquess of Exeter 
(England),86 and the Baden-Baden IOC General Session minutes reported that SANOC 
did not move from its position: “The [South African] delegation frankly states that 
apartheid is no business of the IOC. Anyhow: Non-whites can train together with 
whites and competitions can also take place between them outside South Africa. If 
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non-whites qualify they will be nominated to the team.”87 Resistance to South African 
participation therefore, so SANOC argued, was stirred up by “political agitators.”88 The 
IOC noted “that important progress had been made,” 89 but it remained unconvinced. 
The final resolution was carried by 30 to 20 votes; it instructed SANOC,   
… to make a firm declaration of its acceptance of the spirit of the 
Olympic Code and in particular of Principle 1 and Rule 24 read 
together, and must get from its Government by December 31st 1963 
a change in policy regarding racial discrimination in sports and 
competitions in its country, failing which the South African National 
Olympic Committee will be debarred from entering its teams in the 
Olympic Games.90 
The threat of South Africa’s suspension had now been formally raised. To ensure 
participation in the 1964 Tokyo Games, the obligation to fulfill the requirements of 
the resolution now clearly rested with SANOC. SANOC representative Reginald Honey 
was present at the decisive meeting and voted on the resolution, and SANOC president 
Braun had a conversation on the issue with Brundage, but Braun claimed nonetheless 
that no official statement had been issued on South African participation. Although 
taken aback by this claim, Mayer acknowledged a potential miscommunication and 
volunteered to "extend the delay to January 15th 1964 [i.e., two weeks].… If I missed 
to follow the right line, I regret it and apologize.”91 Mayer pointed out to Brundage 
that SANOC’s “silly excuse not to reply in time” had been seized on by SAN-ROC: “My 
sources of information are: A telephone call from the DAILY MAIL, LONDON and a 
cable from that silly HARRIS chairman of SAN-ROC which I received this morning, 
saying this: ‘Mr. Braun claims South African [National] Olympic Committee has had no 
official notification of Baden-Baden decision and is therefore not bound to report to 
IOC. Urgently request you do not allow this evasion’.”92 
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In the official letter withdrawing South Africa’s invitation to the Tokyo Games, the 
IOC cited the reasons for the retraction and listed the conditions under which SANOC 
would be reconsidered for participation in the Olympics. First, proper trials for 
selection of a truly representative South African team had to take place. Second, 
SANOC had an obligation to disassociate itself from government policy, which, the IOC 
determined, SANOC had failed to do. Lastly, once SANOC had carried out its duty 
arising from Article 24 of the Olympic Charter, the IOC would reconsider its 
participation in the Olympic Movement.93 
Undeterred by the IOC General Session’s decision, Braun continued to argue for 
SANOC’s participation in the Tokyo and later Olympic Games, assuming that the 
retraction of the invitation had not been decided on lightly since “… it would create a 
precedent which could have very far-reaching repercussions upon the ideals of the 
Olympic Movement itself.”94 Probably attempting to delay, as was part of SANOC’s 
plan, he reiterated SANOC’s argument that significant progress had been made in 
South African non-white sports, and that the IOC’s decision could only have adverse 
effects: “… we have opened the door from within, and now it may be shut from 
without.”95  
The resolution’s fundamental rationale, Braun argued, focussed directly on 
governmental policies, and as such it was misdirected: “It is regrettable that the 
opponents of South Africa should have sought to exploit the Baden-Baden Congress 
as a political arena by making athletes political hostages to force ‘a change in policy 
regarding racial discrimination in sports and competitions in their country’.”96 The 
implications of the resolution might therefore well be detrimental to the functioning 
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of the IOC itself: “… your resolution creates a very dangerous slope on which to place 
sport and is tantamount to requiring us – the sportsmen and athletes of South Africa 
to enter into Politics – NOT MERELY TO OPPOSE BUT TO DENOUNCE OUR 
GOVERNMENT.97 
The South African government declined to consider a policy change, but 
reaffirmed its stated position, viz., that any athlete selected on merit would be given 
the opportunity to participate in the Tokyo Games. Braun used this reaffirmation to 
ask for “a little tolerance and goodwill and a measure of sympathetic co-operation,” 
and pleaded for a deferment of action until after 1964 Tokyo Games: “The test of the 
sincerity and bona-fides of my Association and the success of its efforts in upholding 
Olympic Principles will be in the manner in which we deal with our country’s 
participation in the forthcoming Tokyo Olympic Games. My Association will faithfully 
abide by the undertakings given by me at Baden-Baden to bring to the Olympic Games 
the best athletes in this country, regardless of race.” 98 Braun may have taken comfort 
from the fact that the decision had by no means been unanimous. A vote of 30-20 in 
favour, with three abstentions, demonstrated a significant remaining base of support 
for SANOC. Braun certainly felt inclined to thank the Marquess of Exeter, for one, for 
assistance given: “…we especially thank you for the outspoken and fully justified 
sentiments…. Your comments on the resolution bring home very clearly with striking 
force, that this Resolution in its present form, if carried into effect, will achieve 
nothing except to exclude and sacrifice athletes who are in no way responsible for, 
nor can in any way bring about any change in Governmental policy.”99  
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In his correspondence with the IOC, meanwhile, Braun pursued SANOC’s 
customary line of reasoning. He claimed as before that significant developments in 
non-White sports had been brought about by the organization, which would be put at 
risk by the exclusion of South Africa; all that was required was more time to bring to 
fruition a strategy that was, furthermore, constrained by the fact that SANOC was not 
in a position to override official South African government policies: “I beg to suggest 
that with further similar help and encouragement from the IOC more will be 
accomplished in this direction. … Drastic action at this stage by the IOC would be in 
conflict with the Olympic Ideal and would not contribute towards the eventual 
successful outcome of our efforts, but on the contrary it would defeat its very 
purpose.”100 In a personal note to Brundage, Braun then added a new argument, 
pointing to South Africa’s being “strongly represented” at the Tokyo World Paraplegic 
Games, giving rise to the “anomalous position … [of being] absent from the premier 
sporting festival the next week; where the flower of South African sportsmen have 
participated since 1908 with distinction, and honoured all Olympic rules and 
regulations without incident of any sort.”101 Faced with expulsion, Braun recalibrated 
SANOC’s approach, expressing contrition about the style of his interactions with the 
IOC without admitting to doubts about the organization’s arguments, pointing out 
that his occasionally perhaps intemperate interventions had been fuelled by “a sense 
of frustration and also a deep sense of disappointment, which I feel at the injustice 
that will be done to our Non-White athletes, in particular, and to our other young 
sportsmen if they are deprived of the opportunity of marching with pride and dignity 
alongside the other athletes of the world.”102 His concluding missive reaffirmed 
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contrition by assuming a supplicatory posture: “If you feel that the presence of a South 
African delegate at Innsbruck may serve some purpose, please advise me as soon as 
possible so that arrangements can be made in good time.”103 Both Mayer’s and 
Brundage’s responses were conciliatory. “It will do no harm and possibly some good 
if you have a representative at Innsbruck,”104 wrote Brundage, but the IOC meetings 
at Innsbruck would place a damper on Braun’s and SANOC’s hopes. The IOC Executive 
Board noted an overall lack of progress, and a failing on SANOC’s part publically to 
dissociate itself from South African government policies. Brundage “…noted some 
progress but [said] that the promises from Baden-Baden had not been kept. The other 
members said that SANOC had not carried out its obligations…. A resolution to that 
effect would be proposed to the Session.”105 At the General Session, the same 
conclusion was reached: “The resolution passed at Baden-Baden still stands and the 
invitation to the South African team to compete in Tokyo is withdrawn. When the 
SANOC has carried out its duty under rule 24 it will then be in a position to return to 
the IOC for reconsideration of the decision.”106  
Undaunted, Braun continued his efforts to promote SANOC and to publicize 
improvements in the current status of sport in South Africa. In an official statement to 
the IOC Executive Board, SANOC reaffirmed the acceptance and recognition of Article 
1, including “…the principle that complete equality of opportunity shall be afforded to 
all citizens of the Republic of South Africa to compete in the Olympic Games.”107 
Complying with Article 24 was not an issue since all prospective contestants were 
entitled to compete for the South African Olympic team by meeting the necessary 
standards. A list of nominations for the forthcoming Olympics – comprising both non-
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whites and whites – was provided and final team selection was to be made in 
collaboration with administrators of both white and non-white sports bodies 
affiliated with SANOC; all athletes selected would be issued the same South African 
Olympic colours. With such assurances in place, SANOC implied, the onus now rested 
with the IOC, not SANOC: “… it now rests with the International Olympic Committee 
Executive to decide whether non-whites from this country shall be given an 
opportunity of participating in the Olympic Games, or if this privilege is to be denied 
to them.”108 Braun followed up this strategic shifting of responsibilities by attempting 
to rationalize SANOC’s position that despite the strictures posed by South African race 
politics, the organization was in the forefront of non-white sports development: 
Whilst we do not denounce present policy in South Africa, it must be 
obvious to you and the Gentlemen of the Executive Board that more 
is being done in this country for the Non-white Sportsmen and sports 
women than in most other parts of Africa. And whilst we do not in 
any way wish to point a finger at any of our opponents, we bring to 
your attention the fact that tremendous strides have been made with 
Government help to furnish our Non-white community with modern 
facilities of every description, so that the standard of their sport can 
be raised to heights which will help them to aspire to Olympic 
honours.109 
It was, in this interpretation offered by SANOC, thus the IOC and not SANOC itself who 
had “to realise that it has a very responsible decision to make for the furtherance of 
our non-white athletic aspirations”110 – by admitting the South African team to the 
Tokyo Olympics.  
Braun followed up on this theme. He also wrote to Brundage under the same date, 
attempting to demonstrate to Brundage the loss that South African exclusion would 
entail, by submitting a provisional selection of a proposed Olympic Games team that 
would attend the Tokyo Games. This, he wrote, was to demonstrate that SANOC had 
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“nothing more at heart than the progressive development of Non-white sport in South 
Africa to bring it to the standard of white sport and into the sphere of international 
competition. With the magnificent facilities being provided by the Government, Local 
Authorities and private sources, together with the expert coaching provided, it is 
already evident that great heights can be reached by our Non-white athlete.”111 And 
the IOC would share in the international approbation incurred by such a development, 
“you and your Executive will have reason to be proud of the part you have played in 
furthering your Olympic Ideals in South Africa.”112 According to Braun, the best course 
of action was to include South Africa in the upcoming Olympic Games: 
There is nothing to be gained by preventing the South African Team, 
which will include the selected Non-white athletes, from competing 
at Tokyo, but far more will be achieved along the lines requested by 
you if these sportsmen are given the opportunity to travel to the next 
Olympic Games as representatives of South Africa…. Knowing that 
you have always had our interests very sincerely at heart, I leave the 
further consideration of this matter in your hands with the greatest 
confidence.113 
But following the IOC Executive Board meeting in Lausanne, little had changed in 
the IOC’s position: “As the NOC had not publicly stated that it disassociated itself from 
the Apartheid [sic] policy the requirements of the resolution from [the] Innsbruck 
[General Session] have not been met. If South Africa has not done so before August 16 
(= final date for the entries) their participation cannot be considered.”114 Frustrated, 
Braun now interpreted the IOC stance itself as indicative of discrimination: “Failure 
of the IOC Executive to restore our invitation to Tokyo would be tantamount to the 
[South African National Olympic Committee] and the South African athletes being 
made the victims of political discrimination.”115 Mayer returned the argument, 
locating the issue of political discrimination firmly in the South African system. “I very 
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much regret,” Mayer noted, “that you have nothing further to add to your last letter of 
June 20th. As I wrote to you, the Executive Board of the IOC, at its meeting of June 26th 
in Lausanne, confirmed the conditions decided previously and under which only your 
Committee might receive an invitation to take part in the Tokyo Games. Those 
conditions having not been fulfilled…. We certainly regret that your athletes are 
deprived of taking part in the Tokyo Games owing to racial discrimination in sport in 
your country, although we have done our best. There is certainly no political 
discrimination, as you say, in the IOC’s decision.”116 The IOC would not reconsider its 
decision. 
2.1 The Unofficial Correspondence of Ira Emery 
Subsequent to the 1960 Rome Games, Lilian Francey succeeded Ira Emery as 
Secretary General of SANOC. Emery attributed his defeat to the opposition of 
influential groups that had been antagonized by, as he noted, his endeavour “to have 
our colour bar question, insofar as sport is concerned, amicably settled…. I am firmly 
of the opinion, that through my efforts in this direction, certain elements in this 
country are annoyed with me through my persuasion in forcing these affiliations.… I 
am fully convinced that my efforts on behalf of the non-Whites have been the cause of 
my having lost the position of Secretary General which I coveted for so many years.”117 
IOC member Reginald Honey, for one, concurred, and upon learning that Emery had 
not been re-elected as Secretary General, immediately resigned from SANOC.  
Emery had lost his office, but not his interest in South African sports, and he 
offered Brundage his unofficial services: “If you would care at any time to write to me 
unofficially about the position regarding the non-whites and Whites, particularly in 
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regard to their travelling to international contests, I would be happy to give you 
confidentially, the true picture here, as I have always done in the past.”118 Since Emery 
maintained his domestic and international contacts, he, in effect, remained a valuable 
source of intelligence over the next three years approaching the 1964 Tokyo Olympic 
Games. From this position, he helped to assess the future of SANOC within the Olympic 
Movement. In addition to scores of letters with commentary, some five dozen missives 
were sent to Brundage or Mayer containing contemporary newspaper clippings. 
Emery’s unofficial correspondence offers important insights into the issue under 
consideration here. 
About a month after his removal from SANOC, Emery entered into his 
correspondence with Brundage, appraising him of developments in the problematic 
between race and sports in South Africa. With him and Reginald Honey gone from the 
organization, he noted, “the extremists in our Association [i.e., SANOC] seem to have 
gained control, and much as I regret to say it, unless Mr. Honey and I can work 
underground as it were, the chances of mixed competitions in this country for trials 
for the Games in Tokyo will go by the board.”119 The hardening of SANOC’s stance 
could only lead to political backlash by the “non-European [sic] associations in this 
country [who] will make more strenuous efforts to force the issue not only in this 
country but with countries outside.”120 In view of these developments, Emery 
remained skeptical about the probability of SANOC receiving much support at the 
subsequent IOC meeting: “mixed sport must come if we are to remain a member of 
the IOC.”121 
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Emery understood clearly what SANOC must accomplish in order to retain its 
membership in the IOC. He realized that the pressures from domestic resistance 
would only increase if no solution was found: “It would appear to me that this attitude 
… will give a great lead to the South African Sports Association (the organiser of whom 
is Mr. Brutus) to carry on their campaign with countries throughout the world.”122 
Brundage also saw the political liability of the issue increasing: “Already we are 
receiving vigorous protests and it will be difficult to keep this subject off the agenda 
for our [March Executive Board] meeting [in Lausanne].”123 Nonetheless, in view of 
the South African government’s political stance, the issue would be difficult to resolve 
in the area of sports alone. “If we endeavour to arrange mixed sport now in this 
country,” Emery replied, “the Group Areas Act (1960) will be put into operation by 
the Government, which most certainly will preclude us from having mixed trials in 
any branch of sport…. if [South Africans] are not permitted in the Olympic Games of 
1964 there will be such a rumpus among the sport people in this country that it may 
mean a complete revision of the feeling towards mixed sport.”124 In particular so, as 
Emery noted, similar action might also be coming from FIFA, the powerful 
organization running international soccer (association football): “… the sporting 
public of this country will be so incensed, that it may force the issue [of interracial 
sports] with the present Government authorities responsible for the prohibition of 
such trials.”125 Then perhaps, he concluded a day later, “we will be able to come back 
honestly into the fold of the Olympic and Empire Games.”126 But this would only be 
achieved through reactions in South Africa to the actual exclusion of South African 
teams that would put pressure on the South African government, and “I still contend 
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that the actions taken by the various international Sports Federation against us will 
be the only way in which we can beat the colour bar in sport.”127 The underlying issue, 
for Emery, was and remained the official policies of the South African government on 
race relations, and it might be possible to move ahead through intervention by 
international sports organizations:  
Owing to Government regulations and the Group Areas Act, Whites 
and non-Whites may not compete in sport in the Republic of South 
Africa…. I am quite convinced that the [boxing] match organised in 
Rhodesia between Whites and non-Whites was occasioned only 
through threat of expulsion of South Africa from the International 
Olympic Committee owing to the colour…. As I pointed out to you 
previously, I am quite sure that if international sports associations 
demand competition in the Republic of South Africa of Whites and 
non-Whites, and not have to hold matches outside, this colour bar 
will be broken down as far as sports is concerned in the Republic.128 
Emery’s seasoned sense of the South African sport culture gave him a credibility 
acknowledged by Brundage: “I have read the clippings which you sent, with interest, 
and I hope it will be possible to find a solution to this thorny problem before too 
long.”129 But Emery harboured no illusions concerning the difficulties of SANOC’s 
position: “I do hope that Mr. Honey can make the trip to Warsaw as I am afraid that 
there will be strong opposition to our competing at Tokyo if the case is not handled 
properly by somebody from this country. I know you will do all in your power to help 
us but sometimes it looks rather hopeless.”130 
Although outside of SANOC’s control, controversies such as the denial of training 
facilities to a visiting swimming team from Japan by the Pretoria City Council at the 
end of 1962, 131 did not help matters. Emery was left to consider the negative impacts 
of such incidents for South Africa’s Olympic aspirations, but he looked for a silver 
lining: “You may recall that I suggested if a warning were given to South Africa, actions 
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of this kind will make it imperative for the matter to be discussed at Warsaw and may 
stop the agitation against multi-racial sports in this country.”132 The ban was lifted 
eventually, and Emery viewed other such incidents in the same light, pinning his hope 
on the South African sports system being stirred into action in response to the racial 
policies of the country. “You will see,” he advised Brundage, “that even very senior 
Government action is to be taken regarding the refusal of Pretoria to permit Chinese 
to play with Whites in soft-ball, and that the Police have warned Whites not to play 
football with non-Whites in Natal…. I am sure you will, and your Executive will realise 
that sportsmen in this country will eventually force the issue as far as multi-racial 
sport is concerned.”133 Emery went so far as to speculate that a one-year suspension, 
though not an expulsion, for SANOC might serve as a corrective to spur the 
government into action – while still leaving sufficient time for South Africa to prepare 
for readmission to the Tokyo Games at the end of such a period.134 
For Emery thus, SANOC’s position remained in doubt because of what he viewed 
as the uncertainty over the country’s political direction. He was disappointed by the 
statement on mixed sport by the Minister of Interior, Jan De Klerk, when the latter 
was asked to assess the impact for SANOC’s continuing membership or expulsion 
from the IOC, of the incidents mentioned above, “… this final statement by the Minister 
… cut the ground away from my feet and there is little more I can do. I doubt also if 
your representative in this country, Mr. R. Honey can do anymore.”135 Both Emery and 
Honey were approached by the press to comment on the statement by De Klerk. For 
lack of a better option, Honey, so Emery noted, resorted to SANOC’s stock reponse: 
“The only statement Mr. Honey was prepared to make was that he did give an 
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assurance to the International Committee that if a non-European was up to standard 
he would be sent.”136 What was really needed, Emery thought, were changes to the 
Minister of the Interior’s statement and thus a policy change, but those did not appear 
to be forthcoming.137  
Public debates in the media regarding the necessity for a change in government 
policy on the issues of racially segregated or unified teams, and the permission of non-
white athletes to travel abroad, came to the fore during the subsequent days. Emery 
informed Brundage of the scope of this discussion, ranging from a call for a clear shift 
in race segregation policies to the endorsement of a team selected solely on athletic 
merit and allowed to travel overseas regardless of colour.138 Ultimately, Emery noted, 
any political strategy leading to the debarment of the South African team would “upset 
many, many people in this country including ardent supporters of the present 
Government. Sport is a very strong cog in the wheels of this country.”139 Ultimately, 
however, Emery admitted, that SANOC’s hands were tied unless the Minister changed 
the government’s stance of outlawing mixed sport in- and outside the country.140 This, 
as he had observed already, could more likely be effected by IOC action than any 
pressure the internal opposition might be able to muster. His review for Brundage of 
an abundance of new items in the South African papers on the issue, did not change 
his earlier evaluation: “My feeling is that if we are suspended from the IOC until such 
time as a modification of the statement is made, such modification will be made 
sooner than one expects.”141 
Brundage shared Emery’s overall view, but considered the effects of this situation 
on the IOC: “This will undoubtedly force the International Olympic Committee to take 
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action, since we are under pressure from many quarters…. The situation in South 
Africa now seems to be a definite violation of our fundamental principle against racial 
discrimination. We have been lenient enough, I think you will agree.”142 
The IOC’s range of options was increasingly restricted with every racial 
discriminatory comment by the government and SANOC’S inability or unwillingness 
to respond, but Brundage was not in favour of a two-team solution suggested by 
Emery: “I am sure the IOC will not approve two separate teams from any country. 
However, it might be that a South African team could be sent in two sections, but even 
this would be difficult to arrange. … Unless the Committee is assured that its rules and 
regulations are going to be followed in South Africa, it is almost certain that drastic 
action, which I regret, will have to be taken.”143 SANOC’s suspension seemed 
unavoidable by then, particularly so since that even if a two-team approach had been 
acceptable for international events, it would simply have been illegal according to the 
legal regulations: “There is one thing that you can rest quite assured, that irrespective 
of whether the S.A. Government will allow non-Whites to represent South Africa 
overseas, they will never be permitted to take part in mixed trials in this country, as 
the Group Areas Act, which is law, will at all times be evoked, so preventing any trials 
whatsoever between Black and White in the Republic.”144 An intermediate suggestion 
of sorts, to let the soon to be instituted quasi-independent Republic of Transkei (one 
of the Bantustans to be reserved for non-white populations) affiliate to the IOC, to 
balance representation of white and non-white teams. “This is so much utter 
nonsense,” Emery noted, “as the Transkei will always be governed by the Republic 
and the non-Whites from the Republic outside the area of the Transkei could never be 
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accommodated in that area.”145 It is indeed true that throughout the almost thirty 
years of its existence, the Transkei (now a part of South Africa’s Eastern Cape 
province) was diplomatically recognized by just one country, South Africa. 
Matters worsened, and internal tensions within the South African sporting 
community also increased. Opposition from Dennis Brutus and SASA was energized 
by a failure on the South African Amateur Athletics Union’s (SAAAU) part to nominate 
and select to the team two non-white athletes who had met the defined performance 
standards at the trials. SAAAU president, Mr. Marè, so Emery thought, had bowed to 
government pressure. “I have defended the various associations here against Mr. 
Brutus … insofar as the standard of the non-White sportsmen was concerned…. I 
cannot honestly defend the S.A.A. Athletics Union any further.”146 Not having official 
standing himself any longer, Emery urged the Marquess of Exeter to ask Mr. Marè at 
the subsequent meeting of the International Amateur Athletic Federation: why his 
assurances have been reversed; whether non-whites would be permitted to compete 
with white athletes in the Republic; and, whether non-white athletes would be 
permitted to have contests in places reserved for Whites?147 Emery believed that 
SAAAU’s irresponsibility merited suspension from SANOC, “… I am afraid now that 
politics has entered into athletic sport in this country…. the suspension, not expulsion 
of the S.A. Athletic Union would, I am sure have a salutary effect on other Governing 
Bodies of sport in this country and in turn would have a very serious effect on the 
attitude of certain members of the Government of this country.”148 None of this made 
conceivable the unproblematic acceptance of non-white athletes in a country where 
“certain people have been charged in the Magistrate’s Court for playing in a mixed 
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game, when the Group Areas Act … was evoked.”149 It would take the suspension of 
South Africa from international sports governing bodies to “get close to achieving the 
ideals of the International Olympic Committee sooner than one expects.”150 The 
evasive position taken by SAAAU on the issue, which according to Emery, referred to 
“the many factors [that] had to be taken into consideration before the decision was 
made,” without elaborating on those factors could not obscure the underlying race-
related reasoning.151 Emery was convinced that the non-white athletes had not been 
selected because of their skin colour, but SANOC President Gen. Klopper justified the 
decision, pointing out that although the non-white athlete had met the standard, the 
white runner had beaten his time in two different meetings.152 Therefore, athletic 
criteria alone had been applied. 
As the IOC Moscow meetings drew nearer, de Klerk still showed no inclination to 
alter his statement about mixed sport, where Reg Honey was to represent South 
Africa.153 Not wishing to impugn Honey who surely would not seek to mislead the IOC, 
Emery was nonetheless dubious about the veracity of the government information on 
the removal of restrictions on multi-racial sport reaching SANOC and thus Honey, via 
SANOC President General Klopper.154 Klopper himself had made it crystal-clear “that 
over his dead body would non-Whites and Whites compete in trials against each other 
in South Africa,”155 and Mr. Marè of the SAAAU had recently had to yield to political 
pressure in refusing to condone an inter-racial competition at a meeting to be 
attended by South African athletes in Lourence Marques,156 present-day Maputo, the 
capital of Mozambique; so much for the promise of international, if not internal, inter-
racial sports competitions. The notion of mixed sports had to remain a pipedream. 
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With only twelve months to go until the IOC’s final decision, the likelihood of inter-
racial trials in South Africa remained extremely unlikely, a fact that SANOC’s and 
Klopper’s prevarications did little to obscure. “I do not think that statements as made 
by Gen. Klopper that non-Whites will be selected to represent South Africa in 
international sport (you will notice he has never mentioned the Olympic Games) can 
be relied upon”.157 The intractability of the South African political situation led 
Brundage to re-emphasize the primacy of IOC regulations in arriving at an adequate 
resolution: “I think you will agree that we were not as harsh as we might have been. 
We are not asking the Government to change its policies, all we require is that the 
Government permits the National Olympic Committee to function according to our 
regulations. If it is prevented from doing so, there is only one course we can take.”158  
SANOC’s expulsion seemed to be that inevitable course of action, and Emery 
concurred with Brundage: “I quite agree that the IOC were more than lenient with 
your South African counterpart, and I am equally certain the members of the South 
African body were more than surprised at the fair hearing given to your 
representative for South Africa, Mr. Honey.”159 However, Emery doubted that 
government attitudes would change before the deadline of the upcoming General 
Session in Nairobi. He remained convinced that mixed sport would never happen, 
insinuating that “… when the team is finally selected, even in two years’ time, it will 
be found that the non-Whites are not up to the required standard.”160 Emery thought 
SANOC should ask the government whether the Group Areas Act could be set aside if 
non-whites demanded facilities and trials, and the government agreed to a mixed race 
team to represent South Africa at the next Olympic Games. “Unless the [South African 
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National Olympic Committee] can give this assurance,” expressed Emery, “then I 
contend, the matter should again be discussed by your Executive.”161 Brundage 
remained cautious, however, reluctant directly to involve himself in South African 
internal policy matters, insisting at the same time on the precedence of IOC rules: 
“Naturally we cannot interfere in the domestic affairs of any country, but we can 
enforce our own rules and this would prevent two teams from one country.”162 At the 
end of the day, if changes were not made to accommodate a single, mixed team, South 
Africa would have no team at all, and certainly not two. The fall-out of that decision, 
Brundage noted, would have asymmetrical impacts since the IOC would be 
“penalizing maybe 100 innocent white athletes for the sake of a handful of colored 
athletes. This doesn’t seem quite fair either, but we do have to hold our principles.”163 
Emery expected little help from the “non-European,” that is, non-white South 
African organization such as SASA who were under-organized, under-developed, 
under-funded, and, most importantly, they did not have “the sports bodies which are 
attached to the Olympic Games movement, and they will never have the finance to 
organise such an association. This latest attempt is quite ridiculous, and more than 
ever political.” 164 Neither was it likely that such under-powered organizations could 
be represented at SANOC by non-white representatives, an idea that had been mooted 
by new SANOC Secretary General, Mrs. Francey, creating a “considerable amount of 
embarrassment to the President of the Association, General Klopper.”165 
As the correspondence indicates, the situation did not improve in the subsequent 
months,166 but by mid-November 1962 Brundage received an invitation to visit South 
Africa, all expenses paid by De Vaterland, a pro-government publication. He solicited 
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Emery’s advice: “I replied that if and when I went to South Africa it would be at my 
own expense. Incidentally, would any purpose be served by such a visit? What do you 
think? Mr. Honey has been after me to make the trip, and as you know, I will be in 
Africa next year.”167 Emery was skeptical about the utility of such a trip: The 
government’s position had not changed; neither would the arrival of Brundage lead 
to any accommodation of the opposing positions. The only possibility that offered 
itself therefore would be the nomination of two separate teams, a solution entirely 
unacceptable to the IOC. Moreover, since such teams also would have to be selected 
through entirely separate trials, 
… each team [would] represent its own section of the populace, then 
your meeting in Johannesburg can, I think, be embarrassing to you…. 
Things however, may change between now and 1963/4…. Pressure 
is being brought to bear on certain Government officials which may 
eventually result in a compromise between White and non-White 
representatives on national bodies…. On the other hand, there are so 
many die-hards against this mixing, that I personally do not think the 
Government will change their decision at the present time.168 
Emery advised Brundage to visit Johannesburg, and Brundage set forth conditions 
to indicate his arm’s-length distance from the South African organizations: “If I do 
come to South Africa, it will be after our meeting in Kenya and not before, and at my 
expense as I said before. After the South African [National] Olympic Committee has 
made its report, I will review the situation and decide whether it is advisable for me 
to make the trip.”169  
Shortly after, in early 1963, Emery deliberated on the news that Sir Stanley Rous 
was to visit South Africa to end FIFA’s, the world football (soccer) association’s, 
suspension. When Rous did appear, there was a demonstration by non-whites 
demanding a fair hearing. “I do not know what views Sir Stanley will bring back to 
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England or pass on to you,” Emery noted to Brundage, “but he is adamant that two 
associations will not be affiliated to the International Football Federation.”170 It was 
clear to Emery that Rous’ visit had brought the issue of mixed as opposed to separate 
teams back into the area of public media debate: “I have had a private luncheon with 
certain Ministers of our cabinet and I am still definitely of the opinion that the 
Government will not permit a mixed team to compete in South Africa or outside the 
Republic,” 171 Emery summarized the situation, but some suspense remained in 
regard to “Sir Stanley Rous’ reaction to his meeting with the Non-Europeans.”172 The 
press, Emery reported to Brundage, also took the theme up again, shining in this 
context again a light on the position of SAN-ROC, an inevitable aspect of any discussion 
concerning the possibility or impossibility of a mixed team: neither the government, 
nor the white and non-white public would accept the legitimacy of SAN-ROC, and thus 
of a mixed team. Emery thought that this could only lead to the expulsion of South 
Africa, unless SAN-ROC were to change “its attitude regarding segregation of sport, 
suspension must follow. The setup will be, as far as you are concerned, that South 
Africa will select one or two Non-Whites, whether they are up to standard or not, if 
South Africa is permitted to take part in the Games in Tokyo. This will of course be a 
blind [alley], as the non-Whites and the Whites will not travel as one team, nor will 
they enter against each other in any one event of the Olympic Games.”173 
For Emery, it was obvious, the unlawfulness of mixed sports remained the 
intractable obstacle. As long as mixed sport was not allowed, SANOC’s chances to 
participate in the 1964 Tokyo Games were nil. For Brundage, likewise, this remained 
“a difficult nut to crack,”174 and although he assured Emery that the IOC did not expect 
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much of SAN-ROC, since it “would have no more success in organizing a satisfactory 
South African team than the South African Olympic Association, with the existing 
attitude of the Government,”175 he at least did for the first time explicitly acknowledge 
the organization’s existence, in other words, a first reference to organized domestic 
resistance. 
However, given the circumstances in South African sports, no organization could 
succeed in developing a non-racial Olympic team; equality of opportunity for non-
white athletes simply did not exist, and the impetus for change would have to come 
from the outside: “This, in my opinion, is going to be the last wail from the non-Whites, 
because they will contend, and quite rightly so, that the Whites have far better 
facilities for their training and final competitions…. Mr. Honey has advocated that 
there should be mixed sport in South Africa, but I am afraid this statement has not 
been taken too well in Government circles or by the majority of the public…. It will 
only be through drastic action by the international sports Federations, that mixed 
sport inside and outside the Republic will be permitted.”176 
An unlikely solution briefly floated, one Emery was sure the IOC would also reject 
out of hand, would consist of “a suggestion … made to you that if non-Whites are 
selected, they will represent the non-White population, and the Whites – the White 
population…. Only on these conditions will non-Whites be able to attend the 
Games.”177 The strength of sentiment against any solution accommodating non-white 
athletes was indicated by the government-controlled South African Broadcasting 
Corporation’s refusal to broadcast the Natal Golf Open because it promoted multi-
racial sport. Brundage responded that if a mutually satisfactory conclusion could not 
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be found, the IOC might be forced to take drastic action,178 but to Emery it seemed that 
herein might indeed be found a resolution: “For some time now I have suggested that 
if drastic action was threatened against South Africa for its racial policy by the 
International Federations, it would force change. You have no doubt been advised that 
change in a manner has come about.”179 He offered as an example for the success of 
such a strategy that four white and four non-white boxers had been sent to Utica (New 
York) for a competition. They travelled on separate planes, but stayed in the same 
hotel. This was the first time this had happened in South African sport. To Emery, this 
represented a promising development, but he remained concerned that “applications 
will now be made for Whites and non-Whites to tour this country and compete in 
multi-racial sport, which the Government will not allow. I think that now you will not 
have to take such drastic action as was first contemplated and hope that the advent of 
the White and non-White boxers going to the U.S.A. will at least relieve some pressure 
on you.”180 Brundage was equally optimistic in his response: “Progress has indeed 
been made when South Africa sends both black and white boxers to take part in a 
tournament in the United States…. There is no reason why the same procedure cannot 
be followed in the Olympic Games, and this may well solve our problem.”181  
Brundage nonetheless sought to remain aware of all possible options to influence 
a difficult situation. SAN-ROC was an unknown entity, but in requesting more 
information from Emery, he indirectly acknowledged its existence as a possible part 
of a solution. Emery was skeptical: “… [Chairman] Mr. Harris is quite unknown in 
white sporting circles in this country…. I personally have never heard of him, and as 
far as this country is concerned, he carries no weight at all in international sport.”182 
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Brundage however, was insistent: “How many members has the South African Non-
Racial Olympic Committee and how many people do they represent? Is it not true that 
they are more interested in politics than they are in sport? … I hope we can find a more 
satisfactory solution at our meeting next month in Baden-Baden.”183 Emery dismissed 
SAN-ROC as representing “some thousands of non-White sportsmen, but I am quite 
certain they have never yet organized any particular function in sport.”184  
The meetings in Baden-Baden ended with a formal resolution threatening the 
suspension of SANOC, if no solution could be found in due time. If it did not abide by 
the Olympic Charter in due time, a suspension would be inevitable. SANOC’s progress 
was acknowledged, and even though “very few outside of those having political 
animus wanted to punish anyone,” it would be necessary for SANOC “as an agent of 
the International Olympic Committee, to make a public expression of its position on 
the subject of racial discrimination. The choice was of keeping a few individuals out 
of the Olympic Games or of suspending the Committee, which would inhibit its 
activities.”185 Brundage and Emery alike were surprised to find Reginald Honey’s 
public approach at the Baden-Baden meeting to be more hindrance than help. Emery 
expressed his shock “when my dear friend Reg. Honey gave his supposed outburst 
against the International Olympic Committee. I am quite sure he was mis-reported 
but nevertheless he seemed upset at the outcome of the discussions.”186 But Emery 
did not share even the slight optimism that Brundage had expressed; the political 
obstacles appeared unsurmountable: “I am glad you feel that the situation is not 
entirely hopeless but I must tell you now that the [South African National Olympic 
Committee] through its affiliated governing bodies of sport will not be able to hold 
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mixed trials in this country. There is a law against White and non-Whites taking part 
in boxing and wrestling against each other.”187 Braun of SANOC, to the approval of the 
South African Minister of the Interior, also had expressed opposition to “the IOC’s 
ruling that multi-racial trials must be held in South Africa.” 188 Were a foreign athletic 
team ever to compete in South Africa, Emery concluded on a skeptical note, “no non-
White would be permitted to take part against them.”189 Brundage, looking for a 
positive, did not think that “the situation [was] entirely hopeless, but most certainly 
it will have to be handled very carefully if a satisfactory solution is to be found.”190 He 
certainly was willing to remain conciliatory and consider representations on behalf of 
South Africa placed before the upcoming IOC meeting in Innsbruck. After all, it was 
not the IOC’s business “to keep people out of the Olympic Games – our business is to 
keep them in.”191  
Yet Brundage could not have drawn much encouragement from the government’s 
response to the South African Paraplegic Games Association’s (SAPGA) request for 
clarification on the organization’s goal to include qualified non-white athletes on the 
South African team. The Minister of the Interior remained principally unyielding. It 
refused to sanction a single, multi-racial team, but stated that there “would be no 
objection to two teams going forward, one representing White South Africa and one 
representing Non-White South Africa … [nor] to permit both racial group teams to 
travel in the same aircraft.” 192 The Minister also voiced objection to two such racially 
divided teams competing against each other, should that circumstance arise during 
the competition. Brundage immediately rejected as “subterfuge” the attempt to mask 
the racial discrimination evident in the Minister’s response, in particular the thinly 
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veiled attempt to obfuscate it through accepting the possibility of fielding two 
separate teams. 193  
The obstacles to the inclusion of South Africa remained, although an occasional 
small step forward could be observed, as Emery noted, for example, “… the awarding 
of Springbok colours to two non-white athletes who have been selected to tour 
overseas.”194 However, after attending a SANOC meeting, Emery came to see that 
racial integration was not to be achieved as long as SANOC insisted on quibbling over 
technicalities and the Minister of the Interior retained ultimate decision-making 
power: 
Great play was made of the paragraph in the IOC constitution about 
whether or not the rules affect the country only when it reaches the 
Olympic Games and not concern itself with the internal workings of 
a country. … I can assure you that a very genuine effort has been 
made to meet the requirements of the IOC by the sporting bodies, but 
the matter does not finally rest with them, as the Minister of the 
Interior will have the final say.195 
Emery hoped that efforts by other South African sporting bodies might move the 
Minister to change his position, especially since all South African sport associations 
except the SAAAU agreed that non-whites should be given Springbok colours when 
competing for South Africa.196 If a broader inclusion of non-white competitors were 
to be achieved, it seemed to Emery, perhaps SANOC should have considered 
withdrawing from the Tokyo Games and investing the money in the provision of 
better coaching for both white and non-white athletes. 197 
The quandary, in Brundage’s view, was whether the decision rested with the 
political or the sporting organizations. Could the IOC’s stance be seen as implying an 
intervention in South African political issues? Brundage, insisting on the separation 
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of sport from politics – the IOC’s standard position – thought not, and apportioned 
responsibilities accordingly: 
I note that some of the newspapers seem to think we called upon the 
South African [National] Olympic Committee to denounce its 
Government. This, of course, is not the case at all, we simply asked 
them to state publicly that they believe in the Olympic principles of 
non-discrimination. If it were prevented from following this 
principle by its Government, of course, that is quite a different thing, 
and the South African [National] Olympic Committee cannot be 
censured for this reason …. There are two question here – one 
political and one sport, and the International Olympic Committee is 
trying to keep them quite separate and distinct. Unfortunately, this 
is one of those problems to which there is no answer that will satisfy 
everyone.198 
Brundage wanted to retain what he understood as the separation of sport and 
politics, as he had tried to do during the approach of the 1960 Rome Games. This 
remained difficult to accomplish, since, as Emery pointed out, internal disagreements 
structured the internal South African sports landscape. In principle, SANOC accepted 
the nomination of both white and non-white athletes for the Tokyo Games, but the 
Amateur Athletic Union withdrew a mixed team slated to enter the British 
Championships; the Minister of the Interior added that non-mixed teams would be 
allowed. Matters might come to a head at the next IOC meeting, where the “Afro-Asian 
group” might work towards South Africa’s expulsion. As a fall-back position, Emery 
again suggested to suspend, but not expel, South Africa, “as once the country is 
expelled, in my opinion, it will be very hard to be re-admitted, but under suspension 
the matter may be a far easier one when it comes to the 1968 Olympic Games.”199 
SANOC thus found itself in a delicate position, a fact not lost on Brundage: “We are 
doing our best to keep the sport and the political phases of this problem, separate, 
although, as you know, it is almost impossible. It is too much to expect the [South 
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African National Olympic Committee] to denounce its own Government, as many 
demand.”200 Though Brundage reassured Emery that the South African question 
would not be on the agenda, he emphasized that any member might raise the issue 
during the General Session.201 Any campaign carried on by South African domestic 
resistance forces that might consider such an action, was not to be taken lightly 
because they had both the ability and resources to raise the South African issue 
anytime and anywhere. 
3. Domestic Resistance 
Trying to maintain momentum from measures taken during the period leading up 
to the 1960 Rome Games, domestic resistance proved just as persistent during the 
approach to the 1964 Tokyo Games. A few months after the 1960 Rome Games, SASA, 
once again, began engaging with the IOC on the South African issue. At a general 
meeting of SASA, the following resolution was developed for the upcoming Athens IOC 
General Session: 
‘That the International Olympic Committee demand from the South 
African Olympic and Commonwealth Games Association an 
undertaking that it will immediately ensure that all its constituent 
bodies will offer membership to all South Africans on a basis of 
equality and that if the undertaking is not given, the International 
Olympic Committee expel the SANOC and offer membership to a 
non-racial South African Olympic Association which offers 
membership equally to all South Africans in conformity with the 
Olympic Charter.’ The South African Sports Association respectfully 
requests that this resolution be placed on the Agenda of the Congress 
and undertakes to supply conclusive evidence, if required, to show 
that the recognised Association discriminates against non-white 
South Africans on the grounds of racial origins in violation of the 
Olympic Charter.202 
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SASA sought change and progress in South African sport, but its lack of real 
influence served to diminish the force of the ultimatum it issued SANOC: “If the 
discriminatory conditions of membership offered to non-white sportsmen are not 
removed, the South African Sports Association, in the interests of true sportsmanship, 
will have no alternative but to ask the International Olympic Committee to take action 
and to instruct its affiliated international Sports Federation to do likewise.” 203 
Emery’s response for SANOC served to ascertain where the true responsibilities 
rested: “The [South African National Olympic Committee] deals only with South 
African Governing Bodies of Sport who are affiliated to their individual international 
federations…. Your reference to the International Olympic Committee is noted and a 
photostatic copy of your letter is being sent to the IOC.”204 
Brutus obviously did not want SANOC to function as his intermediary with the IOC; 
he requested that a representative be allowed to speak on behalf of SASA at the next 
IOC General Session in June: “We do not feel that the member of the International 
Olympic Committee resident in South Africa can fairly present our case because he 
has already defended the existing racial discrimination in South African sport and 
advised non-white sportsmen to accept it as a ‘compromise’.”205 IOC Chancellor Otto 
Mayer denied Brutus’ request, noting that “the problem of racial discrimination has 
not been brought on our Agenda,” for the upcoming session in Athens. “As a matter of 
fact and contrarily of what you express in your letter,” Mayer continued, “the 
Executive Board of the IOC has received a South African delegation of non-whites 
during the Rome Games with whom we held a meeting. It was composed by Rev. 
Michael Scott assisted by a non-white gentleman on one side, and by Mr. Reginald 
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Honey and Mr. Braun (chef de mission of the South African team) on the other side.”206 
A general discussion occurred on that occasion, Mayer recapitulated, “and it was felt 
by the IOC representatives that the S.A. Olympic Committee had made every 
reasonable effort to implement the undertaking of Mr. R. Honey, given at Munich in 
1959, to ensure that no competitor of requisite caliber was excluded from the South 
African team.”207 It surely could only have been a “misunderstanding” that had led 
SASA to put forward its request. Brutus responded by pointing to what he interpreted 
as an admission made by none other than Reginald Honey in an address to the South 
African Sports Association: 
… that there was racial discrimination in the recognised bodies 
governing sport in South Africa and [that Honey] advised the non-
racial sporting bodies to agree to a compromise with the governing 
bodies and accept racial discrimination…. The South African Sports 
Association is certain that this is in violation of the Olympic Charter 
and requests that Mr. Honey be required by your Committee to 
furnish an explanation and to explain the position to your Committee 
at its Meeting in June.208  
Brutus also repeated his demand that SASA be allowed to report to the IOC 
meeting, but also tied his action to the political circumstances of the country: “In the 
event of our spokesman being refused travelling facilities by the Government, as has 
happened on a previous occasion, we request that you decline to accept a report from 
one side only and instead institute an impartial Commission to conduct a full 
investigation into the true position.”209 
Over six months later, on 12 November 1961, Brutus, on behalf of SASA, again 
requested that, in view of the lack of any progress, the matter of racial discrimination 
in South Africa be considered by the IOC again.210 He requested to withhold South 
Africa’s invitation to the 1964 Games until the issue had been investigated officially; 
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that the issue be placed on the agenda of the upcoming IOC meeting and that SASA be 
allowed to submit written or verbal evidence. “We will not rest content,” he 
concluded, “until there is fair play for all South Africans and the Olympic Charter is 
faithfully observed by all National Sports Federation in our country.”211 
Brutus sought to increase the impact of this intervention by sending out an appeal 
to all NOCs, requesting support to remove racial discrimination and secure 
international recognition for all South African sportsmen. He stated that the IOC was 
requested to reopen the South African issue for discussion in future IOC sessions, 
since discrimination still existed and athletes were being prevented from 
participating in international competition.212 SASA, moving forward with its agenda 
for a meeting in February,213 received growing international support from its 
supporters, among them John Rogers, the SASA representative in London, England, 
and also a member of the British Olympic Committee. Stated Rogers to Brundage: “I 
am sure that the now apparent seriousness of the position in South Africa in regard 
to discrimination in Olympic sport, is blatantly obvious to sportsmen all over the 
world.”214 
Brundage and the IOC initially ignored Brutus and SASA’s request to reopen the 
South African discussion. Failing to receive a response to a letter he sent to Brundage 
in November 1961,215 Brutus reminded Brundage, yet again, of SASA’s concerns to 
place the race discrimination issue on the agenda of the subsequent IOC meeting, and 
investigate SASA’s complaints.216 The IOC finally reopened the South African racial 
discrimination issue by calling for a report from SANOC. Brutus urged the IOC to 
accept a supplementary report from SASA: “As a co-ordinating body representing the 
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overwhelming number of South African sportsmen of all racial groups we believe that 
we can supply important information and that this would be essential in order to 
obtain an accurate account of the position in our country.”217 
The subsequent IOC Executive Board meeting led to a hardening of the IOC’s 
attitude towards SANOC’s position. President Brundage was “very disappointed as 
none of the promises made by the IOC-member Honey in Rome ha[ve] turned out as 
positive as he thought. It is decided to write the NOC and ask why. If no explication 
strong proceedings must be taken against South-Africa.”218 Chancellor Mayer also 
noted the complete lack of progress on the issue: “…even the South African 
Government has stated last month again that it is against policy to permit any racially 
mixed sport anywhere in the Republic or to allow any racially-mixed teams to leave 
the country.”219 Absent any noticeable progress, the Executive Board would be 
compelled to place the issue on the agenda of the upcoming Moscow General Session: 
“It may be that special measures might be taken towards your Olympic Committee, 
what we and you would like surely to avoid.”220 
Otto Mayer maintained a dialogue with Brutus, noting that in regard to the 
supplementary report offered by Brutus, Mayer was willing to receive such a report 
from SASA if it was shared with SANOC. “As we heard,” Mayer said, “the situation 
seems to [be] improv[ing] and we sincerely hope that the racial discrimination in 
sport will disappear in the shortest delay.”221 Mayer also wrote a letter to Lilian 
Francey, reminding her of SANOC’s responsibilities. 
This promising exchange notwithstanding, two months later Brutus used SASA’s 
supplementary report to ask the IOC immediately to expel SANOC at the upcoming 
187 
 
 
IOC General Session in Moscow. The report contained the following charges, among 
others: SANOC condoned racial discrimination in organizations affiliated to it; neither 
SANOC nor its affiliated organizations had shown any signs of admitting non-whites 
to full and equal membership; SANOC would not oppose government race 
discrimination policies; increasing government interference in sports occurred in 
contravention of Olympic principles; the acceptance of “mixed teams of sportsmen, 
either inside or outside the country,”222 was contrary to official government policy; 
principles of athletic merit, according to which qualified non-white competitors 
should have been selected to representative teams, had been disregarded; worse, 
“[n]ine sportsmen – white, coloured and Indian – are due to appear in court this 
month because they organised a football match on a non-racial basis on a ground 
‘zoned’ for Indians.” 223 
While SASA thus pursued its strategies through official IOC channels, domestic 
resistance also served to widen the breadth of public exposure. SASA President G.K. 
Rangasamy befriended prominent Springbok cricketer, Owen Wynne. Wynne had 
requested a national sport convention during a recent interview, and Rangasamy 
suggested to him that an upcoming SASA conference would be a suitable venue in 
which to launch his idea, with SASA and SANOC as co-sponsors. This, Rangasamy 
claimed, would finally be a conference with broad representation since, SASA “… 
represent[ed] the overwhelming majority of the non-white sportsmen of the country, 
through their non-racial bodies, and can undertake to arrange their support.”224 In the 
context of these developments, SASA also attempted to position itself in direct 
competition to SANOC, announcing that it would reconstitute itself through 
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dissolution and subsequent reincorporation as the “South African Non-Racial Olympic 
Committee (SAN-ROC) … and apply for membership of the IOC at its meeting in 
Nairobi in October, 1963.”225  
Beyond advances pursued by each South African NSF and their corresponding ISF, 
staging the “Wynne Conference,” sponsored by both SANOC and SASA, demonstrated 
significant progress. SASA President Rangasamy wrote Honey to solicit support and 
coordinate the conference with SANOC. Furthermore, with the proposition to dissolve 
SASA in sight, Rangasamy suggested: “The time would therefore seem to be opportune 
for a convention to consider the formation of a single non-racial Olympic Association 
which would be truly representative of our country and which would remove the 
imminent danger of expulsion now threatening [the] all-white racialistic and 
unrepresentative Olympic Association.”226 
While awaiting a response from Honey, Rangasamy circulated a letter to all NSFs 
in South Africa about the possibility of a national sport conference in October 1962. 
Ideas and support were welcomed because it was an opportune time to discuss the 
problems in South Africa and develop a solution: “We can save any section of our 
population from being excluded from the Olympics and we can ensure that all South 
Africans are represented on the basis of merit…. For this it is essential that we come 
together to speak frankly and to uphold the ideals of fair play which we profess to 
believe in.”227 
Unexpectedly, Rangasamy received a seemingly conciliatory letter from Lilian 
Francey requesting a list of the sports associations affiliated to SASA, “[a]ssuring you 
that my Association has the interest of all amateur sportsmen at heart, irrespective of 
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race, colour or creed, in terms of the Olympic ideal, and that every effort will be made 
to ensure that no athlete of international standard in any Olympic branch of sport will 
be denied the opportunity of representing South Africa at the next Olympic Games.”228 
SANOC’s request for information was aimed at remaining in control of South 
African Olympic sport, and, Rangasamy assessed Francey’s request for information as 
a delaying tactic. His response was curt: “I am inclined to state bluntly that your 
inquiries are one more attempt to stall: there has been no attempt on the part of your 
association to come to grips with the problem of racialism or to give frank answers to 
our questions…. I repeat my request that your Association should support a 
sportsman’s national convention and hope that this time we shall get a frank and 
direct answer.”229 
Whether SASA really expected SANOC to cooperate on such a convention, remains 
doubtful. Brutus, for his part, certainly sought to leverage the possibility of forming 
SAN-ROC as a non-racial successor to SASA and replacement for SANOC at the IOC, in 
order to force SANOC to reach some form of understanding: “We have indicated that 
if all South African amateur sportsmen can be admitted to equal membership of the 
national bodies affiliated to the [South African National Olympic Committee], then we 
will not proceed with the development of a South African Non-Racial Olympic 
Committee (SAN-ROC).”230 
On the same day, Brutus was similarly unequivocal in explaining the strategic 
purpose of the proposed new organization to Honey: “It was also agreed that SAN-
ROC would agree to ask the [South African National Olympic Committee] to arrange 
talks on the question of admitting all South African sportsmen to equal membership 
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of its affiliated bodies…. On behalf of SAN-ROC I hereby submit the request for talks 
with your Association on the question of equal membership of all South African 
sportsmen in its affiliated national bodies.”231 Brutus anticipated the subsequent 
January as the date for the formal inauguration of SAN-ROC, but, “if a satisfactory 
solution can be found,” he continued, “it is probable that it would be unnecessary to 
proceed with the development of SAN-ROC. It would therefore be most fruitful if our 
talks could be arranged before January, 1963.”232 The responsibility to initiate 
discussions with SANOC devolved to Honey. 
SASA kept up the pressure, and followed up with another letter to SANOC detailing 
the necessity of establishing SAN-ROC – unless the two organizations met to work 
towards the removal of racialism within South African sport. No reply had been 
received by early October. Another month passed, and SASA, interpreting SANOC’s 
non-reply as a stalling tactic, continued with the pressure: 
Since it appears that we are not likely to receive a definite reply in 
the near future, in spite of my putting into your hands personally the 
information you said you required in your letter of the 9th November, 
I must advise you that this body and the South African Non-Racial 
Olympic Committee have no option but to press ahead with plans for 
building up a strong Committee and seeking membership of the 
International Olympic Committee at its Congress in Nairobi next 
year…. It is unfortunate that we should be compelled to do this. So 
much is entailed in the establishment of the Committee and in 
seeking membership of the IOC that we cannot afford to have any 
unnecessary delay: it is hard not to see the evasiveness of your body 
as an attempt to impede our work for the removal of racial 
discrimination and the achievement of true sportsmanship for all 
South Africans in the Olympic field.233 
Since no constructive meetings were held between SASA and SANOC, SAN-ROC 
was officially formed on 13 January 1963. Its first order of business was to issue a 
letter that protested Sir Stanley Rous (President of FIFA) addressing members of the 
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IOC on the racial issue in South Africa;234 Rous was unfit to speak, since during his 
previous visit to South Africa, he had publicly come out in favour of the racial 
arrangements in South Africa.235 R. Hlongwane’s (Secretary of SAN-ROC) address at 
the second biennial General Meeting of SASA, signalled that change was on the 
horizon, but that hard work was required to effect it: 
In October of this year the International Olympic Committee will be 
discussing S. Africa. The racial Olympic body was given a warning 
last year and it has disregarded that warning. Now we must prove 
that they do not represent the country and that they do not carry out 
the Olympic ideals. But to strengthen our case, we must prove that 
the majority of our sportsmen are excluded from the racial body and 
that they are opposed to racialism.236 
Hlongwane sent Brundage news clippings as evidence of the South African 
government’s interference in all matters relating to sport, especially the Nationalist 
party’s coercion of existing sporting organizations.237 The South African Olympic 
administration, however, was more concerned with the formal use of the term, 
‘Olympic,’ than with engaging SAN-ROC on the substantive issues. 
On 9 February 1963, SASA President Rangasamy responded to an earlier letter 
from SANOC requesting that SAN-ROC eliminate the word ‘Olympic’ in the 
organization’s title. Not being a SAN-ROC official, Rangasamy could not resist the 
temptation to return the charge of illicit use of Olympic symbolism, while also letting 
SANOC know that SAN-ROC would only communicate with the IOC itself: 
You are aware that we dispute the right of your body to use the title 
‘Olympic’ since it openly violates the principles of the Charter of the 
International Olympic Committee and that we are preparing to raise 
this matter with the IOC … I must also point out that SAN-ROC cannot 
recognise the jurisdiction of your body and will only act on a request 
from the International Olympic Committee itself. This is, however, a 
matter on which you will no doubt receive an opinion from SAN-ROC 
once you have directed your request to the correct questers.238 
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SAN-ROC President N. Rathinasany then followed up on this challenge to the 
legitimacy of SANOC, requesting from Brundage that the “question of racialism in 
South African sport be discussed at the Nairobi Congress of the IOC in October of this 
year and that the membership of the present body representing South Africa … be 
questioned, since this body in no way checks the practice of racialism in the racial 
bodies affiliated to it.”239 
Brundage gave assurances that the IOC was aware of the problems in South 
African sport, that they had been discussed previously and would be on the agenda at 
the next meeting, but he also curtailed communication with SAN-ROC on a 
technicality. He notified Rathinasany that the organization’s use of the word ‘Olympic’ 
contravened IOC regulations,240 and the IOC later “resolved that, whilst SAN-ROC uses 
the word ‘Olympic’ in its title, neither the International Olympic Committee nor any 
of its officials shall have any communication or dealings with it.”241 
Undeterred by such admonishments and resolutions, SAN-ROC continued to 
attempt to influence the IOC towards advancing its agenda. He asked Mayer to 
forward a letter to the Japanese Olympic Committee (JOC) requesting that the JOC 
withdraw its invitation to SANOC for the upcoming Olympic Games, 242 since it was 
SAN-ROC’s “outspoken contention, which we can support with facts, that racialism 
has increased and is even worse than before in sport in our country.”243 Mayer grew 
exasperated at what he considered SAN-ROC’s overreaching approach: “It is certainly 
not [SAN-ROC’s] business to interfere in our affairs and to give orders to the Tokyo 
Committee!”244 SAN-ROC’s letter would not be forwarded to the JOC, but Rathinasamy 
sought an even broader audience, continually promoting SAN-ROC at the expense of 
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SANOC. In a May 1963 missive addressed to “all Olympic Committees and sportsmen,” 
Rathinasamy elaborated the organization’s position: Racial discrimination in South 
African sports was more deeply entrenched than ever: “There are now more bodies 
recognised by the South African [National] Olympic Committee which are composed 
exclusively of White South Africans only or Black South Africans only. Members of the 
two groups never compete against each other and thus there are no fair trials to select 
the best sportsmen to represent our land at international events such as the Olympic 
Games.”245 Those who sought an alternative to this situation by establishing non-
racial sports organizations were not recognized by SANOC. In consequence, SAN-ROC 
had requested a hearing at the upcoming Nairobi IOC meetings. “We ask the 
sportsmen of the world,” Rathinasamy concluded, “to take note of this and to oppose 
racial discrimination in sport.”246 
Avoiding the political implications of this missive, the IOC remained insistent on 
resolving SAN-ROC’s illegitimate use of the IOC’s trademark, referring to the race 
issue only in passing and casting doubt on SAN-ROC’s legitimacy: “The South African 
National Olympic Committee is still in good standing, although the subject will be 
discussed at our next Session at Nairobi in October.”247 In its own view, SAN-ROC’s 
existence as a formally constituted organization legitimized such interventions, a 
viewpoint it emphasized by forwarding to the IOC and ISFs a copy of its own 
constitution, on the subsequent day.248 Two months later, Rathinasany agreed 
nonetheless to comply with Brundage’s original demand and change the word 
“Olympic” in its name to “Open.” He pointed out, however, that SANOC used the word 
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illegitimately in a rather more substantively political sense, since its accommodation 
of racial politics amounted to a breach of Olympic Charter stipulations.249  
The IOC was none too pleased with the determination shown by SAN-ROC as it 
pursued its agenda. SAN-ROC’s representative John Harris had without invitation 
come to an IOC Executive Board Meeting in Lausanne in early June 1963. His 
insistence gained him “a few minutes – out of courtesy – after the meeting was over,” 
which provided Harris an opportunity to achieve press visibility. “Mr. Harris’ 
communication to the press was obnoxious,”250 Mayer responded with considerable 
irritation. SAN-ROC nonetheless attempted to position itself as the authoritative, best-
informed source for the IOC on Olympic sports and racism in South Africa, requesting 
a visible presence “before the relevant meetings of the International Olympic 
Committee and its concerned sub-committees,” at the October meetings in Nairobi.251 
Mayer at least did not ignore Harris’ communication, but passed it on to Brundage.252 
Some weeks later, Dennis Brutus gave the argument a more explicitly political turn: 
white sportsmen and organizations who were complicit in Hendrik Verwoerd’s 
imposition of apartheid, were guilty of racism, since no laws prohibited racially mixed 
sport – but sportsmen still imposed racial rules. The current system only allowed non-
whites to affiliate with white organizations by maintaining inferior positions while 
still retaining segregated organizations – one white and one non-white.253 Brutus 
concluded with a call to “all true sportsmen to FIGHT RACIALISM. We ask them to 
demand the suspension of the racialist South African [National] Olympic Committee. 
We ask them to stand firm and not permit racial discrimination to be tolerated in an 
organisation which is pledged to outlaw discrimination and to uphold the principles 
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of fair play and sportsmanship.”254 To reinforce the message, SAN-ROC representative 
Harris issued a similarly worded statement on the same day.255 SAN-ROC extended 
the message by suggesting that SAN-ROC rather than SANOC was the legitimate body 
for Olympic sport in South Africa, and by demanding the suspension of SANOC at the 
upcoming Baden-Baden meeting, “such suspension to remain in force until the SANOC 
can show that it grants affiliation only to controlling bodies which are in all ways non-
racial.”256 
These statements coalesced into a four-page document outlining the case for 
SANOC’s suspension: SAN-ROC argued that it could represent South Africa better than 
SANOC. SANOC had lost its legitimacy when it failed to speak out against both Brutus 
and Harris being detained in South Africa since the government did not want those 
who spoke out against racism to leave the country.257 SAN-ROC reiterated that in June 
1962, the IOC had made a decision that if the policy of racial discrimination had not 
changed by October 1963, the IOC would suspend SANOC. Since then, the government 
had made, on 4 February 1963, a full statement regarding its policy on sport.258 Some 
of the notable points from that statement reinforced racial discrimination: (a) white 
and non-whites must play separately; (b) international mixed representation would 
not be approved; (c) non-white associations could exist alongside white associations, 
whereby one to two whites could represent the non-white association at the 
Executive Board level; however, if white representation was not practicable, a non-
white could serve on the white committee; and (d) white Executive Boards could 
serve as a liaison between association and world organizations.259 SAN-ROC 
emphasized the two overarching ramifications of this statement: first, complete 
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segregation in sport was to be retained; second, overall control must remain with 
whites.260 The reality was, according to SAN-ROC, that South African policy had 
hardened since the Moscow meetings, not relaxed. Importantly, SANOC’s compliance 
was voluntary because there were no laws prohibiting whites and non-whites 
coexisting on an organizational level. Therefore, segregation and racial discrimination 
by SANOC was in violation of Article 1 of the Olympic Charter. This warranted the 
suspension of SANOC until it could demonstrate an entirely non-racial approach.261 
A new development strengthened SAN-ROC’s credibility. Harris wrote to Mayer 
noting that SAN-ROC had been invited by the Indonesian Minister of Sport to put 
together a team to compete in the Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO), 
which was established as an Olympic Games alternative. Harris, not wanting to risk 
his position with the IOC, declined the invitation: “While strongly sharing GANEFO’s 
opposition to all forms of oppression SAN-ROC is unable in terms of its constitution 
to accept your invitation…. We are committed to following the lead of the IOC, to the 
requirements of which we have at all times scrupulously adhered.”262 In copying 
Mayer on his response, Harris sought to improve relationships between SAN-ROC and 
the IOC: “We trust that our decision meets with your approval and that you will make 
our action known to those who will soon be considering the entire question of sports 
organization in South Africa. This particular piece of information should surely be 
known to those who will decide our fate at Baden-Baden.”263 
At the same time, SANOC issued a report detailing the progress of, and its current 
position on, South African sport. It is noteworthy that, before publishing a response, 
SAN-ROC representatives travelled to Baden-Baden attempting to arrange a meeting 
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with Brundage to hand-deliver a letter from Brutus.264 SAN-ROC’s response focussed 
on several points. It interpreted SANOC’s report itself as confirmation of the 
continued existence of racial discrimination, pointing among other indications to 
SANOC’s lack of opposition to the South African government’s unchanging policies, 
and to a letter by Balsiger in support of apartheid and included in one of the 
appendices.265 Then there was the simple obvious facts that organizations affiliated 
to SANOC still did not permit multi-racial competitions, and that non-white 
organizations seeking affiliation could still only do so from a position of inferiority: 
“This means, in fact, the exclusion of a great many of the best non-white sportsmen in 
South Africa.”266 Then there was SANOC’s contention that apartheid offered separate 
but equal opportunities – merely a convenient illusion, especially in regard to 
facilities: even the selection of competitors was to occur separately, without any 
competition between whites and non-whites. Lastly,  Braun’s report was 
disingenuous and misleading since, although white and non-white athletes were sent 
for competitions, they had to represent each faction separately, not as a combined 
team; mixed sport was not allowed.267 
Some months later, Harris followed up with an open letter to the IOC Executive 
Board. He focussed on two aspects of the Baden-Baden resolution that, if followed, 
would improve the chances of SANOC’s acceptance for participation in the Olympic 
Games: (1) SANOC’s declaration of acceptance of Articles 1 and 24; and, (2) convincing 
the South African government to change its racial policy, and to work towards the 
elimination of racism in South African sports.268 This, however, was not sufficient; to 
motivate SANOC to seek real progress on the issue, Harris urged the IOC to suspend 
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SANOC for the time being: “ANY LESSER ACTION WILL REPRESENT ACCEPTANCE OF 
THE POLCIES AND ACTIONS OF A BODY WHICH ABSOLUTELY DENIES THE 
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE OLYMPIC MOVEMENT.”269 
SAN-ROC kept up the pressure to achieve South Africa’s suspension in a letter 
addressed to the IOC, some months later. The letter pointed again to what SAN-ROC 
viewed as SANOC’s voluntary compliance with “a policy of total Apartheid [sic] in 
South African sport. Mixed sport is not illegal in South Africa. Hence the South African 
[National] Olympic Committee could certainly make an immediate declaration of its 
own opposition to Apartheid [sic].”270 The fact that SANOC chose not to do so was 
“surely the clearest evidence of its own positive attachment to Apartheid [sic].”271 
SANOC should therefore be informed that, in addition of the retraction of its 
invitations to the 1964 Games, it would be expelled from the IOC unless it changed the 
policy of the sports bodies affiliated to it. 
There can be little doubt that efforts emanating from the sphere of domestic 
resistance were considered in the IOC’s assessment of SANOC’s suitability to 
participate in the 1964 Tokyo Olympics. Part of the domestic resistance movement’s 
support network existed outside SASA and SAN-ROC, and indeed outside of South 
Africa. This added another dimension to the resistance’s wider recognition. 
4. International Community 
Almost a year after the conclusion of the 1960 Rome Games, the IOC received a 
letter from Antony Steel, Secretary of the Campaign Against Race Discrimination in 
Sport (CARDS), based in London, England. One of South Africa’s leading white cyclists 
had been suspended for riding in a match with coloured cyclists. When he was 
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summoned to appear before the board of the South African Amateur Athletic and 
Cycling Association, he was the target of a racial slur by one of the Board’s members. 
Steel was furious: 
This association … is a leading affiliate of the South African [National 
Olympic Committee] which you and your Executive protect 
continually. Writing quite personally it just makes me lose patience 
that your Executive is so ready always to find excuses to save the 
South African [National Olympic Committee] … All that happens is 
that just before each meeting of the IOC the South African spokesmen 
say a few sweet remarks about their belief in inter-racial sport but 
the government makes it impossible or at least very difficult, but in 
between these IOC meetings this is the way they behave. You will 
observe that it is not the government which takes action … but the 
South African Amateur Athletic and Cycling Union quite voluntarily. 
Perhaps you would like to ask that friend of the IOC Executive, Mr. 
Reginald Honey for his excuses this time.272 
Steel’s heated words were shared by many who desired change in South Africa. 
However, the IOC’s Mayer thought some of Steels’ remarks were too harsh: “I very 
much regret that I cannot agree with some remarks contained in your letter, when 
you say that our Executive Board protect the South African [National Olympic 
Committee] regarding the racial discrimination or when you mention that South 
African spokesmen say ‘a few sweet remarks’ etc…. I have informed you already that 
we had a joined meeting in Rome with the delegates of the South African [National] 
Olympic Committee and a Rev. Father together with a coloured gentleman. Full 
satisfaction was given to us.”273 
Mayer certainly was not oblivious to the energy of Steel’s comments. In a private 
note to Brundage, attached to Brundage’s copy of this letter, he offered a more far-
reaching perspective on the issue than the IOC had ever stated publicly: “Dear Avery: 
Between you and me, don’t you think that we should have suspended the South 
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African [National Olympic Committee] since a long time, as after all and in spite of all 
they tell us, there is a race discrimination in sport in that country.… Why should we 
not have the courage to suspend them?”274 This was the first time that a high-ranking 
IOC official questioned the organization’s stance on the issue, albeit in a private. Mayer 
seemed to argue that harsher measures should have been applied to South African for 
its race discrimination. Was SANOC receiving preferential treatment, after all? 
Less than a month later, Steel expressed a more ambivalent attitude about SANOC 
and its possibilities. Writing to Mayer, Steel included in his letter SANOC’s reply to the 
Table Tennis Board as to why its athletes were refused passports to attend the world 
championships in China; SANOC elaborated that it was not customary to provide 
reasons for the refusal.275 Steel pointed out that mixed sport was not supported by 
the government which, in turn, prevented SANOC from honoring its promises made 
at the 1959 Munich IOC General Session. Passports would be denied to those non-
whites who did progress towards international competition through white sport 
associations. Since only one organization, which, in South Africa was controlled by 
whites, was allowed to be affiliated with SANOC, and therefore to participate 
internationally, the IOC, in essence, endorsed white control of sport in South Africa.276 
Noted Steel: “This is obviously completely contrary to the Olympic declaration and I 
would be grateful if you would bring these new vitally important facts that have just 
emerged to the notice of your committee for their consideration, for I just do not see 
how Mr. Honey can continue to argue the way he has done in the past, in the light of 
this evidence, and I hope that South Africa will finally be told to have its official sports 
associations open to all, irrespective of race, or else leave the IOC.”277 
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Other international activists, such as John Rogers, SASA representative in London, 
and member of the British Olympic Committee, added their voice on the issue; the 
international response was clearly broadening: “I am sure that the now apparent 
seriousness of the position in South Africa in regard to discrimination in Olympic 
sport, is blatantly obvious to sportsmen all over the world.”278 One Dr. André Ungar, 
Rabbi of Temple Emanuel in Westwood, New Jersey, also wrote to Brundage on behalf 
of Brutus, resending an earlier letter by Brutus, and providing Brundage with an 
elegant option to redress his earlier remissness in responding to Brutus: 
I am forwarding to you another copy of a letter he had addressed to 
you some time ago. With South African postal and political 
conditions being what they are, it is quite possible that their letters 
to you – and yours to them – have been held up in the mail. It is, thus, 
as an additional precaution that this copy is being sent awaiting your 
kind attention…. I know, Sir, that your concern for the maintenance 
of the Olympic code that debars racial discrimination in 
international sport, will prompt you to take prompt and affective 
action in this matter. My own circle of acquaintances in the New 
York-New Jersey area, including American sportsmen and sports 
writers of note, supports the firm conviction that a very substantial 
amount of popular sympathy exists in this country for the cause of 
decency in South Africa’s sport – above all on the international 
Olympic level…. Please let me know what steps I might further take 
to support Mr. Brutus’ petition and the urgent and valid issue that 
lies beyond it.279 
Even a growing segment of the South African population became more vocal on the 
issue. E.T. Harriott, assistant editor of Drum magazine, requested a comment from 
Brundage on the current state of South African sport, asking for “some suggestions 
about how the major non-white sporting bodies can gain international recognition…. 
I hope you can help us in this way because so many people in South Africa are vitally 
interested in the Olympic prospects of all racial people.”280 Brundage’s reply remained 
non-committal,281 but Harriott persisted, offering his co-operation: “If there is any 
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information I can supply to you on the situation I will be glad to do so and, in fact, we 
are sending to you shortly, an article from the current issue of DRUM, which reflects 
on the above-mentioned situation.”282 Harriott in turn hoped for access to news about 
the IOC’s deliberations, hinting that he “would be grateful if it could be arranged for 
the deliberations of the Olympics Committee in Moscow next month, to be reported 
to me in some way. An official note of the proceedings with regard to South African 
sport would be very welcome.”283 Harriott indeed subsequently forwarded to 
Brundage the Drum’s coverage of the issue.284 
In general, the IOC remained non-committal and cautious in its public statements, 
especially those which might be published in a potentially not neutral magazine, such 
as the Drum, but South African non-white media produced a steady stream of 
newspaper articles explicitly describing racial discrimination in South African sport. 
Steel was mainly pleased with the general tendency of these news items, since they 
tended to confirm the opposition’s comments about the negative actions of South 
African sport authorities. But in view of the public frequently being misled by SANOC 
representatives, would people actually believe the news? Steel hoped “that the truth 
of all that we have said over the past years is accepted, and that your committee will 
see how time and time again they have been misled by the South African 
representatives who will say anything to avoid expulsion.”285  
But Mayer notified Steel that the IOC itself had no shortage of evidence, and that 
the issue would be discussed at the Moscow Session.286 Copying Brundage on this 
correspondence, Mayer attached a personal note that indicated that the direction of 
SANOC’s fate was obvious: 
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After all the documents we have received I really think that our 
South African National Olympic Committee is working against our 
rules. At least the National Sports Federations of that country. They 
had their General Annual meeting on March 27th and promised to let 
us have a report which never reached us…. I think we should look 
over this problem very seriously in Moscow and take a decision, even 
if we have to suspend that Olympic Committee.287 
Brundage also found a new ally by forging a liaison with an organization in the 
political realm. Endeavouring to situate the Liberal Party of South Africa on the 
“proper” side of history, Peter Brown, National Chairman, wrote Mayer to extend to 
the IOC its full support, passing a resolution at the 1962 National Congress of the 
Liberal Party of South Africa. The resolution stated: “That this congress of the Liberal 
Party urges the International Olympic Committee to debar South Africa from the next 
Olympic Games unless she is represented by a team selected from athletes of all races 
who measure up to Olympic standards.”288 Brown added that the Liberal Party was 
the only party open to members of all races, and that thus it was the party’s position 
“that to select an Olympic team on any other basis than that of the ability of the 
contestant was an affront to human dignity…. I would be most grateful if the text of 
this resolution could be brought to the notice of your committee when it next 
meets.”289 
Although Brundage wanted to avoid political connections, Peter Brown’s initiative 
can be seen a symbol of the momentum for change in South Africa. A contributor to 
this momentum was the Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM). On 26 April 1963, AAM 
released a “Boycott Apartheid Campaign” information sheet.290 It provided a 
summary of the current state of apartheid in South Africa, including those sporting 
bodies who had taken action against apartheid. AAM fully supported SASA in calling 
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for a boycott of all sport tours unless they were based on non-racial lines. Racism in 
sport should not be tolerated: “It is not a question of bringing politics into sport but 
of keeping politics out of it,” proclaimed AAM.291 “Every effort must be made to ensure 
that the International Olympic Committee, FIFA, and other international sports bodies 
refuse to condone white supremacy in sport.”292 
International support was growing. Nations such as the Sudan, represented by the 
Secretary of the Sudanese National Olympic Committee, endorsed the movement 
against racism in sport, decrying the violation of Olympic principles: “You can be rest 
assured of our full support in Nairobi and will fight until we see the South African 
[National] Olympic Committee kicked out.”293 Keeping the public informed was 
essential. On 1 June 1963, S. Abdul, Secretary of the AAM, released a statement for 
both the press and sporting bodies which highlighted Brutus’ arrest for failing to 
comply with a “banning order” from the South African government.294 Brutus was 
arrested on May 29th when meeting with Swiss journalist, Mr. Balsiger, after being 
assured by Jan Botha, a member of SANOC and the government, that Balsiger was able 
to meet with whomever he wished in order to construct a complete story. This, 
according to Abdul, displayed the government’s determination to suppress the truth. 
“The Anti-Apartheid Movement will continue to expose racial discrimination in South 
African sport,” exclaimed Abdul, “and we hope that in accordance with the Olympic 
Charter all national and international sports bodies will refuse to condone or accept 
racial discrimination in sport. Racialism should have no place in the international 
sporting community.”295 
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With disbelief at the shooting of Brutus, who was trying to escape the authorities, 
Steel argued that the IOC had to shoulder at least some of the responsibility for the 
incident: “I honestly cannot see what further evidence you need of the ill-will of the 
South Africans and their fear of the case for non-racial sport being put against them…. 
I feel that if the case, put for year after year … had not been turned down mainly on 
the insistence of a few powerful men despite all the evidence produced, this tragedy 
may well not have happened.”296 
The AAM also released a statement on the case, implicitly pointing a finger at 
SANOC for its collusion through inaction, in the government’s race policies: “Mr. 
Brutus remains in prison in South Africa with the prospect of a serious charge facing 
him soon: it is the duty of all who detest this alliance with apartheid to protest to the 
British, Portuguese and Federal authorities, and to demand his release. Those who 
appease Verwoerd and aid him in persecuting men who believe in fundamental rights 
and dignity should not be permitted to get away with their duplicity.297 
On a more reserved note, Americans’ expression of concern also reached 
Brundage’s desk. Is it noteworthy that these letters were written not by 
representatives of political or sports organization, but by ordinary private citizens. 
For example, Nancy Tucker of South Hadley, Massachusetts argued: 
Like many Americans, I am concerned about the racial crises of 
today, both at home and abroad. Whether in the USA or in South 
Africa, I oppose racial segregation of any sort.… the South African 
[National] Olympic Committee have not agreed to open their 
membership to South African sportsmen of all races, even though 
they were asked to do so by the International Olympic Committee in 
June, 1962. This to me seems like a most unsportsmanlike and 
prejudiced attitude. I therefore strongly urge you to refuse … the 
right of representing South Africa at the Olympic Games in Tokyo.298 
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Catherine Morris of Chicago was more specific in apportioning a large share of the 
blame to SANOC rather than the Government of South Africa: “At the present time, all 
sport in South Africa is segregated. This is so, not (primarily) because of the South 
African government’s policy of apartheid, but as a result of the policy and practises of 
the South African National Olympic Committee. This body, which governs all South 
African sport, refuse to recognise racially integrated teams and support all-white 
teams.”299 SANOC had, she continued, consistently supplied non-white athletes with 
inferior training opportunities and facilities, and disproportionally favoured white 
athletes. Only “a South Africa on an integrated, non-racial basis will be included in all 
sport; thus the Olympic principles will be upheld, and the growth of amateur sport 
throughout the world will be furthered.”300 
Stephen Groves of Chicago added a moral element to his complaints about SANOC: 
I hope you have received a huge number of pleas to deny South 
Africa’s segregated Olympic group international recognition. This 
and similar acknowledgement of her is condoning or approval of her 
inhumane policies. This country’s open, blatant, official, even self-
righteous entrenchment of her uncivilized indignities to dark-
skinned alleged citizens is preposterous. Every dodging or 
rationalizing or begging the issue further perpetuates, even 
vindicates, their practices and ‘philosophy’…. Anyone in any position 
to alleviate tyranny has an obligation to conscience, country, the U.N. 
and international humanity’s conscience to identify these tyrannies 
for what they are and act against them with clarity and conviction: 
How else do we make our lives worthwhile and improve this human 
race?301 
The amount of mail Brundage, Mayer, and the IOC received relative to the South 
African issue grew to be overwhelming. At times, it was difficult to truly understand 
the legitimacy and intentions of a writer. This was certainly the case with one Ahmed 
Ebrahim who in a later letter identified himself as one of “the discriminated 
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sportsmen of South Africa.”302 He submitted an appeal to Brundage on behalf of non-
white athletes, believing that the IOC’s “decision should not be influenced by the fact 
that very many countries are hostile towards South Africa and are using this 
organization to further their political aims. The International Olympic Committee 
must simply consider whether the Olympic Committee of South Africa is fully 
complying with the fundamental principles of the Olympic Charter or not.”303 
Had not the IOC been doing just that? Ebrahim developed his argument further by 
elaborating that for 50 years those who represented South Africa had been white. 
Invitations to trials were reserved for whites only although no laws prevented SANOC 
from organizing mixed sport, yet it did not facilitate mixed sport. Non-whites were 
only encouraged to affiliate in order to keep the white organizations relevant. This 
gave the illusion of non-white acceptance: “The South African [National] Olympic 
Committee is not prepared to hold mixed trials … it is not prepared to allow white and 
non-white athletes to compete together against visiting teams … it is not prepared to 
provide equal facilities … it is not prepared to permit non-whites to hold offices in the 
S.A. Olympic Committee executive … Yet it is guilty of all these and I cannot see how 
such a committee can be tolerated by the IOC when it openly and willfully defies the 
basic, fundamental principles of the Olympic Charter.”304 
In Ebrahim’s opinion, the IOC had no alternative but to expel SANOC: “If the IOC 
condones the Olympic Committee of South Africa at this session then posterity will 
hold the IOC guilty of discriminating against 17,000 men non-white sportsmen of 
South Africa who for the past 55 years have been begging for recognition.”305 Some 
three months later, Ebrahim dispatched another lengthy letter to Brundage, 
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reiterating the same arguments he had advanced previously.306 He outlined all the 
facts to date, leading to the same conclusion as stated in the previous letter: “Sir, in 
compliance with the Olympic Spirit, we the discriminated sportsmen of South Africa 
demand the immediate suspension of South Africa and the elimination of race 
prejudice in the IOC and by the IOC.”307 
Ebrahim’s information and arguments appeared to be solid. Why would the IOC 
not consider such a well-expressed statement? It was not until a telegram from Harris 
to Mayer that doubts were cast on Ebrahim’s remarks: “We believe Ebrahim to be an 
agent of the South African government deliberately attempting to sabotage SAN-
ROC’s campaign against racialism in sport. He was expelled from SAN-ROC for this 
reason. The entire SAN-ROC committee from Brutus downwards repudiates him 
totally. Please disregard his attempts to cloud the vital issue.”308 
Although Ebrahim’s proclamations were composed eloquently, his intentions 
could have been less than honest. However, his example was unique. Messages 
continued to arrive at the IOC. The South African Students’ Union in Germany, for 
example, “with the support of all African states including the overwhelming majority 
of the people of South Africa appeal to you to exclude the South African Republic from 
the Olympic Games until its apartheid practises in sport cease. The coloured South 
African delegate at your conference is nominated by the all-white government and 
does not represent the interest of the non-European population of South Africa.”309 
Two weeks after SANOC issued its report to the IOC, the American Committee on 
Africa (ACA) rejuvenated its support for domestic resistance forces. Famed black 
baseball player Jackie Robinson of the ACA, made a request to the IOC to withdraw 
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SANOC’s credentials. “The South African [National] Olympic Committee operates on 
racist principles,” Robinson argued. “It has never selected a non-white athlete for 
Olympic competition. Its non-white affiliates are rigidly segregated. These facts 
constitute a clear denial of the spirit of the Olympic Games … Sports competition is a 
uniquely non-racial activity. Only performance counts.”310 Rather, Robinson argued, 
an organization such as SAN-ROC should select the team for the 1964 Tokyo Games; 
handing control to SAN-ROC would encourage sport among non-whites, demonstrate 
disapproval of Brutus’ behaviour, and remove sport from government control.311 
Should the IOC avoid a clear decision on this issue, Robinson put the IOC on notice 
that he was 
…prepared to undertake the following action: I, together with others 
of similar opinion, will urge that individual participants in the Games 
carefully consider how they feel about such discrimination, 
particularly when competing against a white South African. If they 
find themselves of the same opinion as myself, let them seriously 
consider whether they can in good conscience compete unless the 
South African scratches himself. I am aware that a boycott of this sort 
would create serious disruptions of the Games, but I see no other 
way of asserting a basic principle of all sportsmen: that a winner is 
the man whose performance is best, not whose skin is lightest.312 
Robinson's intervention suggested a novel strategy: rather than intervene at the 
organizational level, he was prepared to use his notoriety and convince individual 
athletes to reflect on the morality of their actions. The advantage of this strategy 
would be that it could cause serious disruptions at the Olympic Games without 
opening itself up to the charge that its proponents were playing the much criticized 
game of institutional politics. 
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On the other hand, Professor Peter Kaiser of Princeton University was more 
outright in proposing an immediate change in the organizations representing South 
Africa in the IOC and Olympic Movement:  
It has come to my attention that the Olympic credentials of the South 
African [National Olympic Committee] may be discredited by the 
International Olympic Committee, in view of the racial policies 
followed by that organization. You therefore have my wholehearted 
support should you decide to accept the credentials of some such 
integrated Olympic sport organizations as the South African Non-
Racial Olympic Committee and the South African Sports 
Association.313 
An emphatic missive from one of their own, the President of the Ghana Olympic 
Committee, may have carried greater weight with Brundage and the IOC, in particular 
as the President refused to exonerate SANOC by pointing to South African race 
politics, up until then a position frequently invoked by SANOC and the IOC alike; it was 
very doubtful whether SANOC had been acting ‘without fear or favour’:  
[A] [f]undamental principle of the Olympic bible insists on no 
discrimination against any country or person on grounds of race, 
religion, or political affiliation. Apartheid South African [National] 
Olympic Committee is indefensibly guilty of a rude and insolent 
violation of this essential principle. That the conduct of South 
Africa’s Olympic Committee is influenced by political pressure from 
its government is a mere balderdash for Article 25 of the Olympic 
bible clearly demanding that National Olympic Committees must be 
completely independent and autonomous and in a position to resist 
all political religious or commercial pressure. Since the South African 
[National] Olympic Committee appears to be incapable of 
conforming to the rules and regulations, the provisions of paragraph 
2 Article 25 – National Olympic [Committees] that do not conform to 
the rules and regulations of the International Olympic Committee 
forfeit their recognition and their right to send participants to the 
Olympic Games – should apply without fear or favour in order to 
instill confidence in the IOC. The present generation of African 
sportsmen is no longer docile and passive over issues affecting their 
interest and defeating the lofty ideals of the Olympic Movement. The 
rest of Africa should not be sacrificed by the IOC on the altar of 
apartheid hoping that the Baden-Baden spirit will direct the IOC to 
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take a bold and uncompromising decision as demanded by 
paragraph of Article 25 of the Olympic family.314 
The IOC needed to thoroughly assess the information it received, and new 
perspectives were welcomed. Count Dönhoff, European Director of the South African 
Foundation,315 was eager to emphasize four points in light of SANOC’s proposed 
exclusion.316 First, it was hard to convince South African athletes that the exclusion 
was a just and equitable measure, especially considering what was happening in other 
African countries. Second, why would the IOC wish to interrupt the development of 
South African sport? A guarantee that any athlete with Olympic standards could 
compete was a remarkable development and significant when considering the 
country’s context. Third, Soviet or Afro-Asian National Olympic Committees voting in 
favour of expulsion seemed unconscionable considering their own practices at home. 
For example, Dönhoff cited countries such as Zanzibar, Rwanda, India, Pakistan, 
Cyprus, Kenya, Tanganyika, and the Congo, each of which dealt with racial tolerance 
through mass genocide.317 Finally, realising the political roots and implications of the 
problem in South Africa, Dönhoff noted: “… the sporting public in the Continental 
European countries will have but little comprehension for an Olympic analogy to the 
United Nations’ treatment of South Africa, e.g. for a defamation of a proud little group 
of first class athletes by countries, the intolerance of which against their racial 
minorities is causing more and more concern to the civilized world.”318 
The premises and explanation in Dönhoff’s letter were strong arguments for 
reconsidering South Africa’s admittance to the 1964 Tokyo Games. Brundage 
responded by pointing out that “we have not closed the door and that it is still possible 
for it [South Africa] to qualify for participation in the next Olympic Games in Tokyo…. 
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As you undoubtedly know, in the international climate which exists in this matter, it 
is very difficult for us to confine the argument to sport and avoid all political 
implications.”319 This may have been the first instance in which Brundage explicitly 
conceded that dealing with the South African issue would of course have ‘political 
implications.’ In the face of the stark realities of life in South Africa, the convenient 
separation of sport from politics, a strategy often employed by the IOC, could no 
longer be sustained. 
The final discussion item received by the IOC on the banning of South Africa came 
from England-based SASA representative John Rogers. Rogers sought clarification on 
the policies of SASA and SAN-ROC, and unsurprisingly appealed to Mayer to use his 
influence to expel SANOC at the upcoming Congress of the IOC in Tokyo: 
How can this body remain in ‘good standing’ within the IOC or with 
other Olympic members or International Federations? … The 
provisional team of eighty-two athletes which the SANOC issued for 
the Tokyo Games included 7 non-whites. Frank Braun, the SANOC 
President, said that the whites and non-whites would be strictly 
segregated if they competed in Tokyo! … This has been the only 
‘concession’ to non-white South African sportsmen since the IOC 
warning to the SANOC over two years ago…. Non-racial sport is 
perfectly legal in South Africa. The SANOC could not publicly declare 
their belief in integration of sport and its administration as directed 
by the IOC because they believe in segregation.320 
Rogers used the conclusion of his letter to sever his long association with the IOC. 
Neither Mayer nor Brundage responded to Rogers’ letter before the Tokyo Games; the 
plea to expel SANOC at the scheduled IOC Session in Japan fell on deaf ears. However, 
the rising tide of South African and world censure led Brundage and the IOC to 
ultimately withdraw the invitation to SANOC to participate in the Tokyo Games. 
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5. Discussion: The Developments from 1960-1964 
The ‘three dominant voices’—South African Olympic affiliates, domestic 
resistance, and international community—continued to resonate from 1960 to 1964. 
On the eve of the 1964 Tokyo Games, they provided sufficient evidence to allow a 
detailed insight into Avery Brundage’s, and the IOC’s, ultimate stance in regard to the 
South African situation. Each voice sustained a definitive narrative. 
These three genre voices were salient factors contributing to the IOC’s final 
decision regarding South Africa’s participation in the 1960 Rome Games, and were 
also effective in the IOC’s decision to withdraw South Africa’s invitation to the 1964 
Tokyo Games. First, Article 1 of the Olympic Charter was still at the core of the IOC’s 
debates regarding SANOC’s suspension, and Article 1 in conjunction with Article 24 
ultimately caused the downfall of SANOC. Article 24 stated: “[National Olympic 
Committees] shall enforce all the Rules and Regulations of the International Olympic 
Committee.”321 SANOC appeared to be trying to overcome the discrimination and 
racism in South African sport, but its actions were circumscribed by, among other 
things, South African government policies. Therefore, it could not truly enforce IOC 
rules and regulations.  
Second, the protocol and structure of the IOC was a deciding force as the 1964 
Tokyo Games approached. NOCs must embrace the Olympic Movement’s ideals and 
the IOC’s rules and regulations when making decisions regarding participation in the 
Olympic Games. Further, a number of resolutions involving SANOC were submitted to 
IOC members for voting decisions. Despite SANOC’s belief in properly enforcing IOC 
rules and regulations, and abiding by the imposed resolutions, there was a difference 
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between the IOC’s and SANOC’s interpretation of the IOC rules, regulations, and 
resolutions. However, the most important element of the IOC structure that led to the 
suspension of SANOC was the IOC bureaucracy itself. The power of the IOC to enforce 
change was, and remains, within the hands of its members. SANOC could not abide by 
the resolutions imposed by the IOC membership at the 1962 Moscow and 1963 
Baden-Baden General Sessions. Although leniency was afforded to SANOC by 
interpreting the conditions of the Baden-Baden resolution in SANOC’s favour—the 
request for proper trials to select the South African Olympic team and carrying out its 
duties under Article 24—there was one other condition that had to be unequivocally 
fulfilled. SANOC had to publicly dissociate itself from the South African government’s 
policy of non-competition and non-integration in sport between whites and non-
whites. According to the discussion from the 1964 Innsbruck IOC General Session, 
SANOC did not fulfill this obligation, which resulted in the withdrawal of the invitation 
to the 1964 Tokyo Games. SANOC did have more time to abide by the Baden-Baden 
resolution, since the final date to submit entries was not until mid-August, but it never 
publicly dissociated itself from the government’s racist policy. 
Third, it remained nonnegotiable for the IOC not to involve itself in political and 
domestic issues of any country. However, at this stage of the South African situation, 
the IOC’s policy to keep the Olympic Movement non-political was being heavily 
challenged. Brundage acknowledged that political implications affected the IOC’s 
decision-making process to suspend SANOC, but every effort was still made to base 
the decision on the IOC rules and regulations, and protocol and structure, even if 
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political and domestic issues influenced SANOC’s actions that led to its withdrawal 
from the Olympic Games. 
It is reasonable to conclude, then, that points one and two elaborated above 
dominated how the IOC administration handled the South African situation during the 
period leading up to the 1964 Tokyo Games. Politics were an element of the process, 
but they were not, yet, an overwhelming factor. Although the IOC only became 
tangentially involved with domestic matters due to the nature of the resolutions that 
were voted on by its members in the General Sessions, if a NOC was suspended or 
expelled partly based on the political element of Article 24, which, in this case, had to 
do with South Africa’s government, then that was clearly a reflection of a domestic 
issue. 
However, based on the correspondence from 1960 to 1964, Brundage’s and the 
IOC’s decisions were dominated by: (a) IOC rules and regulations, and (b) IOC protocol 
and structure. Focussing on these two points helps to understand why South Africa’s 
invitation was withdrawn for the 1964 Tokyo Games. Despite SANOC’s belief that it 
had abided by IOC rules, and that racial discrimination in South African sport was 
diminishing, it became obvious that the South African sporting situation stood 
awkwardly in confrontation with Articles 1 and 24 of the Olympic Charter. Further, 
SANOC did not fully meet the IOC’s standards, nor did it fulfill its promises made at 
the 1960 Rome IOC General Session, nor meet any subsequent obligations imposed 
by each new resolution approved by the IOC’s members. The reality was that SANOC’s 
effort to integrate non-white athletes and organizations to the IOC’s satisfaction was 
a failure. SANOC’s actions, combined with the South African government’s policies, 
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underscored the decision to withdraw South Africa’s invitation to the 1964 Tokyo 
Games. 
In light of SANOC’s suspension, what influence, if any, did domestic resistance and 
the international community have on the IOC? Domestic resistance and international 
community perspectives shared the same sentiment expressed before the 1960 Rome 
Games: SANOC was a disgrace. If its messages and stances did not change, did its 
opinions matter? It was concluded earlier that its opinions failed to affect the 
decisions that were made in regard to SANOC’s participation in the Olympic 
Movement leading up to the 1960 Rome Games. Even though the tone of messages 
scarcely changed leading up to the 1964 Tokyo Games, domestic resistance and 
international community perspectives played a greater role in SANOC’s fate. 
Ultimately, SANOC itself provided sufficient evidence to justify its withdrawal from 
the Tokyo Games. Yet, because of the growth in both size and strength of censor 
against apartheid in South Africa, it was impossible to completely ignore domestic and 
international resistance perspectives. 
Although the IOC’s decisions leading up to the 1964 Tokyo Games resulted in South 
Africa’s invitation to be withdrawn, was there any evidence of structural racism? The 
benefit of the doubt was given to SANOC when the IOC membership discussed if 
SANOC abided by the Baden-Baden resolution. SANOC’s efforts in light of the South 
African government’s laws and policies were noted, but SANOC had to dissociate itself 
from the government’s stance on non-competition and non-integration of whites and 
non-whites in South African sport. SANOC’s non-compliance of the resolution did 
prevent a more complicated problem for the IOC. If SANOC did dissociate itself from 
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the South African government, the IOC would have upheld the invitation to South 
Africa for the Tokyo Games, which would have meant that the IOC allowed SANOC to 
participate knowing fully that racial discrimination was occurring in South African 
sport. Once again, depending on the interpretation of the Olympic Charter, the IOC 
could have implicitly supported the racial discrimination in South African sport. Any 
arrangement to accommodate South Africa’s participation in the IOC, Olympic Games, 
and Olympic Movement that did not include the complete abolition of racial 
discrimination could be interpreted as accepting racism in South African sport. 
SANOC did save the IOC from any further difficult decisions regarding South Africa’s 
participation in the Tokyo Games. However, the details of the resolution served to 
create conditions of institutionalized racism. 
Nonetheless, the organized efforts of those who opposed SANOC and the South 
African government were substantial, at least enough, to help clarify and provide the 
facts of the South African sporting situation to Brundage and the IOC, which led to the 
withdrawal of SANOC’s invitation to the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games. In the next 
chapter, treatment of the 1964-1968 period is the aim to discover if the messages 
from the ‘three dominant voices’ changed. Did those voices gain strength? Did they 
diminish? Or did they remain the same? Further, what was the reaction of the IOC and 
its leader, Avery Brundage? 
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Chapter Four:  
Succumbing to International Political 
Pressure: Avery Brundage and the IOC, 
1964-1968 
1. Introduction 
The overall tensions and dynamic of the South African discussion increased 
immensely between the 1964 Tokyo Games and the 1968 Mexico City Games. 
Although the dialogue between the IOC, South African Olympic affiliates, domestic 
resistance forces, and voices of the international community continued, two new 
elements – the IOC South Africa Commission (SAC) and the opinions of individual IOC 
and National Olympic Committee (NOC) members – added content to an already 
complicated situation. The main messages on the status of non-whites in South 
African sport continued to resonate in global perspective. South African Olympic 
affiliates, represented primarily by the South African National Olympic Committee 
(SANOC), were fighting a “life or death” battle to remain in the Olympic Games and 
Olympic Movement. Efforts to integrate non-white athletes and organizations into the 
white-dominated sport system continued. Some concessions were achieved from the 
South African government to accommodate the IOC’s requests, but ultimately, the 
continued effort failed to garner the needed approbation from those who opposed 
apartheid. The domestic resistance entities present from 1955-1964, waned between 
1964 and 1968. However, domestic resistance forces acquired new sources of support 
that maintained a contradictory stance with SANOC’s ongoing progress. Those 
supporting the domestic resistance network, once again, vied to have SANOC 
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suspended until the South African situation was corrected. The majority of the 
international community persisted to advocate in support of the domestic resistance. 
Until SANOC abided by IOC rules and regulations, the international community 
petitioned for SANOC’s suspension or its expulsion altogether. 
As these genre voices became more complex, it became apparent how they shaped 
the responses and decisions affecting SANOC’s status and South Africa’s participation 
in the IOC, the Olympic Games, and the Olympic Movement in general. The years of 
correspondence, information, and action leading up to the 1968 Mexico City Games 
yielded the same result as the years approaching the 1964 Tokyo Games. By 1968, the 
IOC was forced to succumb to international and political pressure to save the future 
of the Olympic Games and Olympic Movement. The result was a decision to once again 
withdraw the invitation from South Africa to participate in the 1968 Mexico City 
Games. 
2. South African Olympic Affiliates 
It was almost a full year after the 1964 Tokyo Games before Avery Brundage was 
contacted by a South African Olympic affiliate. Frank Braun, SANOC President, 
extended an invitation to Brundage to visit South Africa in early 1966.1 Perhaps it was 
the suspension from the 1964 Tokyo Games that prompted silence between IOC 
officials and SANOC. However, South African Olympic affiliates remained eager to 
continue the process of gaining re-entry into the Olympic Games and Olympic 
Movement as soon as possible. The first attempt to reintegrate into the Olympic 
community occurred at a National Olympic Committee (NOC) Assembly in Rome. 
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Giulio Onesti, Italian NOC President, sent an invitation to SANOC. Reginald Honey, the 
South African IOC member, decided to participate, though Onesti was reluctant to 
have SANOC representatives attend. Due to the protest and threatened boycott from 
other participating countries in the Assembly, the Italian hosts tried to broker a 
compromise. He proposed to formally identify Honey solely as a member of the IOC, 
but not a representative of SANOC: “Mr. Honey did not want to assent to this proposal 
and made violent charges against the IOC and its President, regarding them 
responsible for interference in South Africa’s home affairs. He affirmed that he was 
not going to bestow anything to anybody and that he would be present at the meeting 
as representative of the SANOC.”2 
In the face of Honey’s uncompromising stance, Italian officials tried to convince 
him to withdraw from the meeting, but Honey insisted on attending. If he was to be 
denied attendance he insisted that the Italian National Olympic Committee (CONI) 
prepare and read a letter in front of the entire Assembly explaining why he could not 
participate. His request was denied, and it was stated to Honey that the reason for his 
withdrawal was due to South Africa’s exclusion from the 1964 Tokyo Games. In a fit 
of rancour, Honey held a press conference before the Rome session commenced. This 
was seen by Onesti as a rebellious act. Onesti apologized to Brundage for such a farce, 
belatedly realizing that the Italian delegation should not have invited SANOC to the 
NOC Assembly in the first place. According to Onesti, Honey was treated with the 
utmost hospitality, but Onesti hoped for further clarifications from Brundage and the 
IOC on how best to handle such a matter, hoping that “the NOC[s] receive clear and 
precise indications in this respect.”3 Honey, in turn, wrote to Brundage, offering his 
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own view of CONI’s conduct: “To me, the attitude of the C.O.N.I. is incomprehensible 
and I think it is my duty to disclose the facts to you at once. I certainly think that they 
should be disclosed to those attending the meeting of the IOC in Madrid…. I want you 
and every one to appreciate that there was no personal rudeness to me. But I quite 
candidly feel that my N.O.C. has been treated very shabbily, if not insulted.”4 
The NOC incident garnered enough attention to generate discussions at both the 
Executive Board and General Sessions in Madrid. In the Executive Board meeting, it 
was pointed out that SANOC was only suspended, not expelled from the IOC. 
Nonetheless, the “IOC had hoped that Mr. Honey could convince his Government to 
abolish apartheid in sports, but nothing had been done…. DECISION: to propose that 
the NOC take a stand against this discrimination. If it does not comply, to suspend the 
NOC until such time as their Rules will be in conformity with those of IOC.”5  
Discussions at the General Session served to keep the pressure on South African 
Olympic officials. African delegates noted it as “peculiar that South Africa’s athletes 
could not participate, but its officials continued to sit in on Olympic meetings.” No 
option remained other than to tell Honey to leave, in particular since “Brundage 
reported that the African NOCs present in Madrid during the NOC meeting had been 
agitated, but after his promise that the IOC would make a decision, [the African NOCs] 
had promised to refrain from protests.” The assembly reached the decision that if no 
progress were to be noted in South Africa by the 1966 Rome session, it would be 
suspended, “and its officials will no longer be able to participate in meetings.”6 
After the Madrid IOC meetings, Brundage raised with SANOC president Braun the 
invitation to visit South Africa that had been extended earlier. Perhaps it was time for 
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Brundage to see the situation for himself, and he was quite optimistic about the 
likelihood of such a visit.7 The official position of the IOC on the results of the Madrid 
meeting was communicated by IOC Secretary, Lydia Zanchi. Representatives of 
African NOCs had raised the question of the suspension of South Africa. The IOC would 
invite SANOC representatives to the Rome Executive Board meeting scheduled for late 
April, to appraise the IOC of SANOC’s activities and any improvements evident in 
South African sports, “in accordance with the Olympic Regulations and about the 
declaration voted during the Baden-Baden and Innsbruck sessions in 1963 and 
1964.”8  
SANOC’s presentation to the Executive Board in Rome pointed to a significant 
change in the political strategies of South Africa on the issue. SANOC committed itself 
“to follow IOC rules and … pick 50 percent of the [1968 Olympic team] with 50 percent 
non-whites, both athletes and officials. The Government has accepted this which is an 
enormous step forward because the Apartheid [sic] laws are so important that if you 
break them severe punishment is a risk. The IOC can publish this if it so wishes.”9 The 
Executive Board in response decided to delay any decisions on the removal of South 
Africa, arguing that “it serve[d] nobody to throw South Africa out of the Olympic 
Movement. The only losers will be the athletes. It decides to wait to hear the results 
of the work of its mixed committee.”10 SANOC succeeded in delaying any adverse 
decisions for yet another year; no decision would be taken until the 1967 Tehran 
meetings. In addition, Braun reported that the government agreed to form a 
committee to select a team, the first time that the government acceded to such a 
request. Brundage rationalized the decision by pointing out that apartheid law was an 
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official government matter; SANOC would risk sanctions if it violated those laws; 
overly precipitate action would be worse than a little more patience. “If we expel them 
now, we will never see them again. If we suspend them it might endanger the 
arrangement they are working on with the Government.”11 
The conciliatory atmosphere at 1966 Rome meetings notwithstanding, some in the 
Olympic community remained doubtful of SANOC’s assurance. For example, Reginald 
Alexander, Kenyan IOC member, affirmed that the Kenyan Olympic Committee 
supported the barring of SANOC until it abided by the Olympic Charter, but he advised 
the IOC to maintain contact with SANOC and exert all possible pressure to effect 
compliance.12 
Nevertheless, hope for change in South African sport was high. Brundage wrote 
Honey to discuss the tragic assassination of South African Prime Minster, Hendrik 
Verwoerd, and its implications for South African sport’s progress. Foremost on his 
mind was the IOC fact-finding Commission under consideration to study the 
conditions of sport in South Africa.13 Honey noted his approval of the Commission, 
recommending Ade Ademola (Nigeria), Reginald Alexander (Kenya) and Johann 
Westerhoff (Netherlands);14 Brundage appointed all three to join the South Africa 
Commission (SAC).15 
Appointed to SAC, Westerhoff, who was then serving as IOC Secretary General, 
wrote to Braun requesting detailed organization information on the structure, 
organization and membership of South African Olympic sports; appointment 
procedure for NOC and NSF officials; the state of sport facilities; and explanations of 
government policies affecting sports. Westerhoff concluded with a political 
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admonition: “In connection herewith we should like to have with the Memorandum, 
from your side, recommendations to enable the South African [National] Olympic 
Committee to fulfill the Olympic Code.”16 The IOC Executive Board likewise wished 
the Commission to focus on the racializing contexts of South African sports: “What the 
IOC has to find out is whether or not all athletes regardless of colour are able to 
compete in the Games or whether the NOC, regardless of colour, picks the best 
athletes, and by doing so, comply with the rules.”17 
Westerhoff acknowledged SANOC’s information package but pointed out that by 
then the Commission had run out of time for an adequate tour of inspection, and 
would have to delay the trip until after the IOC meetings in Tehran.18 Braun 
complained to Brundage that SANOC had not been advised of the potential relevance 
of the Tehran meetings after Honey was dismissed from the 1965 NOC Assembly 
meetings in Rome: “Mr. Onesti did not consider it necessary to advise us of the Tehran 
Meetings…. Apart from the fact that as you already know the position of sport in our 
country has been considerably changed, I consider it essential that we should be 
allowed to attend his unofficial Meetings to hear what is going on behind the scenes 
in certain N.O.C. circles.”19 
During the Executive Board meeting in Tehran, an update was provided on SAC’s 
status. If further delays were encountered concerning the appointed members of SAC, 
new members would have to be selected.20 The discussions at the Tehran General 
Session indicated that a firmer direction was required. Westerhoff regretted the 
unanticipated delays, and made reference to the illegitimate use of the word mark, 
‘Olympic’ by an organization called SAN-ROC, which would therefore not be on the list 
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of consulting organizations during the tour. Brundage himself emphasized again the 
IOC’s common perspective at the time – it was not the Commission’s remit to pass 
judgement on South African policies; it was to concern itself solely with issues directly 
related to sports: “… there is a difference between the government Policy of Apartheid 
and Racial Discrimination [sic] in sport. We, as IOC, are concerned with sport only and 
the Olympic Movement.”21 SANOC President Frank Braun framed his report around a 
compatible message, arguing that the South African government had made several 
concessions in its policy; this appeared sufficient to decision-makers at the meeting. 
Despite forceful opposition by delegates from Nigeria, Mali, Congo Brazzaville and 
Uganda, supported by Russia, Romania, Cuba, and the United Arab Republic,22 it was 
thus decided to dispatch the Commission no later than the end of August 1967, to 
submit a report in time for consideration by IOC at the Grenoble 1968 meeting. 23 
The wording of SANOC’s detailed report served to obfuscate the underlying South 
African position; apartheid in sports would continue to be practiced at home, but – for 
white athletes at least – not abroad, since:  
… it was not the intention to export the policy of separate 
development and that it was therefore perfectly in order for whites 
to compete against non-whites overseas. As each population group 
would make its own nominations, trials, as such, before the 
departure of the team were not necessary. In those instances where 
a doubt could exist and where only one competitor can be entered, 
but reserves are allowed, such as in boxing, the elimination or final 
selection could be arranged at the venue of the competition.24 
The implicit assumption that in that case, non-white athletes might also be allowed 
to attend trials outside of South Africa, was rejected as a misunderstanding and 
countered with the release of a clarifying press release.25 This did nothing to assuage 
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the concerns of some delegates, and after SANOC delegates had made their case on 
May 6, “[a]lmost immediately … the Russian and United Arab Republic IOC Members 
made a vehement attack on ‘the South Africa Race Policy’ and demanded that under 
the circumstances the South Africa National Olympic Committee should be expelled 
from the Olympic Family of Nations…”26  
The IOC arrived at a formal decision on the subsequent day. Noting the progress 
that had occurred in South Africa, concerning the issue of racial segregation in sports, 
the IOC resolved to dispatch the Commission no later than late August 1967, “for 
consideration by the International Olympic Committee at Grenoble in February, 
1968…. this resolution prevents South Africa’s participation in the 1967 Pre-Olympic 
Meeting in Mexico and the Winter Games in Grenoble.”27 A related resolution enjoined 
SAN-ROC to desist making use of the term ‘Olympic’ in its name, since this served to 
create the erroneous impression that SAN-ROC was a legitimate representative of 
South African Olympic sports. 28 
Two months after the Tehran meetings, Westerhoff reviewed with Braun some 
necessary conditions for SAC’s visit. The Commission insisted on guarantees of 
unrestricted travel and access, “to contact anybody wanted and to stay together 
during that visit, and that the necessary entry permits be obtained.”29 Of particular 
concern was the position of Commission member and IOC representative for Nigeria 
Sir Adetokunbo Ademola: 
… any unforeseen happening, whatever it may be, could immediately 
cause great embarrassment, if not more, between your country and 
Nigeria, or between Africans black and white, all precautions should 
be taken to avoid such a situation. It is therefore necessary that we 
should receive special guarantees from you and your government as 
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to the personal safety of Sir Ade Ademola and that of the commission 
as a whole….30 
The concerns seem to have been unfounded, the Commission’s travels proceeded 
without impediment, as is indicated by the letter of thanks sent to Braun by SAC 
Chairman Lord Killanin subsequent to the end of the trip.31 (The Commission’s 
substantive work will be considered in a subsequent section of this chapter.)  
The IOC Grenoble meetings, where the SAC report was to be presented, were 
projected to be poorly attended; it was deemed necessary to organize a postal vote to 
decide SANOC’s fate.32 Killanin informed Honey of the postal vote,33 and SANOC 
president Braun expressed the concern that it would be impossible for members not 
present at the meeting, to do the issue full justice, since “all IOC Members voting 
should have the benefit of the discussions that will be taking place at the meeting.”34  
Since some members would not be able to attend, “in the interests of justice and in 
fairness to all concerned my Executive Board feels that after the discussions which 
will take place on 3rd February, 1968, a verbatim report, including all observations 
made by the South Africa delegation should be furnished to Members who will not be 
present in Grenoble, for consideration by them before exercising their vote.”35 
Brundage, for his part, suggested to Braun the best strategy for SANOC to adopt in 
preparation for the Grenoble Session, exhibiting a certain degree of sympathy for 
SANOC’s position: 
If I were you I would have a statement ready for circulation, 
containing all the reasons for recognition. It should cite all the 
progress you have made, the fact that the vast majority if not all of 
the athletes, both white and black, want to participate, as against the 
handful of expatriates who would not be eligible in any event, etc. 
etc…. If South Africa cannot participate, it is the athletes, who have 
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nothing to do with the Government policy, that are penalized, not the 
Government. Point out that apartheid is a political issue like 
Communism and Nazism, and that we are concerned only with sport 
and not with politics. As I understand it, the Government has agreed 
to respect the policies of other countries and only asks that other 
countries respect its policies within its borders. A mixed team 
selected by a mixed committee, wearing the same uniform and 
traveling together will be produced. This you should point out, in the 
circumstances, will be a great victory for sport. The success of such 
a team will no doubt help you establish Olympic conditions within 
the country…. You have a copy I am sure, of the resolution offered by 
the African NOCs at Tehran. It would be well to answer this point by 
point. Emphasize the fact that sport should not be used as a tool or 
as a weapon for political purposes.36 
In his speech at the Grenoble meeting, Braun provided SANOC’s response to the 
SAC report. He argued that the report highlighted the excitement of all South Africans 
for the 1968 Mexico City Games. The policy presented at Tehran, he stated, provided 
a sound base for co-operation between the races, underscored the illegitimacy of SAN-
ROC, and emphasized SANOC’s progress since 1963.37 His interpretation of the SAC 
report concluded that “South Africa ha[d] every justification of claiming that it will in 
future be able to take part in the Olympic Games with a team comprising the best 
athletes on a guaranteed basis of equal opportunity and non-discrimination.” 38 
Exclusion of South Africa by the IOC would do nothing to change the political situation 
in the country, and only inflict harm on “the sportsmen, both Whites and more so the 
Non-Whites.” 39 It had to be understood that sports could only be organized under the 
social and political conditions prevailing in a given country, to change which was 
beyond the IOC’s authority. “By re-extending the hand of friendship in sports to the 
South African [National] Olympic Committee, the IOC can become the instrument 
which will lift sport out of politics. South Africa was asked to comply with certain 
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requirements,” Braun concluded. “This has been done and now we are ready to accept 
your invitation to compete in the 1968 Olympic Games.”40 
A lengthy discussion ensued, and the postal vote was completed by mid-February. 
The result by absolute majority was to re-admit a mixed South African team to the 
1968 Games in Mexico City.41 In a telegram to Brundage, Braun described the non-
white reaction in South Africa as “very favourable. Arrangement for a joint non-white 
selection committee is already in hand.… South Africa will not let you down.”42 A week 
later, towards the end of February 1968, Westerhoff restated to Braun the proposition 
made by SANOC at Tehran, a proposition that had to be effected in order to gain full 
recognition by the IOC. The conditions included a multi-racial team; the team must 
travel together; they must wear the same uniform and march under one flag; white 
and non-whites would be allowed to compete against each other at international 
meetings; and white and non-white officials involved in selecting the team. 
Westerhoff reiterated that the situation was still far from being resolved satisfactorily 
by attaching a copy of the complete Grenoble resolution, crafted by Australian IOC 
member Hugh Weir, focusing on the central demand that “a multi-racial team will be 
selected on merit.”43 As long as the conditions laid down in the Tehran proposition 
were met, SANOC would be officially sanctioned to participate in the 1968 Mexico City 
Games.44 At this juncture, Braun sent a highly complimentary and optimistic letter to 
Brundage, offering his,  
… own humble tribute to your good self for the magnificent way in 
which you have handled the whole question. No one could possibly 
accuse you of taking sides in the matter and I have seldom in my 
experience, found a Chairman who has dealt so fairly with all parties 
concerned.… it has been South Africa’s paramount wish over the last 
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eight years to be able to participate with everybody belonging to the 
Olympic family and although we ourselves have suffered exclusion 
from the Tokyo Games, we feel that this would be the opportunity 
for all countries to celebrate the admission of a full multi-racial South 
African Team to the world’s premier sporting event.45 
Neither the celebratory mood nor SANOC’s optimism were to last. “The 
tremendous uproar, particularly in the press,” 46 caused by the Grenoble decision on 
South Africa’s mixed team, indicated that the problem was as contentious as ever.  
Westerhoff was concerned that the vociferous public and media reaction might induce 
some members to propound problematic positions in order to assuage the public 
mood: “We have done our utmost here to give the press exact information and to ask 
them to stop writing about the issue and by so doing to help us avoid placing the 
different parties in such a situation that they cannot retract certain decisions.”47 Some 
IOC members were even considering calling an extraordinary IOC Executive Board 
meeting. Twenty-four requests for such a meeting had to be submitted, but the 
meeting then would require attendance by thirty-five members to achieve quorum; 
Westerhoff considered this unlikely – not a fortuitous display of IOC internal 
coherence.48 
In an effort to control the situation, Brundage advised Westerhoff to notify the 
Mexican Organizing Committee to forward an invitation to SANOC.49 Further, 
Brundage advised Braun to “… see that caution is used in public statements from 
South Africa and keep me advised of developments, particularly the spontaneous 
response of the non-whites in your country.”50 Brundage also encouraged Honey to 
prepare a strong statement with evidence and referencing laws to prevent the 
withdrawal of the invitation to South Africa from the Mexico City Games.51 
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Brundage also was aware that no official withdrawals from the Mexico City Games 
had yet been received, and, although he had acknowledged a dozen requests for a 
special meeting, he was doubtful that any of NOCs had changed their stances, “and I 
doubt if many will after spending six years studying, debating and investigating the 
problem.”52 Nonetheless, he felt compelled to issue a formal, lengthy statement to all 
IOC and NOC members and to all ISFs asserting that the Grenoble decision did not 
amount to an endorsement of South African policies: it was focussed solely on sports-
related issues, and the South African team would be multi-racial and selected by a 
multi-racial committee. The statement was noteworthy for the clarity with which it 
laid out the IOC’s fundamental principles, if under the circumstances somewhat 
theoretical insistence, of the separation of sports from politics: “For the first time the 
16,000,000 non-whites of South Africa will have an opportunity to participate in the 
Olympic Games on a completely equal basis according to Olympic regulations. This 
invitation is for the 1968 Games only and the situation will be reviewed before the 
1972 Games.”53 Rumors of boycotts of the Games which had begun to circulate, he 
averred, would “astonish the 16,000,000 non-whites of South Africa who have no 
responsibility for South African political policies and who are rejoicing at their first 
opportunity to participate in world sport on the same basis as anyone else.”54 The 
history of Olympic crises, Brundage argued, showed that in every case, the crisis was 
caused by the intrusion of politics into the area of sports. He cited as examples the 
1936 Games, the uproar caused by the entry of teams from the Communist block into 
the 1952 Games, and the crisis of the Russian invasion of Hungary in 1956. Political 
responses in all of these cases inevitably occurred at the expense of sports, confirming 
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the necessity for the IOC’s principally non-political stance. In the case of the 1956 
Games, for example, “[c]ountry after country announced its withdrawal from the 
Games refusing to participate against the aggressors.… Hungarians and Russians were 
both there and the Games were a great success.” Therefore, he argued:  
It has been amply proven that, if there is one place an athlete, no 
matter what race, colour, religion or political affiliation, can display 
his talents and his abilities before the world, on a completely equal 
basis, it is the Olympic Games. Those who would abstain, forget the 
fundamental principle of no discrimination of the Olympic 
Movement and its objective to bring the young people of the world 
(who are not responsible for political policies) together in friendly 
competition. They would not only deprive their own athletes of this 
once-in-a-lifetime opportunity…55 
In short, he concluded, the IOC stood “firmly against discrimination of any kind in 
sport; this is the fundamental basis of the Olympic Movement. Equally important is 
the necessity of preventing the Olympic Movement from being used as a tool or 
weapon for other causes…. Olympic rules alas, apply only to the Olympic Games, they 
have no further competence. The IOC cannot very well reform the world…”56  
Brundage reinforced this message in a another lengthy, internal communication 
sent to Executive Board members in preparation for the special meeting of the 
Executive Board to discuss the South African situation. He reiterated the IOC’s stance 
in principle not to accept the intrusion of politics, since it was: 
… individuals and teams that must conform to Olympic regulations.… 
Olympic rules pertain only to the Olympic Movement, obviously they 
have no competence in other areas. Are we going to try to extend 
them to entire countries and to the whole world? … These 
momentous questions which concern the integrity of the IOC must 
be given the most serious study before they are answered – the 
future of the Olympic Movement is at stake.57  
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While Brundage was trying to firmly retain control against further damage within 
the IOC and in the public view, Killanin communicated with Braun on developments 
in South Africa. The IOC’s decision to re-admit South Africa was under attack on 
multiple grounds, including ostensible misrepresentation in the SAC report of non-
white reactions in South Africa, legal pressure from Mexico City, and the question of 
Olympic trials in South Africa.58 Neither was SANOC to be assuaged which took 
“strong exception to this vexatious and unjustified effort to rescind the resolution 
which was recently passed, and which now entitles South Africa to participate in the 
Mexico Olympic Games. … we accepted without any qualification this decision and the 
conditions therein contained, and this we feel, with respect, finally disposes of the 
South African issue until at least 1970.”59 Although certain NOCs might want to reopen 
this issue, this would only serve to create “a tragedy not only for South Africa’s Non-
White Sportsmen, but also for the whole world of Olympic Sport.”60 
Attempts to contain or resolve the uproar stemming from the re-admittance of 
South Africa to the 1968 Games began at the April 1968 Lausanne Executive Board 
meeting. Brundage fended off complaints about the procedural handling of the 
Grenoble meetings,61 deploring “… the deep division within the IOC which threatened 
to wreck the Olympic Movement and which was due to the actions of some of its own 
members.”62 In view of these tensions, there were only two possible solutions: to 
leave things as they were or not to admit South Africa, but the crisis had reached such 
a state that “[b]oth solutions would leave a bitter division in the IOC and in the 
world.”63 The course of action that promised the least amount of damage to either the 
IOC, SANOC, the NOCs, or the Mexico City Organizing Committee “would be to have 
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South Africa withdraw voluntarily, since then the IOC would be reasonably happy, the 
Mexican OCO appreciative, and SANOC relieved in not being obliged to send a team 
under present circumstances.  SANOC would be asked to withdraw for several good 
reasons as it was in the interest of the IOC and the Olympic Movement and that a 
withdrawal would solve the desperate situation in which IOC found itself.”64 
After an extended discussion of several options to resolve the issue, and “[i]n view 
of all the information on the international climate received by the Executive Board at 
this Meeting,” 65 Brundage communicated in an urgent cablegram to IOC members, the 
Board had expressed the unanimous opinion “that it would be most unwise for a 
South African team to participate in the Games of the XIX Olympiad – therefore, the 
Executive Board strongly recommends that [the IOC members] endorse this 
unanimous proposal to withdraw the invitation to these Games. … Please [respond] 
immediately by cable.”66 
The proposal was supported by a majority vote of IOC members, thus effecting the 
withdrawal of the invitation to SANOC to participate in the 1968 Mexico City Games. 
In a subsequently released public statement, Brundage could not hide his bitterness: 
“Ignoring completely the unsportsmanlike threats, boycotts and legal technicalities, 
which have no place in Olympic circles, but recognizing the explosive conditions that 
prevail in much of the world, and in view of the ugly violence that has already 
occurred, I decided to recommend the action.… It is deplorable, and sad commentary 
on the state of the world today, that the Olympic Games, one of the most priceless and 
powerful instruments of our present civilization, should be endangered by 
controversies of this kind.”67 The decision may have amounted to a setback for the 
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IOC, but Brundage refused to accept it as a total failure: “No yielding of Olympic 
principles. A victory of a kind, not a defeat,”68 he added in brackets at the bottom of 
the release, but even three months later, Brundage’s exasperation still had not 
dissipated entirely: 
The world, alas, is full of injustice, aggression, violence and warfare, 
against which all civilized persons rebel, but this is no reason to 
destroy the nucleus of international cooperation and good will we 
have in the Olympic Movement…. If participation in sport is to be 
stopped every time the politicians violate the laws of humanity, 
there will never be any international contests. Is it not better to 
maintain and support the Olympic Games, one of the most priceless 
and powerful instruments of our present civilization and try to 
expand the fair play and sportsmanship of the athletic field into 
other areas?69 
The personal relationship between Brundage and South African IOC member 
Reginald Honey survived the controversy intact. Honey thanked Brundage for his 
help, noting that the situation would in time “work itself out.”70 Brundage assured 
Honey that the Executive Board members held no grudges, reminding him: “Don’t 
forget that the South African [National] Olympic Committee has some friends and 
supporters who will protect your interests.”71 
2.1 Ira Emery 
Before discussing in detail the role of the IOC South Africa Commission and its visit 
to South Africa, both contributing factors to the controversy in 1968, the 
correspondence between Ira Emery and Avery Brundage on these developments 
merits attention. As before, Emery maintained a steady exchange of views with 
Brundage and other relevant players between 1964 and 1968, contributing to our 
246 
 
 
understanding of the developments leading to the 1968 crisis and the retraction of 
South Africa’s invitation to the Mexico City Games. 
Right after the 1964 Tokyo Games, Emery raised the issue of mixed teams as a 
possible means to resolve the impasse, since this could be an indication of change in 
the right direction: “I will let you know the reactions from the S.A. Government 
regarding the demand for mixed teams inside and outside this country. Personally, I 
feel there will be a change of front.”72 Brundage also shared Emery’s optimism about 
South African sport: “I hope it will be possible to untangle the sport and political 
questions soon so that we can have South Africa back in the fold before 1968.”73 By 
early November, however, Emery had become concerned about possible 
complications regarding the South African Olympic team, since the signals coming 
from the South African government remained anything but positive. The Prime 
Minister remained unmoved in his opposition to mixed teams, and it was thus unlikely 
that Minister of the Interior J. de Klerk could be prevailed upon to issue visas for a 
mixed team to travel and participate in the Olympics, unless a diversionary measure 
could be agreed upon: “There may be some way out and they will grant visas provided 
the team does not travel together, or compete against each other or be housed 
together. I do not know whether you will consider this a feasible proposition but at 
least if you do get the information direct from the Government, your Executive will 
know exactly where they stand.”74 In fact, the political situation appeared to be 
deteriorating since the stipulations of the Group Areas Act had just been extended to 
ban non-whites “from watching any sport below provincial level at the Wanderers 
Stadium in Johannesburg…. In all cases now, permits must be issued by the 
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Government department concerned to permit non-whites to attend any sports event 
in which Whites participate.”75 The sport experiences of non-whites in South Africa 
were deteriorating, but alternative possibilities to involve non-whites in international 
sport still offered themselves on occasion. Emery suggested the possibility to 
establish an Olympic Committee in one of the South African territories that would 
represent non-white sportsmen throughout Africa.76 But Brundage was concerned 
what the acceptability of such an option would be with regard to the Olympic 
principles of unifying team representation: “If South African policy is ‘When we are 
guests of another country we behave according to their traditions – the fact that we 
accept their invitations means we will adapt ourselves to their customs’, can we 
understand from this that South Africa will accept Olympic customs?”77 With this in 
mind, SANOC President Frank Braun’s statement about the possibility of sending two 
teams to the Olympic Games that Emery reported to Brundage,78 anticipated a 
negative response from Brundage, since the IOC would not permit two teams from 
one governed state.  
And SANOC had other challenges to address. A resolution put forth by Black African 
states to suspend South Africa had to be put on the agenda of the subsequent SANOC 
meeting, and what the organizations saw as Reginald Honey’s shabby treatment by 
the Italian delegation at the previous NOC meeting had not been forgotten.79 
Brundage’s description of the incident for Emery indicates the tensions of that 
meeting:  
Because of a personal appeal from me, the African delegates did not 
walk out of the meeting we had in Madrid. They had threatened to 
do so at the meeting held in Rome and this resulted in Mr. Honey’s 
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exclusion. I informed them that we operated in a more civilized 
fashion and suggested that they present a resolution, which would 
be entertained. This postponed the crisis at least until our meeting 
in Rome next April.80 
The issue of South Africa’s presence at Olympic events clearly had to be managed 
with delicacy. Emery attempted to dissuade SANOC from sending delegates to the 
Rome meeting to advance South Africa’s case. He believed that SANOC needed to 
openly declare itself against apartheid with a letter to the IOC before it could credibly 
advance any other arguments for reinstatement: “One suggestion which might be 
given consideration is that until such time as South Africa could abide by the ruling of 
the IOC (and which would quite conceivably be altered) it remains a member of the 
IOC without attending meetings, and with-holding an entry for the 1968 Olympic 
Games in Mexico.”81 
Emery argued that the question of South African sport first had to be resolved as 
an internal matter. SANOC should save the expense of sending delegates to discuss 
these matters with the IOC when a letter would suffice and create less antagonism. It 
did not help that the South African government did not remain silent about its 
discriminatory sport policies, especially those involving mixed sport.82 This stance 
was obviously in contradiction to the conditions laid down by the IOC, which would 
allow South Africa to compete in the Olympic Games provided it accepted mixed sport. 
Emery argued to hold the issue in abeyance: “…until such time as South Africa can 
obey the conditions which have been imposed by the IOC as far as mixed sport is 
concerned, South Africa should state it will not take part in the Mexico City Games and 
any future Olympic Games until they can follow the conditions imposed. This, I think 
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would save a lot of embarrassment at your meeting and should at least permit South 
Africa to remain a member of the IOC.”83 Unable to identify other options, Brundage 
agreed. The IOC had to maintain its principle of non-discrimination, but SANOC could 
not defy its government.84 
The impending, much anticipated arrival of the fact-finding South Africa 
Commission did little to lessen Emery’s skepticism. The Commission “… would be 
shown what is being done for the non-whites but you will not see any competing 
against whites; on some occasions non-whites are not permitted to watch sporting 
fixtures held by whites.”85 In view of the government’s rigid and unyielding attitude, 
the resolution would lead to an organizational convolution that the IOC would surely 
find unacceptable: “The Minister will not agree to a mixed committee and a non-white 
committee will discuss matters concerning the non-whites; a white committee will 
discuss matters concerning the whites, but both will be under the chairmanship of Mr. 
Braun, but not at the same time.”86 In rejecting such an option, Brundage reiterated 
that the separation of sports and politics would not allow the IOC to accept a 
resolution that had so clearly been adjusted to political circumstances: “… 
government policy is a political matter and … it is the athletes of all colors that are 
suffering.”87  
A new wrinkle was added to this debate by the South African government decision 
to form a Department of Sport. To anticipate the degree of political interference this 
could cause for South African Olympic sports, Emery asked Brundage about 
precedents of government interference with NOC matters in recent IOC history.88 The 
Argentine Olympic Committee had been suspended for just such an incident, 
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Brundage replied: “When the politicians have taken control our only recourse has 
been to withdraw recognition from the Committee until it regained its independence 
and freedom.”89 To forestall such a development repeating itself in South Africa, 
Brundage decided to initiate contact with the South African government and discuss 
the idea of sending a fact-finding mission to the country.90 Braun asked that the SAC 
visit be postponed to give the government time to adjust, where possible, its 
approach.91 “You will note,” Emery followed up, “that the Prime Minister said he 
‘would give consideration to creating facilities for non-Whites to take part in the 
Olympic Games, but only within the framework of the principle of separation’.”92 To 
make its case, SANOC firmly planned to send delegates to the Tehran meeting, a 
strategy that Emery considered to be distinctly unhelpful and counter-productive. 
Brundage argued that not all was lost as yet: “Our sole interest is that the National 
Olympic Committee is permitted to function according to Olympic rules, which 
provide that the Games are open to all and no discrimination of any kind is allowed…. 
It is not likely that a settlement will be reached before our Committee of Investigation 
visits South Africa, although if President Braun comes to Tehran we will probably hear 
his report.”93 In any case, Brundage noted, in view of misleading media reports 
coming out of South Africa which stated that the Prime Minister was trying to 
accommodate non-white sport in South Africa, no decision would be made until after 
the Commission had submitted its report.94 
By now, Brundage had accepted the fact that “… the Government has gone as far as 
it can go in trying to satisfy the Olympic authorities…. A great deal will depend on the 
attitude of the black sport organizations which I understand are not unfavorable to 
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the procedure which the South African [National] Olympic Committee offers to 
follow.”95 The Commission, Emery thought, had left a favourable impression in South 
Africa,96 but Brundage was concerned that some NOCs had reached a decision before 
the Commission submitted its report: “There will undoubtedly be a bitter debate at 
our session in Grenoble since, unfortunately, some have made up their mind without 
waiting for the report.”97  
In the aftermath of the IOC’s reversal its erstwhile decision to reinstate SANOC, 
Emery felt apologetic about the attacks on Brundage coming from certain members 
of SANOC: 
I am very sorry that there has been such an attack made on you by 
Braun … but I can assure you that as far as I am concerned I know 
how genuine you were when you were in South Africa and discussed 
with me the possibilities of the outcome of the voting at the IOC. I am 
certain that you wanted us in and I feel equally certain that your fear 
of unpleasantness to the South African Team if it had to go to Mexico 
must have influenced you a lot in your thinking. Some of the 
statements made by Mr. Braun are quite hysterical, particularly the 
one where he stated that thousands of Non-Whites are in training for 
athletics in this country.98 
Brundage remained unfazed by the criticism directed at him: “I can assure you that 
any other action taken at the meeting would have been far worse from the South 
African point of view….[SANOC’s]  invitation was withdrawn because of world 
conditions.”99 In any case, Brundage noted, he acted out of a concern for the safety of 
the South African team at the Mexico Olympics: “My name would never have been 
attached to the cablegram sent to the members of the IOC asking them to withdraw 
the invitation to SANOC had I not been completely convinced that it would both be 
unwise and unsafe for the South Africa team to appear in Mexico.”100 
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3. The IOC South Africa Commission 
The IOC’s South Africa Commission (SAC) was first discussed by the IOC at the 1966 
Rome General Session.101 The official delegation was formally announced by 
Brundage during the Executive Board meetings in Mexico City that same year.102 The 
announcement was met with some concern about the utility of such a mission. Kenyan 
IOC member Reginald Alexander asked: “Is there any evidence of the Olympic 
Sportsmen in South Africa merely ‘taking cover’ behind ‘Government policy’ without 
any effort on their part to achieve compliance with our Olympic principles and rules; 
we cannot expect them to break the law but there is much they can and must do, 
towards integration in Sports Administration and Competition.”103 
In the early stages of the selection process, it was not certain whether Brundage 
himself would be a member of the Commission to reinforce its clout. Alexander wrote 
to Johan Westerhoff: “As I understand it, the proposal is that Sir Ade Ademola and 
myself, accompanied by you as [IOC] Secretary General, should visit South Africa and 
that if, during such a visit, we consider progress is possible then Mr. Brundage would 
join us in South Africa for final deliberations.”104 Brundage postponed talking to 
Alexander about the proposed visit to South Africa until the Executive Board meeting 
in Mexico City.105 By then, Westerhoff sounded more positive on developments in 
South Africa: “On the question of the disapproval of multi-racial universities and 
Political Parties the South African Government appears to be having second thoughts. 
This might indicate that they are prepared to be more Liberal in sport. But I just do 
not really know, and no one will, until they are faced with a real test.”106 
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Once Alexander was officially appointed to lead the SAC, his first order of business 
was to make arrangements for safe and unimpeded travel throughout South Africa. 
Concerns, as was mentioned previously, centred on the person of Sir Ade Ademola, a 
black SAC member, and they were heightened by statements coming from SANOC Vice 
President Arthur Foster, who had expressed his approval of the existing status quo. 
All commission members were to be accommodated appropriately, Alexander 
insisted – identical living quarters, and identical freedoms to move and act as needed 
to complete the mission.107  
Ademola initially declined to join the Commission.108 Foster’s remarks clearly had 
a damaging effect,109 and Alexander requested an official retraction by SANOC 
President Braun on behalf of his organization “before the Sub-Committee commences 
its work.”110 Seeking to calm the situation, Braun complied. He guaranteed freedom of 
movement as long as the Commission did not seek talks with the banned Communists. 
In addition, Braun made it known through the newspaper that Foster’s views did not 
represent SANOC’s official position. “I hope that by that time we arrive there,” 
Alexander noted, “they will have disposed of [Foster].”111 SANOC did indeed 
disassociate itself from Foster. 112 
By mid-May Brundage himself sought to convince Ademola to join the Commission, 
concerned about the credibility of a Commission without a non-white member: “If you 
are not on the commission … there may be criticism of the fact that the black African 
countries are not represented.”113 Although European himself, Lord Killanin was for 
a time considered to be a viable alternate, but he himself was skeptical: “Reading in 
the papers I feel that Ademola will be out of the running with his own internal 
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problems. I might say I am not anxious to go on the commission to South Africa,”114 
but a few days later, Ademola reluctantly agreed to serve on the SAC: “… I must confess 
I share the views of my Government that considering my position as the Chief Justice 
of Nigeria should anything untoward happen as a result of the behaviour of the South 
African Government (or any South African) to me when I am in that country, it will 
cause a great embarrassment to Nigeria. I should hate to be the centre of any dispute 
which is likely to spark off any bitterness in race relationship between Africans 
(blacks) and the whites. … Somehow, I have not the necessary confidence in the South 
African Government.”115 Ademola would join the Commission, contingent on SANOC 
providing assurances for proper security. 
With Alexander busy attempting to retain Ademola’s services, it fell to Westerhoff 
to engage with SAN-ROC. He met its co-founder Chris de Broglio who provided a list 
of officials the Commission should meet on its tour, but not all seemed well in South 
Africa. “They [SAN-ROC] seem to be very afraid that this list may get into the hands of 
people other than you and me, so I ask you to deal very carefully with it.”116 Alexander 
had encountered a similar attitude on a trip to South Africa during the preceding year: 
“I, too, had a list of addresses of officials of ‘non-racial’ organizations but I found them 
reluctant to make contact. Therefore, my advice is that you write now from Lausanne 
to the names with which you have been supplied by Brutus and de Broglio; this will, I 
consider perhaps give them the confidence and assurance of having received a letter 
direct from the IOC Headquarters and will also give them time to think.”117 It would 
be advantageous to suggest to those contacts to “[t]ry and keep themselves informed 
about the movements of the commission so that we can contact them quickly when 
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we are in South Africa.”118 Much as Alexander encouraged input from SAN-ROC, he 
was still put off by the organization’s use of the word mark ‘Olympic,’ and he did not 
consider SAN-ROC’s membership claim of 70,000 credible: “The Africans are the 
majority of the population (they number about 10 million) and it is important that we 
establish who is talking for them. Therefore, please ask de Broglio for an estimated 
breakdown of the 70,000 into races or Communities.”119 
But Secretary General Westerhoff’s efforts as a member of the Commission did not 
last long. Dutch IOC member Herman van Karnebeek recommended that Westerhoff 
be excluded from the three-man Commission. He was seen as too close to Brundage, 
and he was not a full-fledged IOC member. Lastly, in view of Westerhoff’s Dutch origin, 
and the South African colonial power and government consisting of Afrikaaners 
(Dutch descendants), it would be preferable to protect Westerhoff from potential 
political defamation.120 Karnebeek stressed that the fact-finding commission was too 
important for such distractions. Brundage took the suggestions seriously, and 
indicated to Killanin to be ready to join the Commission instead, contingent on 
Ademola also accepting the call.121 Brundage proposed that the Commission should 
consist of Alexander, Ademola, and Killanin. If Ademola could not participate, Jan 
Staubo from Norway would take his place.122 Ademola, for his part, deferred to the 
President and Executive Board on any decision concerning Westerhoff’s 
membership.123 
Westerhoff was in agreement with this arrangement, since he had become 
convinced “that the Secretary General should be neutral and undisputable as well as 
the IOC organization.”124 Killanin then suggested that Westerhoff might join the 
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Commission on its travels, not as a member, “but [he] would purely go in a reporting 
capacity and not … speak or open his mouth. I think it is essential for him to be present 
to listen to all the facts but I quite agree with our colleague from the Netherlands that 
it would be unwise to use his own nationality or that he should be directly involved in 
any questioning, etc.”125 Alexander echoed this suggestion, but Killanin remained cool 
to the idea.126 
Killanin agreed to join SAC, but he was concerned that he might have his own 
credibility problem to consider, inasmuch as he had been a sponsor of an anti-
apartheid movement in Ireland; he felt that an announcement should be issued 
indicating that he would not be biased.127 He then proceeded to demand a much 
broader preparatory information-gathering approach. He suggested obtaining 
various lists and diverse information on South African laws, and requested that 
Brundage define a very specific objective for the trip.128 Killanin assumed that such 
strict arrangements would be necessary to assure efficiency: “I would have thought it 
very important for the Executive to discuss the South African report which I think will 
take much more time and work than anyone realizes, well before the Lausanne 
meeting,”129 rescheduled for December 1967.  
Looking ahead, Killanin even gave thought to a media release strategy to be 
adopted as the Commission went about its work, noting that “the release of the news 
of the Commission should be announced as soon as they are certain, to avoid any 
leakages.”130 At the same time, staying ahead of the news cycle did not mean that the 
investigation had to proceed in a hurried manner: “There was a suggestion of an 
Executive meeting at the end of September, but I do not think we should be hurried 
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too much as we may well wish to digest some facts and have to circulate the final draft 
of the report between the three of us. It would be fatal to be hurried in one’s 
judgement and no final decision can be taken until the full Session at Grenoble 
although the Executive may wish to ask for further information.”131  
Westerhoff was now off the Commission, but as Secretary General he maintained 
his contacts with SANOC representatives, especially on the pivotal issues of 
Commission security and unhindered travel. L.M. Francey, SANOC’s Secretary 
General, offered positive assurances: “The members of your delegation will be able to 
speak to or contact anyone with the same freedom as any citizen of this country and 
as any visitor to this country…. In regard to your references to assurances from our 
Government, we feel we should mention that your delegation will be received by the 
South African National Olympic Committee, which is an independent and autonomous 
body and not by the Government.”132 This did not mean, she pointed out, that the 
Government would be entirely unconcerned: “…, it should be pointed out that it is 
customary for the Government of this country to ensure the safety, well-being and 
dignity of foreign visitors. I, therefore, have no hesitation in assuring you that this will 
apply equally to your delegation to whom every courtesy will be extended and within 
the framework of the laws of this country, no hindrance will be placed on the 
movements of the members of the delegation.”133 
With all preparations completed, a press release about the work of the SAC was 
published. It described the Commission’s purpose and remit as follows: 
The IOC expects this commission to make a thorough investigation 
of amateur sport in South Africa. It is to report facts, not to make 
recommendations. One knows that apartheid is the policy of the 
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South African government. The IOC is concerned with whether or not 
Olympic regulations can be met, and every athlete, regardless of 
race, will have an opportunity to participate in the Olympic Games. 
It wants to know the attitude of the athletes themselves as well as 
the opinion of the amateur sports organizations of all races. The 
investigation will cover different cities and sections of the country, 
the available facilities and the number of coaches and trainers, what 
kind of competitions are arranged, the extent of sport participation 
by various sections of the population, and the different kinds of 
Olympic sports engaged in by the different races…. The International 
Olympic Committee will study the report prepared by the 
investigation Commission, and it will take a decision on the 
participation of a South African delegation in the 1968 Olympic 
Games at its session in Grenoble from 1st to 3rd February 1968.134 
With the trip to South Africa less than a month away, Killanin reminded Westerhoff 
of organizational loose ends, such as a secretary who was not South African; access to 
money; documentation of the rules of SANOC, white and non-white organizations, and 
affiliated associations; and, notification that the public had the opportunity to provide 
evidence directly to the Commission.135 Further, Killanin stressed the importance of 
Dennis Brutus and his people to the Commission; he wanted to make sure that Brutus 
was given the details of the SAC’s whereabouts and contact information at any time.136  
Killanin’s energetic preparation for SAC’s trip resulted in his appointment to the 
Chairmanship by Brundage. Despite Brundage’s confidence in him, Killanin remained 
worried, about the Commission’s reliance on SANOC assistance: “… I was very 
concerned that we were only to have secretariat from the South African [National] 
Olympic Committee which would make it quite impossible to prepare a report which 
must, in the first instance, be of a confidential nature as we thrash out the facts. I have 
spoken to the Secretary General and it is now agreed that someone from Lausanne 
will join us.”137 The same concern was raised about SAC’s capability to make its 
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presence and purpose known to South Africans: “… I would like a note,” Alexander 
communicated to Braun, “stating how you propose that all shades of opinion in 
Olympic Sport in your country should know of the Commission, and the opportunity 
they will have personally to appear before the Commission…. The Secretary General 
sent you a questionnaire early in the year. The replies to this are now urgently 
required.”138 Not wanting solely to rely on SANOC’s intermediary help, Alexander 
suggested to Westerhoff to use a list supplied by SANOC and containing names and 
addresses of persons in South Africa prepared to give evidence on behalf of ‘non-
racial’ sporting organizations, to write to each of them individually, inviting them to 
submit evidence, and offering them a meeting with the Commission in one of the 
scheduled cities on the trip.139 Braun, on the other hand, was quoted in newspapers 
saying that only representatives of national and provincial sports bodies might give 
evidence to the committee.140 “It is important,” Alexander rejoined, “that no one in 
your country who wishes to discuss with us should have any excuse whatsoever for 
being unable to make contact.”141 Braun, in response, assured Alexander that there 
was sufficient publicity to encourage people to approach SAC.142 
Finally, on the eve of SAC’s departure to South Africa, Brundage provided a firm 
directive that rigidly placed the focus on sport-related issues: 
If we are to judge apartheid per se, it is not necessary to send a 
commission at all. Our concern is with the National Olympic 
Committee and what it is doing to comply with Olympic regulations, 
especially Articles 24 and 25…. We had an analogous situation in 
1936, when most of the world condemned Nazism and many wanted 
to remove the Games from Berlin. Also, after the II World War many 
of those who were against Communism wanted to keep the Eastern 
countries out of the Games…. We must not become involved in 
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political issues, nor permit the Olympic Games to be used as a tool or 
as a weapon for extraneous causes.143 
Upon the trip’s completion, Killanin provided Brundage with a brief synopsis of 
SAC’s activities in South Africa and an update on the report’s status. By the beginning 
of December 1967, Killanin reported that the final draft was complete.144 Killanin 
likewise kept Braun updated on the fact that South Africa had been discussed at a 
recent Executive Board meeting and that after the report was received by all IOC 
members and subsequently discussed at Grenoble, a postal vote would determine 
SANOC’s fate.145 He also notified Braun that SAC was still waiting on some 
documentation requested from South African NSFs. This information would have to 
be added to the report verbally at the 1968 Grenoble Sessions.146 
SAC’s report numbered over 200 pages; Killanin emphasized its main thrust as 
follows: 
I would like to report that in general everybody we have seen, with 
perhaps five exceptions, have said that they want to come back into 
the Olympic Games and accept the Tehran five points but there are 
variations, from those who think it is technically impossible, to those 
who say ‘Will we really be represented, it is equal, but the Chairman 
is European.’ I don’t think any single group, except possibly one 
section, have said this, but certain individuals in groups have 
expressed that view. As far as I can recall there have not been any, 
the only ones that have been in specific sports was weightlifting, 
which was explained to Mr. F. Braun. I think the decision that we 
made on Friday night was certainly the correct one in your interests, 
that of you being with us. When I left we raised the question of the 
Constitutions and I am glad to say that I have them all except from 
the Amateur Athletic Union…. We will contact the key International 
Federations (a) out of courtesy and (b) also to report to them that 
we have seen unaffiliated bodies but we have made it clear to all the 
unaffiliated bodies that whatever is accomplished by the IOC they 
still cannot compete unless they are affiliated internationally and 
that is something over which we have no control whatsoever. We 
only recognise one international Federation and everyone must be 
261 
 
 
affiliated to it. That is as far as I can go on that side of it…. We have 
had a great weight of evidence of people objecting to Brutus 
representing them outside the country. There have also been groups 
who support him. So this is our intention. If he had not been seen 
originally by the IOC, but he has been seen, and think that in all 
justice we have to see him. We have not yet decided that we all see 
him or only one of us and perhaps Westerhoff.147 
In reference to the postal vote based on SAC’s report, Alexander suggested to 
Brundage, “… that there must be a specific motion of the Executive Board upon which 
members must decide. To leave it merely to a YES/NO on the existing suspension of 
the South African National Olympic Committee will lead to confusion as it is not as 
simple as that. I have my idea of an appropriate motion but then that it is none of my 
business.”148 In addition, Killanin explained to Westerhoff: “… the wording of the 
Resolution must be very clear and very simple as the Executive agreed it would be 
purely based on permission to make entries for the Games at Mexico City. The whole 
situation would be subject to review after it was seen that the selection for Mexico 
worked fairly.”149 It was Alexander’s recommended draft of the resolution that 
Killanin endorsed to base the postal vote on.150  
Ademola, anxious to avoid any controversy about the vote, added some comments 
on the subject of the postal vote, advising SAC members to refrain from moving 
forward any motions at the upcoming meeting: “Our duty to my mind is to answer 
questions which members may like to put to us on our Report, which naturally brings 
us into the discussion.… I think it should be left to the Executive to formulate its own 
plans as to how a ballot should be effected without any confusion.”151 Killanin also 
agreed with Ademola on the necessity to recuse the Commission in respect of making 
any motions on the report at the meeting: “Our object is to do whatever is best for the 
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Olympic Movement and that is why I think the wording of the Resolution should not 
be weighed one way or the other by the Commission…. I feel if members of the IOC 
cannot make up their minds on the report and on the summary nothing much can be 
done about it.”152 
SAC’s desire for transparency and objectivity was commendable. Its thorough 
process provided a grounded report towards assisting the development of an 
informed decision. Now it was in the hands of the IOC Executive Board and General 
Assembly to leverage the report in deciding South Africa’s destiny with regard to the 
1968 Mexico City Games. 
4. IOC and NOC Opinions 
The correspondence from IOC and NOC members to Avery Brundage related to the 
South African issue mushroomed in the months leading up to the 1968 Mexico City 
Games,153 more than likely energized by important actors such as Killanin 
underscoring the importance of this particular vote: “In regard to South Africa,” he 
noted, “I think it is very important when the results are announced that it is made very 
clear on what people were voting, i.e. the details of Hugh Weir’s Resolution…. A direct 
vote of yes or no could well be misinterpreted in the world as an approval of apartheid 
rather than the qualifying motion on which we are voting.”154 The result of the historic 
vote was 36 to 25 in favour of readmitting South Africa to the Mexico City Games.155 
This decision reverberated through the Olympic world. Indeed, it took many IOC and 
NOC members by surprise. 
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Concerned to prevent even more controversy than there had been already, 
Reginald Alexander advised Frank Braun to remain quiet on the issue: “Pipe down…. 
You have got what you want, for the moment. Now is the time for tact, calm and 
statesmanship. Let the others do the shouting if they want.”156 ‘Shouting’ was an 
appropriate description of what happened between the time of the vote in Grenoble 
and the 1968 Mexico City Games. Giulio Onesti claimed that the decision had caused 
unexpected reactions among the majority of the IOC members: “The evolution of this 
situation throughout the world is such today that no doubt seems to remain that the 
international Olympic Movement is in danger and that its very existence is seriously 
threatened.”157 Onesti believed that the whole of Africa and parts of Asia would forego 
participation in the upcoming Games. He wanted Brundage urgently to convene a 
formal IOC Extraordinay Session to reconsider the question of South African 
participation in the Olympic Games.158 General Vladimir Stoytchev, IOC member for 
Bulgaria, supported Onesti’s request. “You have probably heard and seen the 
repercussion which the IOC’s decision about South Africa has had in the whole world. 
It may have unpleasant consequences for the future of our Olympic Movement…. 
Therefore I beg you to convoke the IOC members to an extraordinary session in order 
to reconsider that question.”159  
South Africa’s re-admittance to the Olympic Games had again become a front page 
international story. Two sides naturally developed – those who supported the 
decision and those who opposed it. The ‘yes’ vote was influenced by the SAC report or 
was convinced in the course of the hours of subsequent discussion. Even SAC 
Chairman Killanin who was surprised by the degree of media attention, did not 
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anticipate the attention he received from the media. He told Brundage: “In regard to 
South Africa, I have had innumerable offers to appear on television, etc., even, I 
believe, at the risk of my amateur status but I consider as chairman of the Committee 
and as your representative I should not express any views although I may have to 
make a short statement to my own national committee if any questions are asked.”160  
Killanin probably felt it a challenge to refrain from offering public evaluations of 
the South African situation; he privately confided to Brundage that the Commission’s 
trip left him feeling “more strongly than ever that what the South African Government 
is doing is very evil.”161 He nonetheless remained steadfastly loyal to Brundage and 
the IOC.  
In the end, it was the Chairman of the Mexican Organizing Committee of the Games 
of the XIX Olympiad, Pedro Ramírez Vázquez, along with IOC members, Marte R. 
Gómez and José de Jesus Clark, who convinced Brundage to revisit the South African 
vote. They invoked the “lofty objectives of the international Olympic Movement… an 
expression of a fundamental conviction of the permanent validity of the basic 
principles of the Olympic Games, a belief in the equality of man, in his freedom and in 
respect for human dignity.”162 It was “alien circumstances” that had harmed the IOC’s 
ability to comply with established formal procedures in this case, and the Mexico City 
Organizing Committee thus was entitled “to appeal an agreement that has notoriously 
been a cause of controversy concerning the Olympic Games, and which is of a non-
technical nature,” in this case the vote that repealed the veto against SANOC. The 
Organizing Committee, wrote Vazquez, “…wishe[d] to reiterate that the 
manifestations that have occurred throughout the world and the threat of possible 
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abstentions from the Games are clear evidence that the basic principle of non-racial 
discrimination, as stated in Olympic Rule No. 1 has been questioned.”163 To prevent 
further harm to the forthcoming Games, a review of the repeal was urgently required. 
Since the request came from the Mexico Organizing Committee, Brundage had to 
give the issue some thought. Meanwhile, Alexander advised Brundage to remain calm 
and avoid ill-conceived action: “Now is the time to avoid precipitate words or actions, 
anywhere in the world that could hinder progress. … in Grenoble I said that there 
would be uproar in Africa for about two months; wait for the dust to settle! … What I 
ask is that you do your utmost to prevent any of our colleagues creating more 
difficulties or impossible situations; your leadership is vital now…. Braun must be 
fixed and quickly. He is a menace.”164 
Alexander’s opinion was not shared by all his IOC colleagues. Onesti continued to 
request an extraordinary session,165 gaining support from colleagues such as his 
Italian IOC colleague Giorgio De Stefani, who advised Brundage that the call for an 
Extraordinary Session should more suitably come from the President rather than 
from a vote by the membership: “The Government, the Press and the public opinion 
[in Italy are] unanimously criticizing the vote of Grenoble and I believe it is my duty 
to inform [you] about it…. Our colleague Mr. Onesti has informed me that he has made 
a formal request to you to convene an extraordinary Session of the IOC to re-examine 
the present situation as a whole. I would like to support his request.”166 
But there were certainly supporters of the Grenoble vote. The Marquess of Exeter 
attempted to encourage like-minded members to make public statements against a 
boycott of the Mexico City Games, provided the stipulations of the initial resolution of 
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readmittance had been fulfilled: “I see that a number of countries including Japan and 
Norway have stated their intention of going to Mexico, and the British Olympic 
Association issued a statement yesterday noting that a multi-racial team from South 
Africa would be present in Mexico and stating that they had received an invitation and 
had accepted it.”167  
Brundage, however, did not sit idle. Rather than wait for NOCs to accept or reject 
the invitation to the 1968 Mexico City Games, he met with Ramírez Vázquez, Gómez, 
and Clark in Chicago, and called a special meeting of the IOC Executive Board.168 For 
the time being, however, this did not quell the media furor, as Alexander reported 
from Kenya: “There is now a real danger that expediency will encourage and 
capitulate to extremism. The issue up to now has been ‘mixed trials’ inside South 
Africa but this could now easily extend to a demand that the IOC must first change the 
Government of South Africa!”169 
Hugh Weir, Australian IOC member, responsible for the wording of the Grenoble 
resolution, was pleased at the final result of the mail vote. However, he was shocked 
of the African attitude. He complained to Brundage: 
It is quite evident that far from a sporting attitude, their thinking is 
governed by political motives. I go so far as to say that few, if any of 
the African N.O.C.’s [sic] made a decision of their own volition. I am 
convinced that they were told what to do by their respective 
Governments…. The inconsistency of their combined attitude lies in 
the fact that in alleged protest against racial discrimination, they are 
now practicing political discrimination against South Africa. Which 
is the worst?170 
Weir opposed a review of the Grenoble decision, threatening to leave the IOC if the 
vote were repealed. He, for one, was particularly suspicious of the motives of many of 
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the African NOCs in joining threats to boycott the Mexico City Games: “[H]ow many of 
the 40 odd N.O.C.’s [sic] loudly announcing their withdrawal would have participated 
at Mexico City next October under [n]ormal circumstances? I venture to suggest that 
quite a number of the smaller and weaker States would have been absentees for the 
reasons that they have no athletes of sufficient calibre or they have no money to 
waste.”171 And even if those African NOCs were to make good on their threat, there 
was no reason for the Organizing Committee to be overly concerned. “Do they not 
realise that even if the whole 40 nations do withdraw, they will still have 
representation from 80 of the most powerful athletic nations in the world including 
Australia.”172  
Weir’s sense of the situation was shared by some, Marquess Exeter among them. 
In preparation for the upcoming IOC Executive Board meeting called by Brundage, 
Exeter wanted the IOC President to look at the laws of procedure and possible angles 
of international law.173 He also forecasted the logistics of the meeting and possible 
votes for and against, and suggested another postal vote if things progressed to 
another motion. However, Exeter believed the meeting should be led by three 
questions: Will the Games go on? Should a General Session be called? Should there be 
postal vote?174 To prevent another General Session, Exeter raised the danger of Onesti 
getting enough signatures for an Extraordinary Session before the planned Executive 
Board meeting. However, Danish IOC member, Ivar Vind, pointed out to Brundage, the 
chances of preventing an Extraordinary Session were becoming slimmer by the day: 
“[I] strongly believe every day you delay sending a firm circular letter will give 
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disloyal IOC members the chance to wreck the Olympic Movement. You simply must 
take the lead and forcefully defend the results of postal voting.”175 
Vind had first-hand experience with perceived disloyalty among IOC members. 
Onesti was working hard to collect the one-third votes insuring Extraordinary 
General Session. But Vind believed Onesti was not applying Article 18 properly since 
it seemed nonsensical to Vind that a quorum of one-third of the votes should be in a 
position to repeal a vote at will.176 Anyhow, Denmark, in any event, supported the IOC 
decision and from what he could tell, so would Finland, Norway and Iceland. Vind 
concluded with four suggestions to help diffuse the situation: (1) Send a circular letter 
to all IOC members, possibly showing disapproval of disloyalty shown through 
decisions made; (2) Send a circular letter to NOC Presidents to fill them in on the exact 
details about the Commission’s report and wording of resolution; (3) Tell the Mexican 
organizing committee and NOC to stay quiet; and, (4) Tell SANOC to stay quiet and 
refrain from circulating any letters.177 
To help expedite the Executive Board meeting, the Mexican delegation sent urgent 
telegrams to the Board members to organize the meeting as soon as possible.178 A 
frustrated Vind wrote to Brundage: “I am really getting sick with all the IOC members 
who primarily are concerned with feathering their own nests and only regard their 
IOC membership as a matter for prestige and social standing.”179 The 
misrepresentation of the details of the Grenoble decision in the media was also a 
nuisance to Vind. He insisted that the IOC must do better to inform the public. In 
preparation for the Executive Board meeting, Clark notified the IOC Executive Board 
that Brundage called the meeting to consider the appeal from Ramírez Vázquez by 
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exercising Article 41 of the Olympic Charter.180 The Executive Board, he offered, could 
resolve the appeal without calling an extraordinary plenary session. Clark reminded 
them where the differences were in relation to voting for or against the Grenoble 
motion between those who voted on the stipulations in principal enshrined in Article 
1, and those who were only focussed on expediently resolving the problems posed by 
a specific case, that is, focussed “on eliminating discrimination in the specific 
representation of a country at the Olympic Games, which in essence, is contradictory 
to the Ideal and does not offer a definite and permanent solution.”181 
Konstantin Andrianov, IOC Vice President, likewise, was convinced that the initial 
decision had been wrong; he laid much of the blame at Brundage’s feet: “We are at the 
moment on the brink of splitting of the international Olympic Movement, the unity of 
which you fully supported verbally many times…. The international importance of this 
social phenomenon is too great to be offered a sacrifice to those who violate the main 
principle of the humanism that is the equality of all the races.”182 
Andrianov finished his letter by mentioning that the USSR was unlikely to send 
athletes if South Africa was admitted to the 1968 Mexico City Games.183 Andrianov 
copied his letter to all IOC members.184 It claimed that South Africa continued to 
violate the Olympic Charter, and therefore, forfeited its rights to participate in the 
Olympic Games. Further, SAC’s report confirmed racial discrimination and the 
procedure and order of voting for South Africa’s readmission were contrary to the 
Olympic Charter’s protocol.185  
Hungarian IOC member Árpád Csanádi likewise wrote to Brundage in favour of 
rescinding the original decision: 
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The report of the IOC delegation having visited South Africa also 
reflects the reality that owing to the policy of apartheid in force as a 
state law in South Africa the lasting noble aims of non-discrimination 
of the IOC cannot be enforced when composing the South African 
Olympic team. Simultaneously it is also clear that the South Africa 
National Olympic Committee is not able to conform its activity with 
the IOC rules as a result of the apartheid policy…. Consequently not 
only its “promise” of doubtful value concerning its participation at 
the Olympic Games can be considered as debatable, but, also the 
activity of the South African National Olympic Committee as a whole, 
which does not meet the requirements or the ideas of the IOC.186 
To prepare for this wave of opposition, Brundage studied Robert’s Rules of Order, 
directed Honey’s attention to the possibility of legal action, and mentioned the 
possibility of sending Westerhoff to Africa to “buy more time.”187 During his attempt 
to contain the situation, Brundage admitted: “Many of our difficulties, as usual, come 
from our own members. Something will have to be done about this.”188 Brundage also 
updated Onesti on the special Executive Board meeting to encourage those who 
opposed South Africa’s Olympic involvement to refrain from drawing attention to the 
situation, “… I think all members should defer public statements or actions until they 
hear from the Executive Board.”189  
German IOC member, Dr. Georg von Opel, emphasized the fact that the IOC had 
neither the authority nor the influence to involve itself in the internal political 
situation of a country, and had to observe the internal integrity of its own decision-
making procedures. The procedural argument in favour of retaining the original 
decision, were clear: “…. the statutes of the IOC are only then practicable if they are 
limited to that sphere of operation for which an IOC may only issue statutes, and that 
is with respect to the intercourse between the Olympic family of nations and the 
performance of the Games…. Since all conditions of the IOC statutes are met, South 
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Africa must be admitted.”190 This, he continued, certainly did not mean that the IOC 
“by re-admitting South Africa identif[ied] itself with the racialism in that country nor 
does it identify itself with the political system of such countries whose teams are 
admitted to the games and which are dictatorially governed.”191 The IOC therefore, 
had to “clarify the sphere of operation of its statues in the next session. Who is then 
not willing to submit to the only reasonable and practicable rules of the Games and 
thinks he can extort the IOC, has to accept the consequences and withdraw.”192 
Exeter concurred with von Opel’s evaluation. First, as von Opel had pointed out, 
Article 1 referred only to the Olympic Games themselves; the IOC should never make 
eligibility dependent on governments and their internal laws. Second, Article 24 
stated that they must abide by rules, but it did not state that they must break the laws 
of their own countries, even though an effort must be made for change. Lastly, Article 
20 outlined conditions where the President could call for a postal vote between 
meetings, but there was nothing in the rules to indicate that the IOC General 
membership itself could not call one.193 
Prince Francois-Joseph de Liechtenstein offered a more pragmatic evaluation of 
the issue, noting that “moral indignation concerning the invitation of the South 
Africans [was] groundless considering how many athletes from countries governed 
by dictatorial regimes with unlimited power over the individual attend the Olympic 
Games.”194 With similar pragmatism, he expressed a preference for the Executive 
Board of the IOC to resolve the issue. “This seems to me preferable to a convocation 
of the IOC at this point, which, I fear, might turn into a worldwide sensation, 
detrimental to our aims for friendship and peace amongst youth of the world.”195 
272 
 
 
Perhaps, Exeter continued his deliberations, part of the virulent reaction to the 
South African issue was a lack of understanding of the details. He wondered if 
Brundage should distribute a fact sheet emphasizing that South Africa was never  
suspended; that  SANOC was not allowed to enter a team in Tokyo because they did 
not fulfill certain conditions; that neither was it the IOC’s remit to deal with 
governments, nor were participating athletes responsible for their laws; the IOC only 
determined conditions under which they could participate; lastly, the fact sheet 
should point out SAC’s evaluation that South Africa had met the conditions, and the 
conditions for participation in the Games were accepted by the overwhelming 
number of non-whites.196 Useful as such a leaflet might have been, procedural 
questions reaching well beyond such a fact sheet were being raised.  
Reginald Alexander wanted to know what authority an Organizing Committee had 
to withhold invitations from specific NOCs, possibly in contravention of decisions 
made by the IOC.  “Once this game starts it opens wide the possibility of any 
Organising Committee avoiding an invitation to one or more National Olympic 
Committees for reasons of its own and with the object of influencing a decision. …. 
Imperfection is everywhere, all of us must strive to do better, and be given the chance 
to do so.”197 In responding to von Opel, and touching on arguments also raised by 
Alexander, Brundage admitted that it was impossible to expect all IOC members to act 
independent of political pressures. “This is a constant source of danger that we have 
to tolerate if we are to unite the world of sport. …. The issue now is whether the 
politicians or sportsmen are going to control the Olympic Games. It is as simple as 
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that. Our rules, alas, pertain solely to the Olympic Games as you say and not to 
countries, otherwise it might be a better world.”198 
Letters of support of the original motion continued to arrive in Brundage’s mailbox. 
Prince George William of Hanover, President of the International Olympic Academy, 
argued that the decision to readmit South Africa was made after much discussion and 
a second vote would be inappropriate. He was not supportive of reopening the South 
African issue, since a second vote would, “… weaken the authority of the International 
Olympic Committee and create a precedence for any other decision where the 
minority might take advantage of this example. The functioning of the International 
Olympic Committee would then become hopelessly difficult and still more expensive 
for the members.”199 Though the strength of the IOC was in its solidarity, the feeling 
of loyalty was not necessarily shared by all NOCs, as evidenced by a letter to 
Westerhoff from the NOC of India: “… a country like South Africa which does not 
follow the Olympic Charter inside its boundaries amongst its own people, has no right 
to take part in the Olympic Games merely because it has agreed to send a few coloured 
people in its team. The method of selection of these coloured people is not in 
accordance with the Olympic Charter which is totally against any kind of racial 
discrimination.”200 
Under ideal conditions, the priorities of the IOC and NOCs would align; however, 
the interpretation and application of “priorities” varied, especially where political 
orientations did not correspond to traditional IOC interpretations of the rules and 
regulations. Exactly this thought perplexed Vind. Writing Brundage from Denmark, he 
observed: 
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I simply cannot see how we can change what was decided upon in 
Grenoble. Whatever the world opinion is, I am convinced that we 
have chosen the right path – it’s only bad that more people cannot or 
will not see it. Our job as servant to the Olympic Movement is not to 
destroy but to build up. We have succeeded in obtaining concessions 
which nobody else has been able to get, and we have therefore 
decided to give the white and the non-white athletes of South Africa 
the chance to prove themselves in a mixed team at the Olympic 
Games in Mexico City. I am sure you will agree with me that members 
of the Executive Board, at their next meeting, cannot possibly change 
this decision!! … If we bend before political pressure and if we 
change our decision made in Grenoble, it will be a disaster and a 
terrible blow to the cause of the Olympic Movement. A blow from 
which I am convinced we might not recover nor possibly even 
survive.201 
While Vind argued on political grounds, Onesti adopted a formal perspective, 
pointing out that the issue was simply a matter of the proper application of rules and 
regulations, especially Articles 1, 24, and 25. Since South Africa, he wrote Brundage, 
was not able to incorporate in its statute, Article 1, the South Africa question,  
… should not have been brought up for examination at the Grenoble 
Session…. In fact, the resolution of the IOC authorising the South 
African NOC to present a team at the Mexico City Games is legally 
absurd. In effect, either that NOC is considered to be ‘recognised’ in 
accordance with Art. 24, in which case its right to ‘enter’ a team for 
the Olympic Games derives automatically from the first paragraph of 
Art. 24, and the IOC Assembly cannot either attribute or deny it such 
a right. Or, on the other hand, it may be considered that that NOC 
cannot enter a team in the Games, failing a special authorisation from 
the IOC Assembly, thereby admitting that the NOC is not legitimate 
to make such an entry…. By the fact of departing from the solemn 
principles of the IOC Regulations, a political act has been committed. 
And it is useless to deplore today the reactions of which you are well 
aware, since the error has been committed by the IOC in an anti-legal 
provision.202 
Brundage was aggravated at this diversity of contradictory opinions. He confided 
to Killanin: “Despite the discussion at our last meeting, the practice of venting 
personal opinion, not to mention adverse criticism of the Committee, has continued. 
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In an important matter of this kind, this verges on treason and I think it has come to 
the point where it should be punished.”203 Member organizations should at least 
withhold public statements, even if they disagreed with decisions taken by the IOC. “If 
they feel so strongly, they can always resign.”204 
The internal loyalties of the IOC and Olympic Movement were being sorely tested. 
In the face of the tidal wave of correspondence reaching his desk, Brundage was 
unable to set the parameters of the public debate and narrative.  
It was becoming increasingly clear that the issue was not going to be fully resolved 
before the Executive Board met in Lausanne to discuss options, but a resolution of the 
issue would not be easy, as Brundage pointed out to Andrianov: “I am sure every 
member of the Committee stands firmly against discrimination of any kind in sport. 
Some think, however, that because of its political policies, South Africa must be 
completely ostracized, while others believe that the admission of a multi-racial team 
to the Game[s] will be more effective in correcting the existing condition. I hope we 
can find a satisfactory solution in our meeting in Lausanne next week.”205 To effect 
such a solution, Alexander advised Brundage to take firm control and contain the 
issue, 
… you alone must make the decision. You have nothing to lose and 
everything to gain.… under Clause 18 the President must rule that 
the power to convene a meeting relates only to new questions. There 
is nothing new about the South African question; it has always been 
known that several countries would threaten boycott if South Africa 
is included…. Here again the President must rule that the organisers 
have flagrantly and willfully violated the IOC rules, and if they do not 
immediately cease to meddle with the South African question their 
authority to hold the Games must be withdrawn. In this case there is 
new information and new circumstances to consider at an IOC 
meeting to be convened for the purpose.206 
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Brundage, as USA IOC member Douglas Roby pointed out, might not now have the 
power base in the IOC to take control of the situation, but the fact was that a clear 
majority had voted for readmitting South Africa. “…the final decision was participated 
in by approximately 66 of our 71 members. Some of the legal minds who are members 
of the IOC now contend that our procedure was improper and, therefore, the decision, 
as taken at Grenoble, should be disregarded. I think these questions should have been 
raised at Grenoble if they were of substance and the fact that all of those who are now 
complaining did participate in the vote places their stamp of approval on the 
procedure as taken. …. I realize that numbers now on the Executive Board are against 
you, but I hope that you and the few that you have with you will continue on the course 
which was charted at Grenoble.”207 
After two days of discussion in Lausanne, the Executive Board settled on a 
recommendation “… to withdraw the invitation which the South African [National] 
Olympic Committee has received to participate in the Games of the XIX Olympiad.”208 
Brundage provided the official rationale: 
It should be emphasized that in adopting this recommendation the 
International Olympic Committee is not bowing to threats or 
pressures of any kind from those who do not understand the true 
Olympic philosophy. Boycott is not a word used in sport circles…. 
The Executive Board was facing a deep and worldwide cleavage in 
public opinion that threatened to split the Olympic family and to 
endanger the success of the Games of the XIX Olympiad. It was 
necessary to reach a decision, and if possible a unanimous decision 
immediately…. The only point in the lengthy discussions on which 
none of the members of the Executive Board could agree, was, that 
because of the explosive conditions throughout the world and the 
ugly demonstrations, rioting, and other violent happenings in many 
different countries during the last sixty days, there was actual 
danger if a South African team appeared at the Games…. You will find 
in the carefully worded cablegram, which was sent to all members of 
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the International Olympic Committee, after two solid days of heated 
but earnest discussions, that there is no criticism of Mexico, no 
criticism of South Africa and no criticism of the International 
Olympic Committee. There were no suspensions nor expulsions nor 
were there any legal technicalities mentioned. Such procedures are 
foreign to the sport world, which is based on fair play and good 
sportsmanship, but in its endeavour to preserve the Olympic 
Movement, one of the most priceless and powerful instruments of 
our present civilization, it was necessary to be realistic; facts right or 
wrong must be faced…. Since our primary concern is the assembly of 
the youth of all the 135 countries now active in the Olympic 
Movement, in friendly and peaceful competition, we regret deeply 
the consequences for the individual participants who had hoped to 
take part in this Grand Festival of Youth in Mexico City. It is a sad 
commentary on the state of the world today…. All of the ballots have 
not yet been received, so the voting is not finished. There will be 
another statement tomorrow.209 
When the results of the vote were finalized, Brundage distributed a circular letter 
recounting the history of the South African issue since the Grenoble meeting, 
emphasizing the importance of the concessions the IOC had been able to extract from 
the South African government, but these were necessarily limited to the Olympic 
Games only. “If nations are to be excluded because of repression or discrimination of 
one kind or another within their borders either by law or by practice,” he noted, “there 
will be few if any countries in the Olympic Games. Large and small, practically every 
country in the world is guilty in some respects.”210 Nonetheless, the Grenoble decision 
had immediately provoked a campaign which saw the Olympic Games “unexpectedly 
precipitated into the middle of a world-wide, racial controversy, which has torn the 
world apart,”  and ultimately threatened the very success of the Mexico Olympiad. 
Only these dire circumstances had induced him to call a Special Meeting of the 
Executive Board. After protracted discussions “at last it was determined that all 
members seemed to agree, although for different reasons, that it would be unwise, for 
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its own sake, as well as for the sake of the Olympic Movement, for a South African 
team to appear in Mexico City next October.” Brundage emphasized that this decision 
did not indicate that the IOC had bowed to political pressure; rather, the decision had 
been taken to put an end to the general disorder and violence the issue had given rise 
to in many countries. “Had the recommendation not been adopted, the Games of the 
XIX Olympiad would undoubtedly have been ruined, if not canceled, and the Olympic 
Movement would have received a blow from which it would take years to recover.”211 
Naturally, this did not please everyone. Australian member Weir, for one, was 
upset at the result: “I cannot help feeling that the IOC and the Olympic Movement 
throughout the world has been seriously harmed and our prestige very seriously 
damaged. Unquestionable, the Black races and those who supported them in their 
threatened boycott are regarding the decision as a great victory.”212 Surely, he thought 
this was Brundage’s most embarrassing and disheartening moment as President.213 
Brundage agreed with him.214 
It was now difficult to determine the strength, trustworthiness, and legitimacy of 
the IOC and South Africa’s future in the Olympic Games and Olympic Movement. 
Though Killanin believed the right decision had eventually been made, he told 
Brundage the IOC was in for more trouble in the near future: “We are living in a very 
different era to that in which Baron de Coubertin constituted the Olympic Games and 
I think it would be stupid for us to bury our head in the sand. I am certain we have 
taken the right decision in the end regarding South Africa but it was unfortunate we 
had to yield certain principles. In point of fact it could be argued that South Africa has 
been kept out by us for political reasons!” 215 What was necessary, he argued, in view 
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of “no doubt … a good deal of trouble from Africa during the next eight to twelve 
years,” was for the IOC to secure its future position in Africa by making “contacts 
regarding suitable people for the IOC.”216 
Brundage agreed; the IOC needed serious review to prepare for and to anticipate 
what lay ahead: “We must be prepared. We saved the Games of the 19th Olympiad and 
prevented a complete rupture of international sport, although we were thrown into 
the middle of this terrible international racial controversy, the last place we should 
be. It was really a victory although we have to admit that is not the public 
impression.”217 
5. Domestic Resistance 
Coincidentally, and similar to the case of SANOC correspondence, there was a large 
gap in the communication between Avery Brundage and the foremost organization of 
domestic resistance in South Africa. Over a year’s time had passed after the 1964 
Tokyo Olympics before SAN-ROC representative John Rogers contacted Brundage 
from London, reviewing the history of the IOC’s treatment of the South African issue: 
“I am requested to strongly demand the unequivocal expulsion of the South Africa 
Olympic Committee from the Olympic Movement under Rule 25 of the Olympic 
Charter and regulations.”218 The domestic resistance was not satisfied solely with the 
withdrawal of the invitation to SANOC for the 1964 Tokyo Games. According to 
Rogers, SANOC’s continued violation of Olympic rules and regulations merited 
expulsion from the Olympic Games and Olympic Movement. 
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Some nine months after Roger’s letter, one of the founding members of SAN-ROC, 
Chris de Broglio, pointed out to Brundage the recurring discrimination in South Africa. 
South Africa’s suspension from the Olympic Games had not impeded the opportunity 
for international competition for white athletes who, like the South African Amateur 
Athletic Union, simply sought expanded opportunities for participation at World 
Championships. “In this way their white athletes will take part even more frequently 
in International Competitions whilst the Coloured South Africans are simply deprived 
of any form of international competition…. We also wish to point out to you that two 
South African Coloured sportsmen who were forced to leave their country because of 
the colour bar in sport have recently been selected to represent Great Britain … The 
great shame is that many others are being deprived of their right of participation in 
international sport because of their colour.”219 Such examples of racial discrimination 
in South African sport, according to SAN-ROC, did not bode well for the re-admittance 
of South Africa to the Olympic Games. 
Four months later, in November 1966, SAN-ROC President Dennis Brutus 
contacted Brundage. When Brutus heard that the IOC was planning a fact-finding 
committee to be sent to South Africa to report on the state of Olympic sport, he saw it 
as a chance to improve relationships with the IOC: “…we would like to submit 
information to the Investigating Commission…. Please be good enough to inform us 
whether we can send information either written or oral or both and if we can arrange 
for representatives of the non-racial sporting bodies to submit evidence to the 
Commission…. We welcome the decision of the IOC to see the facts for [themselves] 
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and believe that this will do much to bring South African sport into conformity with 
the requirements of the Olympic Movement.”220 
As cooperative and as positive as this letter seemed, Brutus may have been acting 
in opposition to SANOC as much from a desire to establish better relationships with 
the IOC.221 In any case, subsequent letters from Brutus portrayed SAN-ROC as 
accommodating and helpful – assisting in any way to improve the South African sport 
situation by combating racial discrimination. Brutus reminded Brundage that SAN-
ROC, in doing so, fully supported IOC rules and regulations, and wished to submit 
evidence to the Commission: “We believe that the bodies which wish to participate in 
international sport should state this frankly to show that they are opposed to racial 
discrimination in sport. They must make it clear that they wish to have events and 
trials and selection open to all regardless of race or colour. It is our belief that the IOC 
should grant recognition and participation to all who make this declaration.”222 
Westerhoff responded for the IOC several days later; he requested detailed 
information on the state of Olympic sport in South Africa, administrative procedures, 
the state of sports facilities, and detailed information on the role of the South African 
government, and sports-related legislation.223 Westerhoff also sent a similar list to 
SANOC. 
Soon, however, the issue of SAN-ROC’s illicit use of the word mark ‘Olympic,’ began 
to affect the exchanges adversely.224 The IOC had warned SAN-ROC about the 
unauthorized use of ‘Olympic’ before,225 and SAN-ROC had pledged to stop using it.226 
Further, a month earlier, Alexander had provided some friendly advice to Chris de 
Broglio, “… it is improper to use the word ‘Olympic’ in sport without the approval of 
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the International Olympic Committee and continued disregard by you of this point 
will only arouse reactions which you can well afford to avoid.”227 
After this incident, Brutus attempted to keep in touch with Brundage more 
regularly, even by arranging to meet in the United States when Brutus was visiting. 
He wanted “… to discuss with you some aspects of the organisation of sport in South 
Africa, with special reference to the observance of the Olympic rules.”228 Two months 
later, knowing that South African participation in the 1968 Mexico City Games was a 
topic of discussion at the IOC Tehran meetings, Brutus wrote Brundage. On SAN-ROC’s 
behalf, he highlighted six points: 
1. We believe that the IOC must provide for all amateur sportsmen 
and all countries in the world who fall within the Olympic code; 
2. We believe that the IOC correctly excluded South Africa from 
participation in the 1964 Tokyo Olympics and that South Africa 
should only be granted participation as soon as they make it clear 
that they do not have racial discrimination in sport but provide 
fairly and equally for all sportsmen; 
3. The present changes in the sports arrangements in South Africa 
are only APPARENT: they DO NOT REMOVE RACIAL 
DISCRIMINATION. This is freely admitted by the Prime Minister, 
the sports administrators and the Press in South Africa; 
4. We believe that these facts can easily be established by the IOC 
Commission which is to visit South Africa and report; the 
investigations to be conducted by the world bodies for 
Weightlifting and Gymnastics will also prove this; 
5. We believe that the IOC should insist on the full observance of the 
Olympic rules by the governing sports bodies in South Africa; if 
there is government interference then this will disqualify them; 
6. We call on the International Olympic Committee and all national 
Olympic Committees to stand firm on these principles.229 
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Brutus also gave assurance that SAN-ROC had the desire to see Olympic principles 
rightfully applied in South African sport, and that it would be willing to work towards 
achieving the Olympic ideals. Such declarations were the right things to say to display 
SAN-ROC’s commitment to improve South African sport. After the IOC Tehran 
meetings, de Broglio released a detailed summary of events at the meetings, from 
SAN-ROC’s perspective.230 He was cautiously optimistic, but noted that SANOC had 
not fully complied with Olympic rules. Further, there was  growing opposition to 
South Africa’s participation: “The African delegates were unanimous in declaring their 
support for the resolution adopted in Bamako, which inter alia asked all African 
countries to reserve their decision to participate in the 1968 Olympics should a South 
African team be invited whilst racial segregation and discrimination is enforced in 
South African sport.”231 For the first time, SAN-ROC publicly stated that, “… [it did] not 
have the ambition of controlling South African sport. If a genuine merger of all existing 
organisations did take place with complete equality, SANROC would have no more 
reason to exist.”232 All in all, de Broglio hoped SANOC left the meeting with a sense 
that work still needed to be done: “It [was] becoming very clear that apartheid in sport 
will no longer be tolerated by the large majority of members making up the Olympic 
Movement.”233  
When the SAC report finally became public six months later, Brutus laid out SAN-
ROC’s perspective on the report. He noted that the document demonstrated the 
persistence of racism in South African sports, and a lack of willingness on SANOC’s 
part to effect any changes. A high degree of government interference likewise served 
to reproduce the racialized set-up of South African sports, even though the 
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“overwhelming majority of South African sportsmen – and this is the standpoint SAN-
ROC represents – fe[lt] abhorrence for segregation in sport."234 
To complement his public statement, Brutus elaborated on his concerns in a letter 
to Brundage: “We note with some alarm the indications in the Report that the 
Commission seemed to think that the fact that some South Africans – white or non-
white, but in any case a minority of the sportsmen – favours racial discrimination in 
sport was sufficient grounds for the IOC to approve a violation of its fundamental 
principles.”235 SAN-ROC, in any case, refuted the insinuation that the organization was 
“not supported by the non-racial sports bodies in South Africa…. I wish to renew the 
request that SAN-ROC, as an interested body, should be heard when the views of other 
bodies are sought.”236 
Long-time SAN-ROC member Reg Hlongwane, sent a cablegram to Brundage 
pointing out some possible considerations when interpreting SAC’s report: “Evidence 
given by most Coloured and Indian sportsmen in South Africa does not reflect the true 
desire of these sportsmen. It must be appreciated that the political situation there 
makes protests against apartheid intolerable to the present government and this 
subjects opponents to police surveillance and intimidation.”237 
Brutus’ and Hlongwane’s interventions notwithstanding, the IOC, as was pointed 
out above, sanctioned SANOC’s participation in the 1968 Mexico City Games. Brutus 
was dismayed at the decision “… to invite the South African Racial Olympic Committee 
to the Mexico City Games.” 238 This decision could only threaten the continued 
existence of the IOC and the Olympic Movement. The Resolution further required that 
the South African team 
285 
 
 
… must be one which ‘conforms with Fundamental Principle 1’ and 
‘on the understanding that it continues vigorously its efforts to have 
ALL forms of racial discrimination in amateur sport removed.’ The 
South African spokesmen have made it clear that they will NOT work 
to have all forms of racial discrimination in amateur sport removed; 
I ask that they give a firm assurance that they will do this…. we 
deeply regret that the IOC has been willing to betray its own high 
principles in full knowledge of the vicious racist policies which 
dominate sport in South Africa; all who truly care for fair play and 
justice in sport must continue to oppose racial discrimination in 
sport.239 
In a letter to Lord Killanin, de Broglio argued that much damage had been done to 
the IOC by an impression created in the report that “an overwhelming majority of non-
white officials and sportsmen favoured a return to the Olympics under the prevailing 
conditions inside S.A. The report gave the further impression that this aspect was of 
crucial importance in deciding the issue…. I contend that this argument is invalid as a 
basis for the readmission of a National Olympic Committee which practices and has 
always practised racial discrimination at all levels of its organization.”240 And even if 
a majority of officials interviewed by the Commission had come out in favour of the 
status quo, “I doubt very much that these officials represented a majority of 
sportsmen …To be fair the report should have made it clear that a number of non-
white officials with large memberships insisted on the principle of Mixed Trials. This 
can be clearly seen from numerous press reports during the visit of your 
commission.… This omission from the report is a very serious one as this was the 
deciding factor in favour of the racialist organisation.”241 Ultimately, he concluded, 
even these points were of minor significance as long as the IOC failed to extract from 
SANOC “solid guarantee to eliminate all forms of discrimination within the next two 
or three years.”242 
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Killanin rejected de Broglio’s charge that the Commission had rested its 
conclusions on a skewed and tendentious sampling of interviewees. “I might say we 
took considerable care to find out those people who spoke to us, who they 
represented and, where possible, the numbers of affiliations, clubs, etc. Had the views 
which you now express been correct I feel they would have been put by those people 
who opposed the re-entry of South Africa during the debate in the IOC.”243 
The last SAN-ROC missive before the 1968 Mexico City Games came from Brutus, 
just before the special Executive Board meeting described above. He wished to 
impress on the board members the importance of entertaining the “view of the non-
racial sportsmen and sports bodies which support the Olympic principles in South 
Africa,” largely to counter “the dishonesty of the South African National Olympic 
Committee in agreeing to accept terms laid down by the IOC when they have made it 
clear elsewhere that they have neither the desire nor the capacity to comply with 
these terms. Any agreement by them to ‘continue to work for the removal of all racial 
discrimination in amateur sport’ is made meaningless by their declaration that they 
cannot foresee integrated sport in the foreseeable future and that they fully support 
the racial discrimination enjoined by government policies.”244 The reasons for 
withdrawing the invitation to South Africa, Brutus concluded, just were still valid. 
The lack of correspondence from domestic resistance forces subsequent to the 
Executive Board’s decision leading to a majority vote by IOC members to withdraw 
the invitation to South Africa for the 1968 Mexico City Games,  can be viewed as an 
indication of the fact that the resistance and SAN-ROC had achieved its immediate 
objective. Between 1964 and 1968, the activities of SAN-ROC and the South African 
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Sports Association appeared less energetic than in previous years. The domestic 
resistance message owed much appreciation to the IOC and NOC members who 
opposed South Africa’s re-admittance to the 1968 Games, and to the vociferous 
international community who made sure that its voice disapproving of South Africa’s 
involvement in the Olympic Games and Olympic Movement was heard. 
6. The International Community 
The period between the 1964 Tokyo Games and 1968 Mexico City Games produced 
more correspondence from the international community than any other period 
examined. Over 100 letters from the general public within the South African folders 
of the Avery Brundage Collection can be noted.245 Unlike the two earlier time periods 
under investigation here, the correspondence was not significantly weighted in 
favour of either suspending or expelling South Africa from the Olympic Games. The 
highly publicized readmission South Africa and the subsequent repeal of that decision, 
stirred feelings that produced both supportive and oppositional arguments 
concerning the inclusion of South Africa in the Games. 
Congratulatory letters were still being received by Brundage and the IOC after the 
1964 Tokyo Games. For example, P.B. Woolley of Australia pronounced: “I am writing 
… to applaud the Olympic Federation on its action in banning South Africa from the 
Tokyo Olympic Games. If this were done by all sporting bodies, then the struggle for 
racial tolerance would be greatly furthered, and as the only sporting body to take such 
action, we feel that the Olympic Federation should be especially commended.”246 
Nonetheless, the letters pertinent to the re-admittance of South Africa to the 1968 
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Mexico City Games began to appear a year and a half after the Tokyo Games. Jackie 
Robinson, residing in Albany, New York, threatened to work towards a boycott, 
should the initial decision to bar South Africa be rescinded: “I must alert you, that if 
there are any changes in this decision we will do everything within our power to have 
all Civil Rights organizations urge Negroes to withdraw from any competition as far 
as the Olympic Games are concerned…. America cannot in 1967 condone the racist 
policies of South Africa. … We hope that unless there is a change in the South African 
policy, the United States delegation will fight vigorously any changes from its present 
position.”247 
This letter was straightforward – keep South Africa out or the IOC will risk a 
boycott. Letters advocating a boycott of the Mexico City Games provided an ongoing 
thread at this stage of the debate.  
On the other hand, some letters supporting the re-admittance of South Africa had 
severe racist and political undertones; however, they sometimes reflected on the 
internal condition of the letter writer’s own country, rather than those prevailing in 
South Africa: “Thank you very much for this, that is, the guts to speak up. I’m so fed up 
hearing about and seeing the negro I could throw up. This America of ours reflects so 
little of its basic culture anymore that I’m beginning to think I’m the minority. I’d just 
love to see an all-white team represent the USA and let the negro go to hell.”248 
Brundage did not need support based in its own form of racism. Letters from 
people such as noted Olympic competitor Ralph Boston, in response to one of 
Brundage’s public statements, struck a rational yet exceedingly critical tone: “As an 
Olympic competitor, I am strongly against [the] use of the Olympic Games for anything 
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other than the reason for which they were organized. I am sure that you are aware of 
the fact that sports has helped the cause of the Negro’s [sic] more than any other single 
thing and that chances for a boycott are practically nil. The people who are saying 
such things are not appointed leaders and have no reason to attempt to speak for 
Negroes as a whole. In short they are ‘out of order’.”249 
Frequently, Brundage sought to correct what he considered erroneous information 
in the public debate. Usually, he reiterated the IOC’s basic position that the 
organization did not condone racial discrimination in sports and insisted on the 
separation of sport and politics. The task of the Commission investigating the South 
African situation was to determine just those conditions in the country, as Brundage 
explained to Tom Jacobson: “The fundamental basis of the Olympic Movement is no 
discrimination because of race, color, religion or political affiliations. Apartheid is a 
political policy of the South African government and we do not deal with 
governments.  … We have sent a committee to investigate and there will be a report 
at the next meeting of the International Olympic Committee in Grenoble next 
February.”250 
The amount of correspondence directed to Brundage spiked following the IOC 
South Africa Commission visit to South Africa. M.O. Whitsel Sr. of Louisiana argued 
that action deriving from the Commission would only serve to harm the athletes: “I 
read an article, in which so called big leaders, are talking [about] boycotts by 
American negroes to the International meets…. It is them (big leaders) who are 
hurting the negro athletes. These men who are great in sports have worked hard to 
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get where they are. Now some big so-called leaders are hurting these men and women 
who have worked hard to get to the top.”251 
Ralph Davis, a lawyer from Chicago, USA, expressed a similar opinion: “After 
hearing the proposals [of the American Negro athletes], I commented that they were 
‘shooting’ at the wrong persons. In my opinion you had always been the ‘Champion’ 
of the rights of the amateur and minority groups.”252 The reception of principally 
supportive letters was balanced against those with a negative connotation, as, for 
example, a note from John Laird of California: “Just let those negroes go to – do not 
even try to pacify them; we can get along without them and they will be the losers so 
just sit tight and leave them alone…. Of course they won’t want to stay home since 
they like to be seen on TV so much…. If the TV station would stop showing them 
waving their arms telling their crowds what to do, most of the rioting would stop.”253 
Vera Herbstman, by contrast, encouraged Brundage to join the Black American 
boycott of the Olympic Games.254 D.K. Miller passed on support from people on Capitol 
Hill, commending the position Brundage had taken.255 Ardis Bryant sent Brundage a 
six-page booklet discussing how the boycott would negatively affect black athletes.256  
Of far greater weight was the letter Brundage received from Douglas Roby, 
President of the United States Olympic Committee257 and IOC member. Roby 
expressed himself skeptical of South Africa’s aims: 
I am writing to express my concern about the possibility of South 
Africa’s readmission to the Olympic Games, despite her continued 
policy of ‘separation’, that is, apartheid, in sports. If the Olympic 
Committee seriously respects the Olympic Charter it cannot possibly 
allow South Africa to participate, since it is obvious that Vorster’s 
new sports policy is merely a new face for the same old situation of 
discrimination. South Africa, by enforcing separation of the races in 
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sports up to actual participation in the Games, is obviously going 
against the Charter.… apartheid is necessarily a political matter, and 
its intrusion into sports matters is grounds for the continued 
expulsion of South Africa from the Olympic Games. I therefore urge 
the International Olympic Committee, at its meeting at the end of the 
month in Grenoble, to decide not to allow South Africa back into the 
Olympics. This will be one of the strongest ways in which the world 
can express its abhorrence of South Africa’s racial policies, and it is 
an opportunity which must not be missed.258 
This was the first letter specifically referring to the upcoming IOC Grenoble 
meeting where a decision to readmit South Africa was to be made. Advice for 
Brundage relative to the Grenoble meetings continued to come in. Joseph and Carol 
Schwab of New York basically mirrored Roby’s argument: “We are not fooled—and 
trust that you are not fooled either—by South Africa’s promise to send a racially 
mixed team to the Olympics; obviously, black athletes do not have an opportunity 
equal to that of whites to qualify for a South African team…. We hope that as you 
consider your position on this matter you will think of the human degradation that is 
committed under apartheid in South Africa.”259 
SAN-ROC’s attempts to mobilize international opinion was also increasingly 
reflected in the correspondence. For example, Margaret Flory of New York based her 
opinion on information circulated by SAN-ROC: “Mr. Dennis Brutus, President of 
South Africa’s Non-Racial Olympic Committee has himself stated that South Africa’s 
‘New Sports Policy’ has so far been nothing more than a propaganda tool and has not 
in any way affected the racial structure of South African sports. Therefore[,] South 
Africa’s policies of racial discrimination in sports continue unchecked. …We feel that 
the IOC must not allow South Africa in the Olympic competition until she does in fact 
learn to accept the principles of racial equality….”260 
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Rudolph Balsiger, who had published an extensive and one-sided report in 1963, 
distributed a long letter to IOC members. He reiterated many of the arguments made 
in the report mentioned in an earlier chapter. He insisted on racial separation, arguing 
that the guidance of whites through a policy of separate development had contributed 
much to the development of the non-white population of South Africa, compared to 
other African countries. SAN-ROC, in contrast to the ostensibly benevolent white 
organization, was “an illegal, political Committee which tries to win the allegiance of 
Non-White sport organizations and render them subservient to their political 
designs.”261 And Dennis Brutus, he argued, certainly could not be trusted: After all, it 
must have been Brutus himself who, on the occasion of a meeting organized in 1963 
by SANOC and attended by both Balsiger and the then banned Brutus, through “self-
denunciation” had seen to it that South African police appeared on the scene, in order 
“to show me, a foreigner, what a police state South Africa was.”262 When Brutus was 
later shot by South African police, John Harris took over for SAN-ROC whose 
statements, Balsiger insisted, “showed more and more his true attitude which, in my 
opinion, had nothing to do with sport, but uncovered the Communist agent more and 
more.”263 Ultimately, Balsiger warned the IOC not to overestimate its influence on 
South African racial politics, and focus on the sports situation within the context of 
that racial policy: “The racial legislation in South Africa would never be changed by or 
because of sport, in the same way as no other Government, whether of the East, West 
or Africa, would change her laws as a result of the wishes of the IOC. And there are 
many things in many countries which could be rendered more worthy of human 
293 
 
 
beings…. A boycott of South Africa by the IOC would direct itself in the first instance 
and with all its force against the Non-White sportsmen of this country.”264 
By contrast, contributors such as Robert Maurer, Mathew Ahmann, or Arne 
Sovik,265 based their opposition to the racial policies of South Africa on human rights 
and the unity of the human race. Until South Africa provided social change and racial 
integration, they urged the IOC to deny South Africa’s participation in the 1968 Mexico 
City Games. Nor would have Balsiger convinced Leon Shull, J. Murray MacInnes, Tim 
Smith, or Edwin Luidens,266 all of whom individually addressed the inauthenticity of 
South Africa’s “New Sports Policy.” Shull, for example, noted that “… further 
examination reveal[ed] that the team’s membership still [was] chosen through 
racially segregated trial competition. Separate racial competition and inferior 
facilities for non-white athletes repudiates the essence of free, unrestrained 
competition mandatory for national representation…”267 Shull therefore urged the 
IOC “not to accept the ‘New Sports Policy’ that would allow South African participation 
in the 1968 Olympics.”268  Bruce A. Cronnell, similarly, appealed to the necessity of not 
supporting racism,269 while others, such as Vel Phillips and Bettie Mae Eisendrath,270 
as well as Elizabeth Landis,271 based their arguments on the Olympic Charter and 
South African law. Landis pointed out that, the new sport policy notwithstanding “the 
South African government prevents compliance with the Olympic Charter, in 
particular Principle 1 and Clause 25…. The fact that South Africa may be represented 
by a team which includes non-white athletes, chosen, after separate competitions for 
members of each racial group, by a multi-racial committee on which whites have a 
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built-in dominant position, does not change the fundamentally discriminatory nature 
of all sports in South Africa.…”272 
Some of the correspondents argued for the exclusion of South Africa from the basis 
of personal experiences in the country, among them James Dorothy and Tina Bristol 
of Philadelphia: “As a result of two years of experience in Southern Africa, we are 
deeply aware of the racial injustice daily, doing violence [to] millions [of] non-white 
Africans. International condemnation of apartheid is necessary. South Africa’s new 
sports policy is hypocritical, leaving unaltered racially segregated trial competitions 
for selection of the Olympic team.”273 
Though the majority of early correspondence on the matter was from the USA, 
letters from other parts of the world also continued to reach the IOC. Lars Borge-
Andersen wrote on behalf of the Norwegian Council for Southern Africa which “fully 
support[ed] the demand for continued exclusion of South Africa from the Olympic 
Games, as long as coloured sportsmen are not allowed to compete freely with white…., 
[we] request Olympic sportsmen to condemn sports racism in South Africa and to 
insist on the decision of 1963 not to permit South Africa to take part in the Olympics 
until there has been ‘a change of policy regarding colour discrimination in sports and 
competitions in its county’.”274 
Palmer Van Gundy, who wanted Brundage to use his influence and power to keep 
South Africa out of the Games, was another who offered that line of reasoning.275 
George Houser of the American Committee on Africa (ACA), similarly wrote to 
Westerhoff to complain: “The IOC’s decision to readmit South Africa to the Olympics 
has destroyed the integrity of the Games. South Africa’s policy does not change 
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apartheid in sports in South African and still defies Olympic rules. Reaction in much 
of the world will confirm the fact that the IOC accepts racism.”276  
Houser’s intervention drew a lengthy reply from Geoffrey Picard, a bronze medalist 
at the 1964 Tokyo Games. He objected to ACA’s call for a boycott since the racial 
segregation it targeted, was by no means limited to South Africa, but rather 
“appear[ed] indicative of ‘fuzzy thinking’,” inasmuch as such segregation was not 
unique to a single country. “I suspect,” he averred,  
that either directly or indirectly the Hindus’ discrimination against 
Moslems and other Hindus, the Moslems’ discrimination against 
Hindus, the discrimination against Chinese in Malaysia and 
Indonesia is reflected in the composition of the Olympic teams of 
India, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Indonesia respectively. Obviously we 
can go further: Should not the anti-Asian policy of Kenya be 
considered? And, if so, what about the U.K.? We have not even 
mentioned the U.S.A. … Were your [ACA’s] protest one against 
discrimination in general, it would be far more effective. Indeed, in 
this case, the protest could be focused on South African apartheid as 
a concrete symbol of a much larger problem. Lacking emphasis on 
these broader implications significantly weakens the proposal.… 277 
Picard concluded his argument against a boycott by pointing out that it would only 
lead to the denial of important opportunities to participate in high-level competitions 
to “blacks, whites, and Asian, however selected.”278 
The international correspondence remained strong as evidenced by missives from 
The National Executive Board and Pan African Students’ Organization in the 
Americas,279 Leonard West, on behalf of the Africa Cultural Centre,280 and David H. 
Rubenstein, the Associate Secretary for Africa for The United Church Board for World 
Ministries. He argued that the IOC’s admittance of South Africa amounted to a 
contravention of Articles 1 and 25 of the Olympic Charter; he “urge[d] that the 
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International Olympic Committee reconsider its decision concerning South Africa’s 
participation under its present declared policy, and thus make it unnecessary for the 
Supreme Council of Sports for Africa and other nations of the world to boycott the 
Olympic Games in 1968.”281 
Nonetheless, there were those who, for various reasons, supported South Africa’s 
re-admittance. Henry Cathles, writing to Brundage, deplored that “… the tendency of 
communist and new African states not educated in the enlightened classical purpose 
of the Olympic Games as originally established in Greece, is to use them for political 
boycott, spreading hate and unrest…. Of course one cannot help wondering if we are 
not better off without the barbarian communists, etc. in the games at all!”282 Nancy 
Lee Hanson, expressed her support of South Africa’s re-admittance, inasmuch as it 
had “taken the first amazing step forward by agreeing to an integrated team. This 
surely will be followed by other steps – certainly if the negro athletes do themselves 
proud and win some medals or shatter some records. Think what that would do for 
Black morale in South Africa…. I think you are doing a wonderful job toward better 
world relations. Keep it up.”283  T.R. Kendrick III of Georgia, offered similar words of 
encouragement: “I believe that the Union of South Africa by being willing to liberalize 
its apartheid philosophy and enter a completely integrated team is a mammoth step 
forward for that nation and is a ‘big feather in the cap’ of international athletics.  This 
is the first indication of liberalization of the apartheid philosophy that even economic 
and political embargoes have been unable to change. I believe it would be a very big 
mistake for the International Olympic Committee to give in to a threat of boycott by 
several minor fourth and fifth class nations….”284 
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Often enough, however, letters in favour of South African reinstatement carried 
racist undertones. Forbes Norris, for example, declared himself “…sick and tired of 
reading about these ‘unhappy black racists.’ Now they want to dictate how the 
Olympics should be run…. I hope you and the Board will stick to your guns and let 
South Africa compete. If the blacks don’t like it, fine. I’d rather we lost without them 
than win with them. I wish they’d all get out…. don’t let the blacks ruin it.”285 
While Brundage received letters expressing concern about the effects of such 
decisions on various countries,286 most focussed strictly on the IOC and South Africa. 
Sir Arnold Lunn broke down the situation to two choices for the IOC. When one 
explored them, certain contradictions surfaced: 
The Olympic Committee could adopt one of two logical policies with 
regard to countries in which men are persecuted or discriminated 
against for religious, political or racial reasons. The Committee could 
exclude from the Games all teams representing countries in which 
there is such persecution, and this I believe might lead to a real 
diminution of persecution, or the Committee could admit all teams, 
irrespective of the domestic policies of the countries entering them, 
but in a century in which there has been more persecution than in 
any previous century, to signal out one country, South Africa, for 
excommunication, is a classic example of selective indignation…. As 
the IOC officially disapproved of apartheid as practised by South 
Africa, why did the Committee ignore apartheid as practised by 
Germany and Russia? … I am not criticising the Olympic Committee 
for admitting Russia to the Games … but the inconsistency in 
applying what you profess to be the Olympic Committee’s principles. 
‘Apartheid, Nazism and Communism …’ you write, ‘are political 
doctrines, and we have enough troubles in sport without venturing 
into politics.’ But you did venture into politics when you 
excommunicated South Africa for its apartheid politics. The form of 
anti-Semitic apartheid practised by Nazi Germany was infinitely, I 
repeat, infinitely, more objectionable than that practised by South 
Africa, and if you had withdrawn the Olympic Games from Germany 
when it became impossible to deny that thousands of Jews were 
being persecuted, the blow to Hitler’s prestige might have been 
incalculable.287 
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The IOC did indeed begin to understand that its decisions concerning forms of 
political discrimination that had affected earlier Olympic Games, were exerting a 
significant influence on its options to reach a decision on the South African case. 
Indeed, one effect of this international debate was that the issue of discrimination and 
its connection to political intervention was discussed prominently.  
Brundage even received resolutions that were more closely linked to political 
decision making bodies, such as the Japanese Diet Member Sports Promotion 
Federation: “Though we believe the world of sports should not be influenced by 
politics or ideologies, the current controversy involving re-entry of South Africa in the 
Olympic games comes from the people[’]s innate idea[s] demanding non-
discrimination of races and equal treatment for them, and we strongly request that 
the IOC should take proper steps, in the light of the spirit of the Charter of Olympics, 
to open conversation urgently with the representatives of African nations so as to 
prevent the so-called Five-Rings Rally being reduced to a Four-Rings one.”288 This 
missive made it clear that the political connotations of the situation could not be 
avoided.  
This resolution focused on involving every African country in the discussion 
because of the politics involved. It seemed that political repercussions were 
unavoidable according to the Rt. Rev. C. Edward Crowther’s personal experience: 
Having been deported by the South African government in June last 
year because of the stand I was obliged to take in the light of the 
tremendous suffering of my people, I believe that I can speak with 
reasonable knowledge of the situation…. I know how politically 
useful to the government of South Africa the decision of the Olympic 
Committee will be. I am perfectly aware of the argument that politics 
has no place in sport. I only wish that were so. In South Africa, sport 
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is politics. The triumph of Mr. Vorster in furthering the belief of the 
whites of South Africa that the world will learn to accept apartheid 
is a terrible blow to the many non-white people and those South 
African whites who look to the outside world for hope and support…. 
It is in the hope that sport can be preserved from politics that I urge 
you to seek reconsideration of South Africa’s participation in the 
Olympic Games.289 
Brundage was not willing to accept the possibility that sports and politics could be 
so inextricably intertwined. “The International Olympic Committee does not deal with 
governments nor with political policies,” he informed SAN-ROC representative John 
Rogers, “[e]very member of the Committee is firmly opposed to discrimination of any 
kind in sport. South Africa has not been admitted to the Olympic Games, we are 
inviting a multi-racial team selected by a multi-racial committee in accordance with 
the Olympic regulations.”290 
Brundage appreciated those, who like him, clearly separated SANOC from South 
African politics. When he agreed with people, such as correspondents Nancy Lee 
Hanson, T.R. Kendrick III, and Martin Pape,291 he wrote letters thanking them for their 
support. However, Brundage did not expect all feedback to be positive and he well 
realized that some of the IOC’s conflicts were necessary. He pointed out to 
correspondent Henry Cathles: “It seems to be a continuous battle to keep the Olympic 
Movement free from politics and commercialism. In this last squabble they seem to 
overlook the fact that the IOC is the only organization that has ever done something 
for the underprivileged non-whites of South Africa.”292 
Regardless of the good Brundage thought the IOC was able to accomplish, 
statements of personal support and criticism, of morals or political reasoning, 
continued to arrive, many in support of South Africa’s exclusion from the 1968 Mexico 
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City Games. A Canadian labour union, misunderstanding IOC administrative 
procedures, even requested that the Canadian federal government, through the 
Canadian Olympic Committee, involve itself directly and “demand an extraordinary 
meeting of the 71-member International Olympic Committee to reverse its earlier 
decision to readmit South Africa for participation in the Summer Olympics, to be held 
in Mexico City in October of this year…. Failing such reversal by the IOC, this Union 
requests the Canadian Government that it advise the Canadian Olympic Committee to 
withdraw from the Summer Olympics.”293  
Such a suggestion to mix sports with political processes was sure to raise the IOC’s, 
and Brundage’s, ire. To the latter’s credit, he was consistent in his convictions and did 
not waver in his message, which he continually repeated in his correspondence. To 
correspondents such as Hugh McGee, Carl Bauer, James Wilson, James Lee, Joseph 
Pratt, Ira Nadler, or Edwin Mosler,294 Brundage offered the same unchanging position: 
The issue was whether politicians or sportsmen controlled the Olympic Games. 
Correspondent  Alejandro Sanchez Robles of Mexico offered insight from the 
perspective of just such a sportsman: “…if the majority is against the participation of 
South Africa, it is because it does not take the trouble to consider that athletes cannot 
be held responsible for the political attitude of their governments. The fact that South 
Africa has agreed to send a multi-racial team to Mexico indicates that she is prepared 
to respect the Olympic Ideal…. The Olympic Games are not competitions between 
nations but between individuals, and claims from countries which refuse to 
understand this are not worth further attention.”295 Edwin Mosler likewise 
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emphatically expressed his support for Brundage’s insistence on the separation of 
sports from politics:  
We have a right to expect that the Olympic Committee will not 
interfere in internal politics, laws, or policy, and that the nations that 
compete will not use the Olympic Games as a forum to express their 
political views or advance their ideologies. If South Africa is admitted 
to the Olympic Games and lives up to the Olympic regulation and 
ideals, I expect to support those Games and I am willing to work a 
little harder if that’s what it means…. When the IOC allows politics to 
enter the picture and accedes to the demands of nations who 
disagree in politics or ideologies, that’s when I will lose interest…. I 
hope your committee will stand by its decision.296 
Some correspondents, on the other hand, invoked the notion of a universal 
morality: “It is within the power of the International Olympic Committee to help 
prevent the dangerous division between the black and white races of the world. Please 
express your belief in the equality of all men by [having] representation in the 
Olympics by the athletes from South Africa.”297 Grace Campbell likewise excoriated 
“South Africa’s deplorable and inhumane policy of apartheid [which] simply cannot 
and must not be tolerated any longer by the freedom loving, just and humane peoples 
of the world…. We intend to do our utmost to influence all the people we can against 
visiting the games or Mexico because of this shameful condition.”298 To the extent that 
moral considerations entered the discussion, as this example indicates, they were in 
the large majority of contributions targeted at a discussion of the race-related issue. 
This, in consequence, became the dominant strand of this narrative, leading the 
majority of correspondents to demand a retraction of the invitation, and to ignore 
possible side effects such as the foreclosure of opportunities to participate in high-
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level competitions. Hideji Kawasaki’s letter to Brundage provided a good example of 
this race-centred aspect of the developing narrative: 
… there lies a fundamental question on the participation of South 
Africa in the Olympic Games since it has been pursuing, as the 
national policy, strict discrimination between the white and non-
white people which go counter to the spirit of Olympics…. The 
statement made by the South African [National] Olympic Committee 
on February 28, 1968, seemed to be a step forward to the right 
direction, and the invitation of the IOC extended to it bas[ed] on the 
said statement should be said reasonable…. It is reported, however, 
by some reliable sources that there have been instances in South 
Africa recently in which whites were given preferential treatment in 
selection of players in some athletic events and that uni-racial bouts 
of boxing were held. Viewing from these facts, it must be said that in 
South Africa there will never be equitable selection which is 
essential to the Olympic Games.299 
This emphatic dimension of the debate was also echoed in a close concern with the 
stipulations of Article 1 touching on discrimination. Ira E. Gillet of Portland, Oregon, 
suggested that a clarification of those stipulations would be helpful: “It seems to me 
the code needs clarification else decision and boycotts will occur because of 
interpretations which are not warranted by the wording of the code…. ‘No 
discrimination is allowed’ by whom? By IOC? Or by the internal regulations of the 
participating countries in their selection of teams? … One could scarcely conceive of 
an IOC being permitted to discriminate on the grounds mentioned.”300 Going further, 
Lynn Moran suggested an even more simplified decision-making framework. South 
Africa’s willingness to nominate white and non-white athletes indicated the country’s 
adherence to the Olympic oath; this would be sufficient to decide the case: “The 
Olympic oath should be followed, of course, but what a country does outside the 
Olympics should not ever concern the IOC, which must consider itself strictly separate 
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from politics or national pressures at all times.”301 ACA Director George Houser, on 
the other hand, denied that such a possibility existed, since racial discrimination in 
South Africa could not be overcome without political intervention, and sports could 
not be an exception. The withdrawal of South Africa’s invitation could not be 
understood as anything other than a political act: “… the resolution passed by the IOC 
in its re-admittance of South Africa admits that South Africa’s internal sports policy is 
discriminatory and that the South African National Olympic Committee does not 
achieve the aims of Fundamental Principle I. Yet, paradoxically, the IOC has decided 
to still allow South Africa to participate in the Games…. South Africa would have the 
world think that there has been a change in its internal racial policy of apartheid. 
There has been no change…”302 Brundage, as may be expected, objected to this 
perspective, pointing out that the IOC did not “deal with governments nor with 
political policies [sic]. The South Africa Olympic Committee has agreed to send a 
multi-racial team, selected by a multiracial committee to the Games of the XIX 
Olympiad in Mexico City;” this decision remained internal to the relevant sporting 
organizations.303 
The volume of correspondence increased until mere days before the pivotal 1968 
Lausanne Executive Board meeting to discuss the South African issue. Reactions 
subsequent to the meetings expressed a wide range of opinions, from disappointment 
to emphatic support for the decision.  Some statements commented on the lack of a 
black voice in the decision-making process: “In all the ‘hue and cry’ over the 
participation of South Africa in the Olympics, one big observation is that at no time, 
by no person, have the black athletes themselves been given a choice in the matter! … 
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I am sure THEY would argue that for South Africa to enter with integrated teams, 
represents an important step forward.… I am not a ‘white racist’—in fact, my own 
husband is a Negro—BUT we are both realistic enough to believe that if a man is to 
preach an end to hypocrisy, he had better NOT be found practicing it himself!”304 
Philip Melnick similarly registered his disappointment “to hear of the decision to 
keep South Africa from participating in this year’s Olympics in Mexico! This action will 
not help but only increase the racial tensions in that country…. Sports should be free 
from such methods of coercion and intimidation.”305 Further, J. Maurice Clark 
expressed his discontent in a letter to Westerhoff, but acknowledged that Brundage 
had had to maintain a very finely tuned balance: “Sportsmen everywhere will surely 
deplore the action of your board in recommending withdrawal of South Africa’s 
invitation to participate in this year’s Games…. Apartheid has nothing to do in this 
connection, because the South Africa team was to have been multi-racial…. I am not 
racialist, and I dislike apartheid. But I also dislike the habit, so prevalent now-a-days, 
of yielding to every irresponsible and immature outcry by the so-called ‘coloured’ 
peoples. Your Board, Sir, has just afforded a prime example of this weak-minded 
surrender…”306 
Many correspondents, P.F.S. Otten of the Netherlands among them, argued by 
comparison, questioning as unfair treatment the singling-out of South Africa when 
several examples of similarly problematic conditions could easily be identified: 
“Really I do not understand the attitude of your International Olympic Committee 
with respect to South Africa. In the later years I have had the opportunity to visit many 
countries in Africa and in none of them the position and treatment of the coloured 
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people (Bantus) is so good as in South Africa…. It is being an unfair and unwise 
popular attitude always again to criticize South Africa, without having been there and 
in other countries of Africa and without serious knowledge and a yardstick for 
comparison.”307 Ernst V. Lotz also criticized the IOC’s strategy as unfair and 
unbalanced: “To be consistent, the IOC should now also ban the following countries 
from the Games: Russia, for all the atrocities committed in the name of Communism 
(the Wall of Shame in Berlin, to name but one); Great Britain and Australia for 
discrimination against would be non-white immigrants; Israel for her recent war of 
aggression, etc., etc. Then, when all the devils have been banned,” he continued 
sardonically, “the angels will have the field all to themselves.”308 
This sentiment was echoed by Mr. and Mrs. Haldiman’s letter: “What nation does 
not discriminate …. Russia anti-Semitic, Israel anti-Arab, Black African Nations anti-
white and on and on. And South Africa had agreed to integrate its team fully…. The 
next trip we take will be to South Africa, a good friend to America [who] is really 
feeling discrimination at the hands of our irresponsible ‘leaders’ in Washington and 
the U.N.”309 Edward Schinman, lastly, criticized the IOC for excluding South Africa 
while failing to do likewise in the case of “countries as Nigeria, who have boycotted 
athletes both on the basis of race and religion and you have also welcomed Soviet 
Russia among whose representatives I am sure you will be hard pressed to find non-
communists or Jews. The same applies, for example, to Poland, and how many Asians 
will you find on the team representing Kenya…. It would appear that the Olympic 
Committee is now engaging in politics….”310 
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Stuart Morris from Wisconsin, on the other hand, acknowledged that Brundage 
could not control many aspects of the South African debacle: “As but one man, you 
could not have prevented the outcry over South Africa’s admission to the ’68 summer 
games, but how right it was that she be admitted after agreeing to send an integrated 
team. Even thus, have politics subverted the Baron’s ideals and goals.”311 But had 
Brundage, after all, lacked the courage of his convictions? “But you could have taken 
one more courageous step—you could have indicated that South Africa’s admission 
was more important to you than your position as President, or more important than 
the ’68 games themselves, for that matter—you could have resigned in protest!”312 
Peter Luisa of Queens, New York, was even more scathing in his criticism of the IOC: 
I would like to say that it is an outright shame that people even think 
like you do in a world such as ours. Don’t you, and more importantly, 
the African nations realize that by your actions you have thrown into 
the ground and completely crushed, the first formidable chance that 
the Negro has had to prove himself in South Africa ….I thought that 
your actions were a crime. I realize that you were all under 
tremendous pressure … but it is totally incomprehensible to me, that 
you could be true to yourselves in fostering such actions, as banning 
South Africa again after letting them re-enter the Olympics….313 
Rutherford Platt’s disappointment at the decision was also based in the 
understanding usually advocated by the IOC, namely, that only sport-internal factors 
should be taken into consideration: “I am sure that the young athletes who entered 
the lists from South Africa, were not in the least involved in making any political 
decision in their country, whether those decisions are right or wrong in others’ 
opinions. That has nothing to do with your criteria. They must have offered to 
compete as sportsmen, purely.”314 Alan Cochet’s criticism likewise focussed on the 
fact that the decision would affect the athletes rather than the political system at the 
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root of all the problems: “Sir, if you allow political differences to prevent South Africa 
from participating in the Olympic Games, you are not punishing South Africa, but her 
athletes and all the athletes of the world…. It was previously a cliché to say that the 
Olympics generate international good will. I am terribly afraid that henceforth it will 
be stated that the Olympics generate international controversy…. I deeply feel that 
South Africa should not be barred from competing in the 1968 summer Olympic 
Games.”315 
Considerations of fair and unfair treatment, of countries reprehensible or 
commendable, frequently shifted towards a discussion of the political characteristics 
by which such distinctions should be made, in particular between the Communist and 
non-Communist countries of the time. Here, the exclusion of South Africa was often 
understood as a victory for ‘blackmail’ from the Communist Bloc countries who were 
identified negatively by their support for what was seen as problematic opposition 
from Black African countries. Correspondent Andrew McAllister spoke of the Games 
becoming a weapon for “Communists against the Free World,” warning that the USA 
should not compete in the Games in order to send a message to the world that it would 
not submit to blackmail from Communists or “the black power block.”316 Dewey Taft 
argued that the IOC shocked the entire world by barring South Africa while allowing 
“barbarian professionals from Communist countries” to dominate the Games.317 
Ralph Russell interpreted South Africa’s exclusion as “another stunning victory for the 
Communist conspiracy. …. By this one act,” he criticized the IOC, “you have changed 
the Games from an athletic event to a political/racial sideshow. You will have allowed 
the Communists to use the Games as a tool for political propaganda. Try to think of 
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the black and white athletes of the Union of South Africa, these men and women have 
worked just as hard and waited just as long as their counterparts in the other 
countries for a chance that will never come their way again.”318 J.D. Bell also expressed 
his disdain for the IOC’s “[y]ielding to such flagrant blackmail … [which] has utterly 
destroyed its image and prestige. It was a shocking exhibition of cowardice and 
unjustified prejudice.”319 
 Charles Soltis, on the other hand, acknowledged the difficult position Brundage 
and the IOC had found themselves in as they sought to bring about a resolution of the 
issue, but, he noted, the organization would have emerged stronger had it “taken a 
stand on principle – that it keep the door barred to political pressure and interference; 
that the original vote to reinstate the Republic of South Africa was valid and should 
not have been brought up again.” Surely, nobody would have equated the acceptance 
of South Africa with an endorsement of its racial politics: “I am positive that the 
participation of Russia in the Olympic Games cannot be interpreted to mean that the 
people of the world at large approve of the system of Communism.” In consequence 
of the IOC’s actions, Soltis concluded, “the future of the Olympic Games has been 
weakened … not strengthened; …this short-sighted decision based on politics and 
expediency will introduce long-run problem of monumental proportions.”320 
Brundage in dealing with the torrent of correspondence precipitated by the 
exclusion of South Africa, largely held fast to his strategic position, insisting that the 
decisions were driven by considerations internal to the Olympic community, and not 
by political objectives; therefore, no Olympic principles were abandoned. His defense 
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remained consistent, as is evidenced by several pieces of similar correspondence, for 
which the following is a typical example:  
The Olympic Movement with its basic principle of no discrimination 
of any kind found itself of all places in the middle of this terrible 
international racial conflict…. We saved the Games of the XIX 
Olympiad and prevented a complete rupture in the world of 
international sport without yielding any Olympic Principles. 
However, it is a sad commentary on our so-called civilization that 
one cannot stage Games designed to promote international 
friendship without demonstrations, boycotts, disorder and 
violence.321 
Some people commended Brundage on his strength and resilience. Sgt. James E. 
Moore thanked Brundage for his unwavering stand. He acknowledged that the 
international pressure on Brundage must have been immense at a time when 
Brundage also had to manage conflicting national interests. He suggested that the IOC 
“… release to UPI or the AP the two IOC votes country by country which eventually 
disqualified South Africa from the Olympics. The sports fans of this world are entitled 
to know how treacherous and backbiting some of the Nations really are.”322 Such an 
act would have been beyond Brundage’s authority, however, and it would have 
amounted to a breach of trust. The stability of the Olympic Movement, whose 
credibility had already suffered in consequence of these developments, might well 
have been crushed by such an incident. After all, it was not uncommon to encounter 
opinions of the IOC such as that espoused by Marjorie Headly, who was sharply critical 
of the men “who sit as officials in the Olympic Committee [who] are, in my opinion, a 
bunch of self-righteous hypocrites, who, while maintaining that the Olympics are 
nonpartisan, which it is not, has dragged the question of political expediency into the 
sports arena….”323 
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Brundage and the IOC, it was clear, were walking a fine line; no matter what 
decision the Movement arrived at in the end, it was certain to generate opposition and 
hostility to the same degree that it gave rise to approbation and approval. The 
exclusion of South Africa from the 1968 Mexico City Olympic Games, did nothing to 
resolve these tensions. 
7. Discussion: Developments during the Period, 
1964-1968 
It was clear by the 1968 Mexico City Olympic Games that the ‘three dominant 
voices’—South African Olympic affiliates, domestic resistance, and international 
community—were representative of two distinct sides of the South African situation: 
supportive of South Africa’s re-admittance or supportive of South Africa’s 
banishment. The result of the IOC vote to readmit South Africa to the Mexico City 
Games sparked unprecedented discussion and divide. Nonetheless, there was 
sufficient evidence for explaining the IOC’s ultimate stance. Though each voice 
continued to espouse a recognizable message, the international community 
dominated the discourse. 
The three factors that shaped the final decision regarding South Africa’s 
participation in the 1960 Rome Games and 1964 Tokyo Games remained relevant in 
the IOC’s decision to withdraw South Africa’s invitation to the 1968 Mexico City 
Games. First of all, at the core of the debate, as it had been for over a decade, was 
Article 1 of the Olympic Charter. Arguments based on a combination of Articles 1, 24, 
and 25 contributed to the withdrawal of South Africa’s invitation to the 1968 Mexico 
City Games. Article 1 forbade any racial discrimination, Article 24 instructed NOCs to 
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follow the rules and regulations of the IOC, and Article 25 emphasized the need for 
NOCs to be politically independent and autonomous, able “to resist all political, 
religious or commercial pressure… National Olympic Committees that do not conform 
to the Rules and Regulations of the International Olympic Committee forfeit their 
recognition and their right to send participants to the Olympic Games.”324 
SANOC tried to overcome the discrimination and racism in South African sport by 
brokering concessions with the government that allowed SANOC to select a multi-
racial team. However, the sticking issue was the point succinctly stated by Mexico’s 
IOC member José de Jesus Clark: 
There is no doubt that the desire of all voters was to eliminate racial 
discrimination, with the only difference that some aimed at 
maintaining non-discrimination within the stipulations of Rule No. 
1, in a permanent way and as one of the basic fundamentals of the 
Olympic Ideal, and the others only thought of eliminating 
discrimination in the specific representation of a country at the 
Olympic Games, which in essence, is contradictory to the Ideal and 
does not offer a definite and permanent solution.325 
Although Brundage and other IOC members viewed Article 1 as only applicable to 
a country’s Olympic team in regard to the Olympic Games itself, the interpretation of 
Article 1 as a permanent, basic fundamental Olympic Ideal dominated the debate that 
led to South Africa’s suspension for both the 1964 and 1968 Olympic Games.  
Second, the IOC’s trust in its own protocol and structure affected decisions as the 
1968 Mexico City Games approached. The SANOC delegation had the opportunity to 
present its case to the IOC Executive Board and General Session for reinstatement to 
the Olympic Games. As a result, an IOC South Africa Commission (SAC) was assembled 
to evaluate the sport landscape in South Africa devoid of any political considerations. 
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SAC’s directive was to specifically investigate if SANOC complied with Article 24 and 
25 of the Olympic Charter. Remaining distant from any resolutions or 
recommendations to the IOC membership, SAC presented a report of its findings in 
South Africa. Based on SANOC’s willingness and preparedness to form a mixed team 
for the upcoming Mexico City Games and the results of SAC’s report, a resolution was 
approved by an absolute majority that allowed SANOC to enter a team into the 1968 
Olympic Games. According to the conditions of the resolution, as long as SANOC’s 
team conformed specifically to Article 1, in addition to the other rules and regulations, 
of the Olympic Charter and SANOC’s efforts continued to remove all racial 
discrimination from amateur sport, the question of South Africa’s participation in the 
IOC, Olympic Games, and Olympic Movement would not be reconsidered until 1970. 
This decision created international controversy. 
As a result of a large faction unhappy with the re-admission of South Africa to the 
Olympic Games, the goal of those who opposed the Grenoble vote was to call an 
Extraordinary Session to discuss the South African situation and, possibly, muster 
another vote. After much discussion about the various rules that could have been 
invoked to force Brundage to call a plenary session, Brundage had an emergency 
meeting with the Mexican delegation of Ramírez Vázquez, Gómez, and Clark in 
Chicago. Brundage received a petition from the Chairman of the Mexican Organizing 
Committee, Ramírez Vázquez, that set into motion Article 41 of the Olympic Charter, 
which allowed an Organizing Committee to submit a request to the Executive Board 
to decide on a matter of controversy of a non-technical nature concerning the Olympic 
Games. Without that particular request, the whole controversy would not have been 
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discussed in a timely manner. Article 41 was responsible for opening a much needed 
discussion on South Africa. Due to Brundage’s Chicago meeting, he decided to call a 
special Executive Board meeting to discuss the South African situation. The result of 
the 1968 Lausanne Executive Board meeting was a unanimous proposal to withdraw 
SANOC’s invitation to the Mexico City Games. The proposal was approved by the IOC 
membership through the administration of a postal vote. 
Third, the IOC was unwillingly drawn into the political and domestic issues 
entangled in the South African situation. SANOC’s re-admittance to the 1968 Mexico 
City Games while South Africa’s apartheid policies did not fully allow SANOC to 
properly abide by Articles 1, 24, and 25 triggered international and political unrest, 
which led to the threat of a boycott. The opposition to South Africa’s participation was 
based on an anti-apartheid movement, which was a stand against South Africa’s laws 
and policies. This politically charged group smothered the discussion in regard to 
SANOC’s participation in the Olympic Games, giving the IOC no choice but to succumb 
to international and political pressure. However, according to Brundage, the reason 
for withdrawing the invitation to South Africa for the Olympic Games was to prevent 
a violent and dangerous atmosphere in Mexico City. 
It is reasonable to conclude, then, that this latter point dominated how Brundage 
and the IOC handled the South African situation during the period leading up to the 
1968 Mexico City Games. The Grenoble vote triggered an international controversy 
that made politics the overwhelming factor. However, it was protocol and procedure 
that masked the political undertones of the IOC’s decision-making. Protocol and 
structure allowed Brundage to call a special Executive Board session that was 
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responsible for issuing a postal vote, which overturned the Grenoble vote, resulting 
in the withdrawal of the invitation to South Africa to the Mexico City Games. The 
ultimate rationale to withdraw the invitation was creating a safe environment for a 
successful Games, not the political pressure to make an anti-apartheid stance. 
Nonetheless, though protocol and structure were a tool to succumb to international 
and political pressures, protocol and structure were not the main impetuses that led 
to SANOC’s suspension. 
Based on the correspondence from 1964 to 1968, Brundage’s and the IOC’s 
decisions were dominated by: (a) IOC rules and regulations, and (b) the influence of 
political and domestic issues. Focussing on these two points helps to understand why 
South Africa’s invitation for the 1968 Mexico City Games was withdrawn. Despite 
SANOC’s argument that it had overcome the charges of non-compliance with IOC 
rules, through the concessions wrung from the government, violations of Articles 1, 
24, and 25 of the Olympic Charter were unavoidable. Further, the controversy 
spawning from the Grenoble vote became a public image disaster. It ignited 
international attention and pressure that was too great for the IOC to handle. 
Domestic resistance support and international community perspectives were finally 
extremely influential factors in SANOC’s suspension. There were two catalyzing 
elements missing from the domestic resistance and international community 
correspondence leading up to the 1960 Rome Games and 1964 Tokyo Games, but that 
made their correspondence effective leading up to the 1968 Mexico City Games. First, 
the Grenoble vote allowing SANOC to enter a team in the Mexico City Games sparked 
an international controversy – people questioned how an apartheid laden South 
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Africa could be allowed to participate in the Olympics. Second, because of the 
international attention, IOC and NOC members felt pressure to overturn the Grenoble 
vote; this in itself provided more substance and support to domestic resistance and 
international community forces. 
The IOC’s decisions did result in South Africa’s invitation to be withdrawn, but 
Brundage’s publicly stated reason was to provide a safe environment for a successful 
Olympic Games. Even if the underlying reason for withdrawing SANOC’s invitation 
was political pressure, racial discrimination as an explicit reason for South Africa’s 
suspension was in the background. Due to the initial decision of the IOC from the 
Grenoble vote and the explanation given for the final result from the subsequent vote, 
do these points lend credence to identify here a case for structural racism? Supporting 
SANOC’s re-entry to the Olympic Games and not explicitly referencing racial 
discrimination as a reason to withdraw its invitation does raise some questions. For 
Brundage and some IOC members, it was a matter of how one interpreted the 
application of the Olympic Charter. However, regardless of whether one wished to 
limit applicability of IOC general principles to the Olympic Games only or sought to 
extend their applicability beyond the Olympics themselves, South African laws and 
policies were racially discriminatory and SANOC had to work within those laws and 
policies. The latter interpretation of IOC’s general principles made the decision to 
banish South Africa from the Olympic Movement easy. Abiding by the former 
interpretation of the general principles indeed amounted to structural racism. 
Although SANOC assured fielding a mixed team, whites and non-whites could not 
train together or compete against each other. Under those circumstances, in accepting 
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a mixed team, the IOC condoned discriminatory practices. Further, the Grenoble 
resolution that achieved an absolute majority and allowed SANOC to field a team in 
the Olympic Games, had two major deficiencies. First, the one condition retained from 
the Baden-Baden resolution—SANOC had to publicly dissociate itself from the South 
African government’s policy of non-competition and non-integration of whites and 
non-whites—strangely no longer was a concern in the Grenoble resolution. Second, 
the wording of the Grenoble resolution indicated that the IOC was aware of racial 
discrimination in South African sport and society. 
The organized efforts of those who opposed SANOC and the South African 
government were the largest and most effective of those during the three time periods 
examined in this dissertation. However, what did the withdrawal of the invitation for 
a second time mean for the South African sporting situation? Would the government 
relax its apartheid policies enough for SANOC to field a team in the next Olympic 
Games? Or would South Africa be uninvited again from the 1972 Munich Olympic 
Games? 
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Chapter Five: 
Summary and Conclusions 
1. South Africa, Brundage, and the IOC 
When Avery Brundage was sworn in as the International Olympic Committee (IOC) 
President in 1952, he did not know what the future held for him, the IOC, Olympic 
Games, or Olympic Movement. However, he did know how he wanted to portray 
Olympism and the Olympic Movement within the context of the IOC’s history. 
Regardless of what the future held, his vision of an amateur, non-political, and non-
commercial Olympic experience remained central to the decision-making of the IOC 
to foster success and growth of the Olympic Games and Olympic Movement. As leader 
of the IOC, Brundage had great responsibility as the face of the Olympic Movement, 
which also made him the target of those who challenged the IOC and what it 
represented. One such challenge was created by the South African situation. 
South Africa’s participation in the Olympic Games and Olympic Movement from 
1956 to 1970 was a heavily questioned issue because of its apartheid policies that 
enforced racial segregation. According to the archival correspondence, the challenge 
of racial discrimination in South Africa formally confronted the IOC for the first time 
in 1954. Initially, Brundage tried, unsuccessfully, to manage the South African 
situation by consulting directly with the South African National Olympic Committee 
(SANOC) through its Secretary General, Ira Emery. Largely from Emery’s viewpoint, 
Brundage began to familiarize himself with the South African governmental and 
sporting landscape, trusting SANOC would combat the racial discrimination issues 
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affecting South African Olympic sports as best it could in order to incorporate the non-
white community. 
With government policies becoming more restrictive, and the South African sport 
landscape for non-whites not improving, a domestic resistance movement slowly 
gained ground under the leadership of Dennis Brutus. The South African Sports 
Association (SASA), formed in 1958, grew out of this movement; it was founded to 
address the discrimination in South African sport. This served to increase concerns at 
the IOC about South Africa’s place in the IOC and Olympic Movement, in particular 
since SASA was able to reach out to the international community. Although SANOC 
and the IOC were able to channel the pressure from domestic resistance organizations 
and the interested international community leading up to the 1960 Rome Games, this 
was not the case for the 1964 Tokyo Games and 1968 Mexico City Games. 
Through the reconstruction of the correspondence surrounding the South African 
situation, it was evident that Brundage and the IOC had to negotiate with ‘three 
dominant voices’ after the 1956 Melbourne Games until the 1968 Mexico City Games: 
(1) South African Olympic affiliates; (2) domestic resistance; and, (3) international 
community. Within each time period between the  Olympic Games—1956 to 1960, 
1960 to 1964, and 1964 to 1968—the IOC received and transferred thousands of 
pages of material discussing South Africa’s place in the IOC, Olympic Games, and 
Olympic Movement. Each time period was dominated by one of the ‘three dominant 
voices’, but the stance of each voice was consistent over the 12-year period, even 
though the details of the South African situation from Games to Games were in flux. 
329 
 
 
By the 1960 Rome Games, the basic details of the South African sport climate under 
apartheid were in place, establishing the context for each voice. The South African 
Olympic affiliates, controlled by SANOC, acknowledged that there was a racial 
problem, but did little to challenge the status quo. Although help from the IOC was 
appreciated, SANOC wanted to remain in control so it could confine the matter to the 
domestic sphere. The South African domestic resistance, led by Dennis Brutus and 
SASA, desired an inclusive sport system where non-whites could compete 
internationally for South Africa. The domestic resistance sphere remained singularly 
dissatisfied with SANOC’s effort and called for urgent measures from the IOC. Voices 
from the international sporting community likewise constructed a narrative of 
disappointment, and consequently sought to pressure the IOC to take control by 
either resolving the racial discrimination issue or expel South Africa from the IOC, 
Olympic Games, and Olympic Movement. 
As the 1964 Tokyo Games approached, each voice continued to focus on a distinct 
narrative. SANOC argued that the racial discrimination in sport was diminishing as a 
result of its integration of non-white athletes and associations through affiliation with 
legitimate National Sports Federations (NSF). SANOC assumed that it had firm 
control, and that it had fulfilled both the promises made by Reginald Honey at the 
1960 Rome IOC General Session and the obligations under the 1963 Baden-Baden 
resolution. Domestic resistance forces thought the South African Olympic affiliates 
had failed to improve the non-white sporting experience. Racial discrimination in 
sport was still prevalent, perhaps even worsening. The affiliation terms offered to 
non-white associations were restrictive and unfair, and government policies 
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continued to discourage mixed sport. The international community continued to 
support the domestic resistance, realizing that discrimination in South African sport 
remained commonplace – SANOC was not abiding by its obligations to fully 
incorporate non-whites into the South African sporting structure. Both domestic 
resistance and the international community demanded the suspension of SANOC from 
the Olympic Games and would have preferred it if the IOC had gone one step further 
and expelled SANOC from the IOC and replace it  with a non-racial National Olympic 
Committee. 
By the 1968 Mexico City Games, the ‘three dominant voices’ represented two 
distinct sides of the South African situation: supportive of South Africa’s re-
admittance or supportive of South Africa’s banishment. Due to its suspension from 
the 1964 Tokyo Games, SANOC was determined to achieve re-admittance to the 
Olympic Games and Olympic Movement. It thought the unprecedented concessions by 
the government combined with the positive progress shown in the IOC’s South Africa 
Commission report would guarantee re-admittance to the Olympic Games. Those who 
opposed the discriminatory practices of SANOC and South Africa did not yield their 
argument to keep SANOC out of the Olympic Games. The opposition considered the 
concessions made by the government to accommodate non-white athletes to be minor 
and a diversion from the continued discriminatory practices in South African sport. 
The dominant domestic resistance entities from 1956 to 1964—SASA and the South 
African Non-Racial Open Committee (SAN-ROC)—weakened, but domestic resistance 
acquired a new source of support that maintained a contradictory stance with 
SANOC’s ongoing progress: the IOC and NOC members who felt pressured to overturn 
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the Grenoble vote. Much of the pressure came from a community of international 
activists and concerned citizens, who, for the first time during the South African 
situation, dominated the spotlight. Although correspondence from the international 
community supported both the domestic resistance and the IOC’s re-admittance of 
South Africa to the Mexico City Games, the contingent against South Africa’s re-entry 
was too strong, resulting in a withdrawal of the invitation to South Africa for the 1968 
Mexico City Games. 
During the entire 12-year period, Brundage and the IOC stood firm on three factors 
that shaped the responses to all ‘three dominant voices’ and affected the decisions 
leading to each Olympic Games. First, IOC responses consistently relied on Article 1 of 
the Olympic Charter, which forbade discrimination of any kind. Article 1 was the main 
pillar that influenced the decisions in regard to the South African situation. However, 
throughout the 12-year period, there were multiple interpretations of Article 1, 
which, in turn, affected the terms and conditions that SANOC had to abide by in order 
to be a participant in 1960, 1964, and 1968 Olympic Games’. Brundage believed that 
the Olympic Charter only applied to the Olympic Games and Olympic Movement. If a 
NOC followed the IOC rules and regulations when selecting a team to represent a 
country in the Olympic Games, then the NOC qualified to participate. According to 
Brundage, and other IOC members, a country’s domestic and political matters should 
not be a determining factor of a NOC’s admission into the IOC and to qualify for the 
Olympic Games. The other interpretation of Article 1, and the Olympic Charter, was 
that the rules and regulations were fundamental to the Olympic Movement and had 
an overarching application, that is, they applied both to the NOC and its home country. 
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Brundage’s interpretation separated NOC and country, while the latter interpretation 
considered the NOC and country as one entity. Although the IOC rules and regulations 
were invoked in all of the discussions regarding the South African situation, they were 
most influential in the decision-making for the withdrawal of South Africa’s 
invitations for the 1964 Tokyo Games and 1968 Mexico City Games. 
Second, Brundage firmly defended the protocol and structure of the IOC, defining 
an unrelentingly formal position to provide a rationale for the IOC’s actions and 
positions. An approved NOC is the official IOC representative of a country. A NOC 
approves NSFs (who are members of their respective International Sports 
Federations) that, in turn, recommend athletes to the NOC to represent the country in 
a particular sport. All athletes must belong to a NSF. The NOC makes the final decisions 
for the country’s Olympic team and submits the list of athletes to the IOC. The NOC 
manages all domestic issues and the selection of the Olympic team with the ideals of 
the Olympic Movement and the IOC’s rules and regulations in mind. Following the 
rules and regulations, which defines structure and protocol, guarantees a spot for a 
NOC in the IOC and at the Olympic Games. Each country also has one or more IOC 
representatives who represent the IOC in that country. Only NOCs and IOC members 
can communicate with the IOC, but only IOC members have voting power during the 
IOC General Sessions. Nonetheless, both the NOC and IOC members must follow IOC 
protocol. Any person or organization beyond the structure and protocol typically has 
no sway in IOC matters. The IOC structure and protocol were major factors in the 
decisions to include South Africa in the 1960 Rome Games and withdraw South 
Africa’s invitation in the 1964 Tokyo Games.  
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Third, for the IOC to involve itself in political and domestic issues of any country 
was anathema, especially for Brundage. Throughout the IOC’s existence, it had tried 
to remain politically neutral, allowing the Olympic Charter to guide the decisions 
pertaining to the Olympic Games and Olympic Movement. However, the traditional 
interpretation of the Olympic Charter, following Coubertin’s vision, had enforced a 
certain structure, that when followed, potentially caused undesired repercussions. In 
the case of the South African situation, the sole focus on the Charter as a guide to 
decision-making kept the focus on the Olympic Games exclusively, with South Africa’s 
political and domestic issues basically ignored. This strategy, pursued by Brundage 
and the IOC, implicitly left SANOC’s racially discriminatory actions and South Africa’s 
apartheid policies unchallenged, in effect contributing to the production of the kind of 
structural racism mentioned in the introduction of this study. 
It was not until the decision was made to withdraw South Africa’s invitation to the 
1968 Mexico City Games that politics significantly influenced the actions of the IOC, in 
particular through international pressure. The IOC was fully aware of the specific 
political and domestic issues in South Africa over the 12-year period, but these did 
not play a significant role in the IOC’s decisions to include South Africa in the 1960 
Rome Games and withdraw its invitation to the 1964 Tokyo Games. Politics certainly 
influenced the outcome for the 1968 Mexico City Games. 
To recapitulate, the reconstruction of the deliberations, disputes, opinions, and 
proclamations carried on by important actors within a network of exchanges centred 
on the IOC and its influential President Avery Brundage, revealed ‘three dominant 
voices’ that shaped the debate about the South African situation. Within that debate, 
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three factors emerged that guided the decision-making of the IOC. Identifying these 
three factors helped explain why Brundage and the IOC allowed South Africa to 
participate in the 1960 Rome Games, but withdrew the invitations to the 1964 Tokyo 
Games and 1968 Mexico City Games. Ultimately, SANOC did not fulfill the proposed 
terms, conditions, and obligations imposed by the IOC that were necessary to be 
included in the Tokyo and Mexico City Games’. As well, the IOC structure, and 
members within that structure, through their actions and resolutions during the 12-
year period involving the South African situation, contributed to the reproduction of 
elements of structural racism. 
2. Conclusions 
After the 1968 Mexico City Games, South Africa and SANOC never regained the 
trust of the IOC or public. The influence of IOC members who interpreted the Olympic 
Charter as fundamental to the Olympic Movement, applicable to all aspects of a NOC’s 
existence, grew. The ideal of no race discrimination in combination with domestic and 
international anti-apartheid forces, such as the African-Eastern bloc alliance, resulted 
in the final expulsion of SANOC and South Africa from the IOC and Olympic Movement 
in May 1970. It would take over 20 years for South Africa to rejoin the IOC and the 
Olympic Movement. 
The IOC’s experience with controversy in regard to the issue of racism and politics 
of race was not new. The 1904 St. Louis Olympic Games and 1936 Berlin Olympic 
Games serve as two examples of the IOC confronting racial discrimination before the 
South Africa situation, which is an example of the IOC’s tacit participation in 
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“institutionalized racism.”  Due to an interpretation of the Olympic Charter that 
allowed the IOC to ignore political and domestic issues, narrowly apply the rules and 
regulations to the Olympic Games and Olympic Movement, and trust NOCs to fully 
abide by the Olympic Charter, SANOC was permitted to field an Olympic team at the 
1960 Rome Games. With that permission, and the evidence of racial discrimination, 
the IOC implicitly sanctioned South Africa’s behaviour. In the event, but as a result of 
reasons other than specifically racial discrimination, SANOC’s invitations were 
withdrawn from the 1964 Tokyo and 1968 Mexico City Games, which saved the IOC 
from explicitly having to endorse racial discrimination in the Olympic Games and 
Olympic Movement. 
To date, the aforementioned observations based on a reconstruction of the 
deliberations, disputes, opinions, and proclamations found in the archival record, in 
reference to the South African situation, have not been delineated in the literature. 
Shane Quick focussed on the power shift from Brundage and the IOC to African and 
Third World representation.1  Although my findings do indicate the rise of influence 
of the African-Eastern bloc alliance in the anti-apartheid movement, especially when 
the IOC succumbed to political pressure, the African-Eastern bloc alliance was one 
part of a larger international anti-apartheid movement. Quick’s findings were based 
on the correspondence of Brundage and South African officials and did not have the 
breadth and number of perspectives provided by my examination of the relevant 
archival record. The voices of other IOC and NOC members as well as the international 
community in response to the Grenoble vote must not be overlooked as significantly 
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influences affecting the eventual expulsion of South Africa from the Olympic 
Movement. 
In Donald Macintosh, Hart Cantelon, and Lisa McDermott’s study, the IOC, under 
Brundage’s leadership, was identified as a transnational organization when dealing 
with South Africa in the Olympic Movement during the 1950s and 1960.2  As a 
transnational organization, the IOC’s mission was to spread Olympism through NOCs 
without exhibiting any interest in political ideologies. The IOC’s decisions were driven 
by its commitment to Olympism, explaining why the IOC was interested in SANOC 
abiding by the Olympic Charter. Macintosh, Cantelon, and McDermott use records 
from the Avery Brundage Collection to highlight the discussions between IOC officials 
and SANOC officials as evidence supporting IOC’s mission to spread Olympism. The 
authors claimed the interpretation of Olympism affected the treatment of SANOC that 
led to its inclusion in the 1960 Rome Games, withdrawal from the 1964 Tokyo Games 
and 1968 Mexico City Games, and its expulsion in 1970. Nonetheless, Macintosh, 
Cantelon, and McDermott were more interested in confirming the IOC as a 
transnational organization, not the minute details of how the change happened from 
one interpretation of Olympism to another that affected the decisions to include or 
exclude SANOC from the Olympic Games. My findings confirmed the IOC’s dedication 
to spreading Brundage’s form of Olympism throughout the world. However, within 
the 12-year time frame of this study, the withdrawal of South Africa’s invitation to the 
1964 Tokyo Games and 1968 Mexico City Games was not yet due to the change in 
Olympism’s interpretation, but due to the IOC rules and regulations, structure and 
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protocol, and political pressure within Brundage’s, and others’, traditional 
interpretation of Olympism modeled after Coubertin’s ideals. 
In a subsequent article, Cantelon and McDermott argued for a connection between 
the IOC’s decision-making and Coubertin’s idealist vision.3  Through Brundage’s and 
South African IOC member Reginald Honey’s correspondence, the authors wanted to 
detail how Coubertin’s idealist vision was ingrained in the IOC organization, which, in 
turn, influenced the decisions made when dealing with the South African situation. 
This study only provided a small example of one interpretation of the Olympic 
Movement. Brundage and Honey did share the same interpretation of the Olympic 
Movement, thus affecting how the Olympic Charter was understood and explained. 
However, other than Cantelon and McDermott providing some evidence of a certain 
interpretation of the Olympic Movement, my findings suggested that the effect of the 
relationship between Brundage and Honey on, and Honey’s actual influence in, the 
South African situation was infinitesimal. There were a number of more important 
relationships and influential correspondences affecting South Africa’s participation in 
the IOC, Olympic Games, and Olympic Movement. 
One such relationship was between Brundage and Kenyan IOC member Reginald 
Alexander. Maureen Smith focused on the correspondence between Brundage and 
Alexander in regard to the South African situation.4  According to Smith, Brundage 
and Alexander shared a similar interpretation of Olympism and application of the 
Olympic Charter, and both men wanted to find the right solution to help the non-white 
sportsmen in South Africa. Garnering Brundage’s trust, Alexander was appointed a 
member of the IOC South Africa Commission that examined the state of South African 
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sport, which resulted in a report that contributed to the absolute majority vote in 
Grenoble that readmitted SANOC into the Olympic Games. Smith’s article did provide 
some insight on Alexander’s role in the South African situation without the intricate 
details of Alexander’s correspondence with Brundage and IOC officials. Further, 
Smith’s examination focuses on Alexander’s contributions from 1960 to 1986, 
investigating the role of politics of sport. In Smith’s article, the coverage of the 12-year 
time period in my study was generally canvassed and acted as a summary of what 
occurred from 1960 to 1968. Again, due to Smith’s narrow and succinct treatment, the 
amount of detail and actual scope of my findings were not present in the article. 
This investigation revealed several specific aspects of this problem not dealt with 
in the current literature examining the South African situation from 1955 to 1968. No 
author has attempted to reconstruct the deliberations, disputes, opinions, and 
proclamations found in the archival records. A reconstruction of the material 
provided a detailed account of the key actors involved and the intricacies behind the 
decisions of the IOC in regard to South Africa’s participation in the IOC, Olympic 
Games, and Olympic Movement. Emerging from the reconstruction are two important 
discoveries. First, there are ‘three dominant voices’ of which the IOC had to consider 
and negotiate: South African affiliates, domestic resistance and the international 
community. Emerging from the discussion surrounding the South African situation 
were three factors that shaped the debate and final decisions of the IOC: (a) IOC rules 
and regulations; (b) IOC structure and protocol; and, (c) the IOC’s stance to remain 
inactive in political and domestic issues of any country. 
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The results of examining the South African situation from 1955-1968 yielded six 
general observations. First, the emergence of Ira Emery’s private correspondence 
from 1961 to 1968 provided a unique insight into the development of this period. 
After losing the 1961 election for the SANOC Secretary General position, Emery 
maintained close communication with Brundage. Emery’s correspondence may have 
served to shift Brundage’s thinking on the issue, since it provided an informative 
inside perspective on developments in South Africa that Brundage otherwise might 
not have had access to. Although Emery was not referred to specifically in the 
correspondence as affecting Brundage’s decision-making, both Brundage and Mayer 
referred to alternate sources of information when debating with SANOC 
representatives. There was no doubt that Emery was a major source of information 
that helped Brundage and the IOC deal with SANOC. The influence Emery had on 
Brundage’s decisions remained unclear, but Emery was an important actor that 
helped Brundage have a more complete sense of the South African sporting situation, 
which, in turn, assisted in the preparations for dealing with SANOC. Emery was a 
South African figure whose importance was not highlighted enough in the existing 
literature. 
Second, Dennis Brutus was certainly a political figure that increased awareness of 
the South African situation and maintained pressure on SANOC and the IOC to react 
to the racial discriminatory injustices in South African sport. However, in regard to 
affecting the decision-making of the IOC, according to the correspondence, he did not 
have much influence as an actor who received much attention as part of the larger 
group that imposed external pressure on the IOC. There was definite proof of his 
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advocacy for equal treatment of the non-white population in sport, but there was a 
lack of evidence for Brutus as a major influence in the decisions of the IOC. His 
reputation as an influential character in the existing literature was overstated.  
Third, the correspondence, actions, and decisions of the IOC continually confirmed 
Brundage’s interpretation of Olympism and the Olympic Movement, which indicated 
Brundage’s influence and the IOC members’ strong belief in Coubertin’s vision. 
Brundage believed the Olympic Games and Olympic Movement were separate from 
all other worldly things, and if a NOC could obey and conform to the ideals, rules, and 
regulations of the Olympic Charter within the Olympic structure, it could be part of the 
IOC family. The consistency of the IOC’s message was impeccable throughout the 
correspondence, however, this specific interpretation of the Olympic Movement and 
Olympic Charter did result in instances of “institutionalized racism.”  Allowing SANOC 
to participate implicitly supported the racial discrimination implied by SANOC’s 
organization and the political context of South Africa. 
Fourth, until the controversial 1968 Grenoble vote, not much credence was 
afforded to domestic resistance and international community debate. According to 
the popular interpretation of the Olympic Movement and application of the Olympic 
Charter, a NOC could have been allowed to submit an Olympic team if it accepted and 
abided by IOC rules and regulations. Based on that fact, it was difficult to expel a NOC 
from the IOC and Olympic Movement as well as deny it entry into an Olympic Games. 
Overturning this result could only be accomplished by changing the interpretation of 
the Olympic Charter by obtaining the support of the IOC member majority. The 
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interpretation of the Olympic Charter in the South African situation did change 
because of international political pressure. 
Fifth, although Brundage was IOC President, and was re-elected to serve as 
President until 1972, the IOC was morphing into a different version of the Olympic 
Movement and interpretation of the Olympic Charter. The composition of the IOC 
membership was dynamic because some of the more recently accepted members 
integrated into the organization wanted to use the Olympic Games as a political 
platform. These newer members gravitated toward the interpretation of the Olympic 
Charter as being fundamental to the Olympic Movement and image of the IOC. 
Lastly, the IOC was a group of individuals, not one person. Based on the 
correspondence, Brundage, as IOC President and the central player in the IOC, 
received much of the attention for the successes or failures of the IOC. Many observers 
were under the impression that Brundage had more control than he actually did in 
making decisions for the Olympic Games and Olympic Movement. As President, he 
could impress upon other IOC members the importance of one ideal or choice over 
another, but ultimately, each IOC member could raise relevant topics during a General 
Session and could vote for or against any resolution tabled by Brundage. Considering 
the tensions, and the opinions at variance with Brundage’s vision of the IOC, Olympic 
Games, and Olympic Movement, it speaks to Brundage’s resilience that he did serve 
another term as President after the 1968 Mexico City Games. This vote of confidence 
displayed the respect IOC members had for Brundage’s capabilities to steer the IOC 
through the difficult challenges of the South African situation. 
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Brundage’s leadership in regard to the South African situation, however, begs the 
question: did the IOC’s actions help to save the Olympic Games and Olympic 
Movement or were the IOC’s actions a disservice to non-whites in South Africa and 
internationally? As mentioned in an earlier section, Avery Brundage and the IOC’s 
position on Race and Sport, the South African situation was one issue Brundage and 
the IOC had to confront during the 1950s and 1960s. Brundage’s insistence on an 
amateur, non-commercial, and non-political Olympic Movement while maintaining 
Coubertin’s ideals helped create a strong organization that contributed to the success 
and existence of the Olympic Games and Olympic Movement. These values guided the 
decisions and, in turn, the actions of the IOC in regard to the South African situation. 
However, the strict interpretation of the tenets and ideals that made the IOC a strong 
organization to survive all the controversy, ultimately, did a disservice to non-whites 
in South Africa and internationally. Although Brundage, and the IOC, did not want to 
politicize the Olympic Movement, South Africa’s discriminatory laws and policies did 
not only violate Article 1 of the Olympic Charter, but these domestic affairs affected 
the selection of the South African Olympic team and the entire South African sport 
system. The racism undergirding sport in South Africa could not be prevented and 
Brundage and the IOC should have made an explicitly stand against apartheid much 
earlier than South Africa’s expulsion in 1970. 
3. Recommendations for Future Research 
Investigating additional archival resources beyond what was used in this 
dissertation is a step in the right direction to create an even clearer picture of the 
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viewpoints of all the actors and organizations involved in the South African situation 
from 1955 to 1968. Analysing the archives in South Africa, more specifically, the 
complete records of SANOC and, if existing, the records of SASA and SAN-ROC would 
add to the depth of this study. A newspaper content analysis of both domestic and 
international newspapers discussing the IOC, SANOC, domestic resistance, and the 
international community would provide a better sense of public sentiments and 
pressure. 
Projects beyond the precise focus of this dissertation include tracing and analysing 
the correspondence covering the South African situation within other ISFs. Perhaps 
various international sport organizations received correspondence from the same 
three ‘dominant voices’ that emerged in this study. Discovering what was said to other 
ISF officials, how certain ISF officials responded, and how the correspondence and 
international climate affected ISFs decision-making would develop excellent 
comparison material for this dissertation. 
Regardless of what future research reveals in regard to the South African situation 
from 1955 to 1968, the IOC’s decisions and actions that determined South Africa’s 
involvement in the Olympic Games and Olympic Movement remain unchanged. Due 
to pressure from the international climate, the IOC opposed apartheid by suspending 
South Africa from the 1964 Tokyo and 1968 Mexico City Olympic Games through IOC 
policy and procedure, which eventually led to South Africa’s expulsion from the IOC, 
Olympic Games, and Olympic Movement in 1970. 
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